• 6 minuti fa
La sconfitta dei repubblicani alle elezioni di metà mandato potrebbe spingere Donald Trump a una nuova escalation militare contro l'Iran. A sostenerlo, in un'intervista all'Adnkronos, è William F. Wechsler, responsabile dei programmi sul Medio Oriente dell'Atlantic Council, in Italia per i MED Dialogues di Napoli. L'esperto americano analizza i nuovi equilibri nel Golfo, la crescente autonomia strategica dell'Arabia Saudita, le scelte di Emirati, Qatar e Oman e il ruolo che Italia ed Europa possono giocare nella sicurezza regionale, tra forniture militari e corridoi commerciali alternativi allo Stretto di Hormuz.

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00:01So, let's start with the effect of the midterm elections on the Middle East, on U.S. policy
00:09towards Iran.
00:10Is it something going to change?
00:12Yeah, the midterms, of course, the midterms were a blue wave in the United States.
00:19President Trump and the Republicans lost at much greater numbers than they were expecting
00:24and much greater numbers that are typical for off-year elections in the United States.
00:32The president, the day of the election, came out and announced that he would be eliminating
00:39U.S. military aid financing to Israel starting at the end of the year.
00:46It's probably not going to happen, but it's interesting that he felt compelled to announce
00:50that at the beginning of the election day.
00:53And the day after the election day, the vice president wrote a long piece about why they
00:59lost, and at least two of them were involving Israel and the region, and probably three of
01:05the four things that he mentioned.
01:08So, they clearly believe that the Middle East had a disproportionate impact on our elections.
01:15Now, what does that mean for our policies?
01:18Well, there are some people abroad that think that with the Democrats coming in, that means
01:22that President Trump will be more constrained on the Middle East.
01:25Actually, it's the opposite.
01:27He will be constrained in the immediate timeframe, which he has been, because he needs to get
01:33his own house in order.
01:34He needs to get consensus within the White House.
01:36He needs to talk to people in the Republican Party.
01:38But that process is just about ending right now.
01:41The Democrats on Capitol Hill will have all the ability to stymie President Trump's domestic
01:48policy agenda.
01:50But they'll have the ability to make a lot of noise about his foreign policy agenda, but
01:56they won't be able to do an awful lot to stop that agenda.
02:00At the end of the day, the president of the United States is the commander-in-chief in our
02:04system.
02:05And the laws that exist on the books give a lot of power to the president to conduct foreign
02:11policy and to use military force.
02:13And President Trump is shown quite willing to do so.
02:17So the question is, as the days go by, the weeks go by, the months go by, the years go
02:22by, next two years, President Trump is not going to want to just sit there vetoing everything.
02:29He said that publicly.
02:30He will focus where his power is, which is on foreign policy.
02:34He is right now looking at the possibility of his greatest nightmare coming true, which
02:41is that he will go down in history as a loser and a loser of a policy of his own
02:48making.
02:48This is not COVID that came out of the blue.
02:51This is a decision that he made to go to war with Iran that thus far has not come out
02:57well
02:57and thus far has widespread disapproval in the United States.
03:01So the question is, how does he respond to that?
03:04He would love to have a deal of the kind that Iran would capitulate to his desires, especially
03:10on the nuclear portfolio.
03:12But that's highly unlikely for anyone that knows Iran.
03:17What's more likely is that Iran feels that it has accomplished something politically against
03:23Donald Trump, just like it accomplished something against Jimmy Carter, just like it did against
03:28Ronald Reagan, just like it did against George W. Bush.
03:31And it will continue to push on that end, that it will continue to escalate.
03:38We've already seen strikes just in the last number of days.
03:42And Donald Trump will conclude that perhaps the only way to not go down in history as a loser
03:48is to win the war.
03:50And if this is how he thinks, then we can imagine an escalation coming in the near time frame.
03:57While we're having this conversation, a third aircraft carrier strike group
04:03just got moved into the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
04:07This is a tremendous amount of naval assets.
04:09We haven't had this kind of naval assets in this area since before the war with Iraq in 2003.
04:18The United States only has three to four aircraft carrier strike groups that it can put anywhere
04:24in the world deployed at any given time.
04:26And we have basically all of those assets right there now.
04:28And these kinds of deployments bring with them a momentum of their own.
04:33So we'll see.
04:35So you've been to the Gulf and the Middle East recently.
04:40You're going to Naples today to the Met Dialogues.
04:43What is the sense that you're getting from both states, from Israel?
04:50Has the power shifted in the region right now?
04:55Is Iran now stronger than a year ago?
04:58And do you think that the security balance in the region is shifting and how it's shifting it is?
05:11You're right.
05:12Iran at the beginning of the year was actually in a very remarkably weak position.
05:18We actually, January 1st this year, had Iran in a fairly good place.
05:24And I give President Trump credit for his willingness to use force against the nuclear program last year.
05:30That was a good use of military force.
05:33Unfortunately, while the United States military has done a lot of damage on Iran,
05:38and while the continuing blockade is doing a lot of economic damage on Iran,
05:45Iran has also been able, shown that it's been able to project power and strike at will against its neighbors
05:52in the Gulf.
05:53And it's set a new normal of behavior that allows it to strike below the threshold of war.
06:03This is what's really, this is what's really amazing.
06:05It can strike at any one of its neighbors at any given time.
06:08It can strike at any shipping going through.
06:11All of that previously would have been a causus belli.
06:14Previously would have been something that the United States would go to war for.
06:18Now it's happening and we're not going to war.
06:20That is an advantage if you're in Tehran.
06:24And let's not forget, the people in Tehran who are making these decisions, they only have one objective.
06:30It's not the good, it's not the well-being of the Iranian people who they've killed by the tens of
06:36thousands.
06:37It is their own staying in power.
06:39And they're willing to accept a lot of damage as long as they can keep themselves in power.
06:45That's the new environment that everyone is seeing.
06:48So how are people responding to it?
06:50Well, one thing that we should all eliminate from our vocabulary going forward is talking about the Gulf as a
06:58unified whole.
06:59The Gulf is not a polity.
07:01The Gulf is barely a geographic explanation.
07:03It is a series of individual states.
07:07And at this point, those states, we're entering an age of agency.
07:12Each one of those states is an agent on its own.
07:15Each one is identifying their own national interests, their own strategies, and is going to execute this.
07:20There's going to be a lot less deference to each other in the future.
07:25It doesn't mean that they're enemies with their neighbors at all.
07:28But depending on the issue, by issue, depending on the circumstances involved, they will collaborate with some countries.
07:36And at the same time, they will be competitors with those very same countries on other issues.
07:42And some places, they will actually be in opposition to them on other issues.
07:48It's a much more complex region in the Gulf right now.
07:51And what you're seeing is different countries coming to different conclusions.
07:57If you're in the UAE, for instance, or in Bahrain, you generally believe that your experience during this time of
08:07hardship has concluded that you need to stay with the countries that provided material assistance to you at your time
08:16of need.
08:16And that's generally the United States, and that's generally Israel.
08:20Not only, but those are ones.
08:22If you're in Saudi Arabia, you're very worried about the unpredictability of the United States, about the unreliability of the
08:32United States.
08:33They are, of course, taking incoming weaponry not only from Iran to their east, but Iran's proxies to their north
08:45in Iraq, which they've taken military action against.
08:47And from Iran's partner to the south, the Houthis in Yemen, which has, from time to time, shut down the
08:53airport in Riyadh.
08:55And that they're heavily engaged in fighting an indirect and sometimes direct war against the Houthis right now.
09:02That's why the Saudis have decided to not put all of their eggs in the proverbial basket of the United
09:10States, but to look for other partners as well.
09:13And so that's where they get the Mecca joint defense agreement with Turkey and Pakistan.
09:19That's why they're going to Syria to see if Syria might be willing to send forces to help them.
09:25And that's why they continue to talk to Egypt about these issues as well.
09:29That's how Saudi Arabia is dealing with this.
09:33Then you have other countries like Qatar in the Gulf, which has decided after a period of strategic confusion after
09:41the war to re-up their position, double down on their position as an international mediator.
09:47And that's how they are going to deal with this kind of environment.
09:51And then you have Oman at the other end of the spectrum, which has decided to acquiesce to Iranian power,
10:01to say that Iran has this power.
10:03They have to work with them, and they've been the most willing to cut deals with Iran that would, in
10:13effect, toll in what had previously been well understood as an international waterway.
10:18Again, that's something that if you look at the Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary to Carter Doctrine, this has been
10:24something that has been well understood to be against U.S. interests for decades.
10:29And Oman and Iran are working towards that end.
10:34Final question.
10:36You are here in Rome right now.
10:38You're going to Naples.
10:39Do you see a role for Italy, for Europe?
10:42Do you see some form of effect that Europe could have on this issue?
10:51Or do you feel in your trips to the Middle East, to the Gulf, to Israel, that Europe is not
10:59part of the conversation?
11:02Italy and the rest of Europe are definitely part of the conversation.
11:07However, it must be said, it is less part of the conversation than they would like to be.
11:12And the fundamental reason is not because of a lack of good leadership or lack of good ideas, but because,
11:18in general, ever since the 1990s, the Europeans as a whole have sharply diminished their ability to project power militarily.
11:28And at the end of the day, there is very little diplomatic power without military power.
11:34That is something that, given Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Europe is now starting on the path to changing.
11:42And that is only good that it's going to do that.
11:45But it has many, many years to go to deal with the challenges in Ukraine, much less the challenges in
11:51there, near abroad, across the Mediterranean.
11:53Now, that was said, there's a lot that we do want Europeans to do in the region.
11:58First of all, is to be very clear about who is the bad actor in this region.
12:08Iran is a malign actor.
12:10You can agree or you can disagree with Donald Trump's decision to go to war.
12:13I've already said I think there is huge mistakes in what he did in February.
12:17But at the end of the day, there's no comparison between the malign activities that Iran has been promoting throughout
12:25the region ever since its revolution in 1979.
12:31And Europe needs to be very, very clear on that.
12:34The second thing that it can do is, for those who are arms exporters, like Italy, they can facilitate, accelerate
12:42the sales of weaponry to the Gulf.
12:46The Gulf states, while they have many differences, they all are looking to enhance their own military capabilities.
12:54The United States is probably their preferred partner, but we are incapable of meeting all of their needs.
13:00And Italy and the rest of Europe will have to meet some of those needs as well.
13:06It can also be heavily involved in the economic implications of this war.
13:12How do you build alternatives for Hormuz?
13:15How do you build ways that you can move over land?
13:21This is the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor and all of the other corridors that go across the region.
13:26These are on paper right now.
13:28They need to become reality.
13:30And since Europe would benefit the most from them, Europe should be really at the lead of pushing this and
13:36putting money behind that.
13:38Because while there are some countries, like Saudi Arabia, that can pay for their infrastructure,
13:42there are others, like Jordan and Syria, that will have challenges of doing so.
13:48That's where Europe can come in.

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