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Attacks on Saudi oil routes are raising costs and testing Gulf security. Experts explain why China cannot replace the US in the region.
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00:00Saudi Arabia has become the pivot point of the global economy.
00:03It has some of the biggest crude reserves in the world, but now it's struggling to get
00:07that oil out.
00:09War has choked its main shipping route.
00:11Its backup, a pipeline in the Red Sea, was hit by drones this month.
00:15America, its protector and ally for decades, declined to step in, so Riyadh has seemingly
00:20turned to China for help.
00:22Meanwhile, European buyers are told that they won't be getting any Saudi oil at all, compounding
00:27worries of an energy crunch.
00:30So who does Saudi Arabia trust to protect it now?
00:33And if Saudi can't keep itself safe, who pays the price?
00:37Welcome to The Dip, your podcast for money, power and consequences.
00:41I'm Daniel.
00:43So to get more on this topic, I have my team of experts here.
00:47We're joined by Kate Durian, who is a fellow at the Washington DC-based Arab Gulf States
00:52Institute and who's covered Gulf oil for four decades and is tracking where Saudi Arabia's
00:57crude can still get out.
00:58And Andrew Lieber, who's a political scientist at Tulane University in the US and has spent
01:03years researching inside Saudi Arabia how its rulers make decisions and what they expect
01:08from Washington and Beijing.
01:10Kate and Andrew, welcome to The Dip.
01:12And Kate, I'd like to start with you for the first question.
01:15You started out as a correspondent in Beirut.
01:18You've been all over the region and you've been tracking oil and energy there since the
01:241990s.
01:25Saudi Arabia is normally a fairly stable country.
01:29So when you saw that its pipeline in the Red Sea burning, what went through your mind?
01:37The pipeline itself didn't burn.
01:38It was the pumping stations.
01:40And the one that was severely damaged was the one closest to Jambo, which is the terminal
01:45on the Red Sea, which was really the only conduit when the Strait of Hormuz was effectively shut.
01:53But now we're seeing a shift again because now the Houthis are threatening shipping through
01:59the Babel Mandit, which is the southern exit from the Red Sea, which is the fastest route
02:03to Asia, which is the main market.
02:05So, I mean, they are squeezed on both sides.
02:08They have managed to increase car shipments from Rastanura on the Gulf Coast, but that's
02:16expensive and risky.
02:17Jambo was less risky and less expensive, but now that's been squeezed, so they have to go
02:23north through the Suez Canal.
02:24So it's like a pincer movement and they're caught in the middle.
02:27But did you find this shocking that this happened?
02:29Did it surprise you at all?
02:32Yes, I mean, we've seen attacks on Saudi infrastructure before.
02:37We saw the attack in 2009 on the Abqaiq gathering station, which is the largest in the world.
02:44But Aramco has a good record of repairing this kind of damage fairly quickly.
02:49This time, I think they had three pumping stations that were damaged.
02:52And I think what is surprising is the precision.
02:56These attacks supposedly came from Iraq, but they did travel a long distance because you're
03:03talking about a few miles from Yambo.
03:05So I think that's really the surprise.
03:07So they've got attacks from the South, from the Houthis in the South.
03:12They've got Iraq.
03:13They've got Iran on the East.
03:16So I think, you know, they're sort of facing attacks on three fronts, which is also quite
03:21unusual.
03:21And from what we see, the United States doesn't seem to be that keen on providing any assistance.
03:28Okay.
03:28And Andrew, Kate says it's surprising.
03:30When you first saw that, what went through your mind when the pumping station got hit?
03:35Yeah, I mean, for me, seeing the pumping station get hit and the East West pipeline hit as well
03:40was really a sense that the Saudi rulers must be concerned about this, given that the East
03:46West pipeline was really their major backup plan for the blockages and the blockade in
03:51the Strait of Hormuz.
03:52It's really allowed Saudi finances to remain fairly stable despite this conflict, given that
03:58the kingdom has up until now, been able to offload a significant amount of oil at pretty
04:03elevated global prices out through the Red Sea.
04:06But it was also really one-two punch in that you had the demonstrated ability of Iraqi militias
04:12to take that pipeline offline at the same time as Houthi forces have effectively taken
04:18over most of the Red Sea coastline and have at least stated that they will threaten any Saudi
04:24shipments that move through the Red Sea.
04:26So this greatly limits both the ability of Saudi Aramco to move oil from the oil fields in
04:33the eastern part of Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea in the West and also closes down options
04:39for Saudi Arabia to export oil beyond.
04:42Okay.
04:43So I think we've managed to get a kind of overview of the situation from here and how much of
04:47a
04:47surprise it was for everyone involved except obviously the attackers, though they will probably
04:53be happy as to how much of an impact this has had.
04:56And Kate, the pipeline that runs across the desert to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, as you
05:02mentioned, is Saudi Arabia's kind of escape route to avoid the Strait of Hormuz.
05:08It's now restarted, they say.
05:11This east-west pipeline has come back online fairly quickly.
05:15How much oil can it actually move right now?
05:18What is the state of things at the moment?
05:21I haven't actually seen it reopen.
05:24I mean, there was talk that it was about to reopen.
05:26I haven't actually seen confirmation.
05:27I may be wrong.
05:28But once it starts, the only route they can take is export through the Suez Canal.
05:35Now, tankers, large tankers via CCCs can't go through the Suez Canal, so they have to offload
05:41at Ein Sukhna and then reload again in the Mediterranean and then go all the way around the Cape to
05:46Asia,
05:47which is really the main market.
05:49So I think that's going to limit the volumes.
05:53I mean, they were exporting 4 million barrels a day through Yanbu.
05:58That's crude.
05:59And also supplying their refineries.
06:01They still have about 1.5 million barrels a day of refining capacity because one of the refineries has been
06:09hit by the Houthis,
06:12which was an export refinery in the south.
06:15So I think that's, you know, that's going to be—they might just export more from the—more products because, you know,
06:26they're higher value, the products.
06:28So they might export more products through Yanbu because these smaller tankers can actually go through the Suez Canal,
06:35which makes it a bit easier without having to offload and reload again, which adds the cost, which adds the
06:43time, and leads to congestion.
06:45Okay.
06:46And, you know, for the people who don't have the map in their mind, normally you think of the eastern
06:50side of Saudi Arabia.
06:52You have the Strait of Hormuz where oil can go out from Saudi but also from Iran as well and
06:57go to Asia and wherever else it needs to go.
06:59And that's obviously being blocked due to the war in Iran.
07:03They would then normally just say, okay, we'll resort to the Red Sea in order to export south.
07:08But now because of the conflict in Yemen, that southern route is now blocked and so they can only go
07:13north.
07:13But then it's a much longer way round.
07:15And also you mentioned oil products.
07:18Just very briefly, what do you mean by product?
07:20Because it's not just crude oil that's caught up in this.
07:23No, I think we're talking diesel.
07:26We're talking jet fuel.
07:27We're talking gasoline.
07:27I mean, if you look at one of the biggest refineries in the region is in Kuwait, the L0 refinery.
07:34And that was an export.
07:35It was exporting a lot of jet fuel to Europe, for example.
07:39And that's why we're seeing – and you've got a situation where Russia is not exporting any of these fuels,
07:47like diesel.
07:48So I think you're seeing diesel prices which are at records.
07:51In the States, they're up to $6 a gallon.
07:55In California, even higher, which is also a political liability for the Trump administration.
08:01So I think you look at the crude price.
08:04The crude price may be at $100, $103 at the moment.
08:07But diesel, you're talking $200.
08:09And, you know, if I look here in Italy, where I am, people are shocked at the prices of diesel.
08:14I heard that in the States, some of the gas stations, the filling stations, don't even dare put the price
08:21up because it's just so volatile and so frightening to consumers.
08:25And, of course, diesel is very important because it's not only a transport fuel.
08:30It feeds into other sectors, agriculture, you know, all your goods are going to be affected by the price and
08:38diesel prices.
08:40Absolutely.
08:40And, Andrew, I know it's a complex topic to fit into a small answer.
08:45But, you know, Saudi Arabia traced the drones that hit the pipeline, or rather the pumping station at least, to
08:50Iran-aligned groups in Iraq, while the Houthis in Yemen are pushing along the Red Sea coast.
08:57So, who are these groups and what do they want by attacking Saudi Arabia specifically?
09:05Yeah.
09:05So, in terms of Iraq, there are a number of militias that are aligned with Iran that have been sort
09:12of an important sort of source, of course, of power for the Iraqi state over the past decade.
09:18Like, some of these militias were integral to the fight against ISIS back in the early 2010s and have effectively
09:24been integrated into the Iraqi state.
09:26But still, a lot of these militias are not under central state control in Iraq.
09:31You know, whether they're acting, you know, probably not acting at the direct order of Iran, but still want to
09:38demonstrate an ability to take part in this conflict, whether as a way to, like, boost support from among their
09:45own supporters, garner greater support in the region, or just demonstrate that they are an actor that can't be ignored.
09:52Saudi Arabia has a much longer history with the Houthis in Yemen, or as they call themselves Ansar Allah.
09:57Saudi Arabia led an intervention back in 2015 to try and remove the Houthis from power after they effectively took
10:05over much of the country.
10:07That kicked off a long-running war that also saw the participation of the United Arab Emirates and other countries
10:14more or less ended in a stalemate and massive reputational damage for Saudi Arabia because of the humanitarian crisis it
10:23contributed to and had effectively settled into a stalemate backed up by a UN-organized ceasefire from 2022.
10:33The Houthis didn't take part in the earlier stages of the conflict when Iran was retaliating against US and Israeli
10:41attacks by striking Gulf states, but over the course of the summer has steadily expanded its coordination with Iran and
10:49its efforts to effectively break the stalemate in Yemen and force new facts on the ground on the UN-recognized
10:56government of Yemen.
10:57So they've seen what's happened with the Strait of Hormuz and the blockade that's going on there, and they've thought
11:03we can also do the same thing on the other side in the Red Sea.
11:07And, you know, what Iran has seen is that this obviously has had a ripple effect far beyond the region,
11:15and that is the leverage that Iran has.
11:19Is that what the Houthis are seeing as well?
11:21And that's the whole reason to attack is not just to harm Saudi Arabia specifically, that is a factor, but
11:29to basically take advantage of their leverage and cause that ripple effect worldwide.
11:35Yeah, no, I think that's exactly right.
11:36I think this is a situation where the Houthis have seen Iran's ability to garner both strategic relevance and, you
11:44know, potentially some concessions from very powerful actors by seizing strategic waterways.
11:49I think the Houthis are being very careful to try and message this so that they don't drag the United
11:56States in, if at all possible.
11:58Certainly, President Trump is very much wavering on a day-to-day basis as to what he does here.
12:03But I think the ultimate aim for the Houthis is to gain greater leverage against Saudi Arabia and effectively get
12:09some kind of economic concessions under the table.
12:12What we've seen from Saudi Arabia is that, you know, they're not willing to intervene militarily if the United States
12:18isn't going to take the lead, at least not yet.
12:20OK, and we'll get to that kind of power balance with the U.S. a little bit later.
12:25But certainly the ripple effect, Kate, has been evident.
12:29I mean, Aramco has reportedly told at least two European refiners, including Poland's Orlin, that they'll get no Saudi crude
12:37in October.
12:39Of course, that was before this reopening.
12:42But I imagine those delays do actually stack up, that there is a kind of shipment debt that accrues during
12:48that time.
12:48So what does this mean in practice for a refinery that was counting on that oil?
12:55Is this still going to be impactful on Europe, let's say?
13:02I don't think so much impact on Europe because, you know, they do have other options.
13:08They are getting, you know, there's U.S., there's African crude is going through.
13:14You've got Libya.
13:15You've got, well, Libya, there's an issue now.
13:17In fact, I was just checking on the Yambor.
13:19You said the pipeline is not open.
13:21I think they're testing it.
13:23The idea was to bypass some of these damage sections.
13:26So I think we're just getting a dribble.
13:28So it's not completely open yet, which is surprising because it's, you know, as I said, Aramco has a history
13:36of actually repairing damage relatively quickly.
13:38But I think, yes, you know, Europe is not such a big market.
13:43But I think we've seen, you know, Poland has been buying crude oil from other sources.
13:49I think the UAE was one.
13:51I have to double check who's actually buying.
13:53But yeah, they have cancelled.
13:55But Aramco, surprisingly, is also offering on the spot market.
13:59So there's been a change in the way that they're managing their trades.
14:05So there's things that they can do to try and balance it out in some ways.
14:09And then, of course, a lot will depend on whether these tests on the pumping station actually lead to the
14:14pipeline coming online, as they had hoped that it would as soon as possible.
14:18But then comes the question, Andrew, you know, a long pipeline in the desert, hard to defend and cheap to
14:26hit.
14:27What kind of power does that hand to armed groups?
14:30Can Saudi Arabia even do anything about it?
14:33Yes, it can do perhaps more to protect the certain critical aspects like the pumping stations.
14:38But it would probably be very difficult to protect the pipeline in its entirety.
14:45No, I think this is why we've seen the main response from Saudi Arabia thus far be to not escalate
14:50this, at least if the United States isn't going to get involved.
14:53I think there's a recognition in Riyadh that only some kind of political agreement will actually stop these attacks at
15:00their source.
15:00Because it does hand inordinate power to the attacker.
15:03You just have to take the pipeline off once.
15:06Just one drone has to get through.
15:07This has been signaled since the start of the conflict, even just the day after the ceasefire was signed between
15:15the United States and Iran.
15:16A drone hit the east-west pipeline, I think, in an indication, a reminder to Saudi Arabia that it would
15:22be very easy to pull off this kind of attack in the future.
15:26And Saudi Arabia's own past experience with Yemen speaks to this.
15:30So in terms of the Houthis, the Houthis prior to the UN-organized ceasefire had demonstrated an ability to cause
15:37damage inside Saudi Arabia with pretty crude drones and rockets.
15:40And it was ultimately only a political agreement that stopped those attacks occurring inside Saudi Arabia.
15:47Not anything Saudi Arabia was able to do with missile defense.
15:51Okay. And then what decides who gets the oil that's left?
15:56I mean, Kate, maybe you could start maybe from the, I don't know, is it the Aramco perspective?
16:00Is it the Saudi government perspective as to who gets what oil there is?
16:05Or is it just a bidding war?
16:07Is it who's going to pay the highest price?
16:10I mean, they do have term contracts.
16:11So, you know, these are the ones that they're really trying to meet.
16:15And I don't think Aramco, when it comes to marketing, I don't think the government interviews very much.
16:20So I think Aramco will just try to manage what it can with its term contracts.
16:27You know, these are very, very long term.
16:30So that's why they're taking the risk of shipping from the straightforward moves.
16:34But as I said, they also have stakes in refineries.
16:38The only problem is that they were able to manage meeting customer demand because they had so much storage abroad
16:45and along the Red Sea.
16:48They still have some storage, so they could have exported, but obviously they didn't because we saw a complete stoppage
16:56of exports from Yambor.
16:58So I think that's, you know, they haven't declared force majeure.
17:02So it is complicated trying to meet those commitments to your customers because they are, you know, contracts that are
17:09signed for a full year.
17:11China is a particular.
17:13But I think they're also being helped by the fact that Chinese imports are very, very much lower than they
17:18were before the conflict.
17:19They are creeping up.
17:20But that has been a big help as well.
17:23OK.
17:23And just digging into the U.S. aspect, because that's something that we've touched on already.
17:27I mean, for decades, the rough deal was essentially that Saudi kept oil flowing and that America kept the Gulf
17:34safe.
17:35And you said that the Gulf state's big failed bet was that the Trump administration cared more about making money
17:43than about a confrontation in Iran.
17:45How much of that old bargain is still standing?
17:48Because we've seen recently that the U.S. wasn't willing to ride to Saudi Arabia's support in this conflict.
17:58Where the Gulf states are now is that they're kind of caught in the middle on this.
18:02They still depend enough on security ties with the United States for missile defense, for other forms of national security,
18:10for merely supplying their militaries, that they're not about to suddenly turn on the United States or abandon the relationship
18:16anytime soon.
18:17But really, it's going back years that they've seen that the investment in the security relationship, it's very easy for
18:23them to pay into this relationship, buying weapons, investing in the United States, coordinating with the United States on national
18:29security goals.
18:30But it's very hard to get things back from the United States on this.
18:33So 2019, under President Trump's first term, we saw that the Abgeg oil refinery complex in Saudi Arabia was attacked
18:42and the United States pretty much shrugged.
18:44And throughout this war, we've seen many Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, like the UAE that spent 2025 investing both
18:54in the economic relationship with the United States and honestly, the economic interests of the president himself have found that
19:02it's actually very hard to leverage those investments to get the United States to get involved in a conflict or
19:08to even not get involved in a conflict.
19:13When doing so is more in the interest of the Gulf states than whatever President Trump wants.
19:16So they found that they don't have the leverage to get him to intervene in Yemen.
19:21They don't have the leverage to get him to actually sign a deal with Iran or to kind of leave
19:26the region.
19:26So they really remain trapped in this relationship.
19:29But it seems that previous administrations had essentially bet that we need to keep supporting Saudi and the Gulf states
19:36because otherwise they could go to China, essentially, and become China's best friend.
19:42How much is that a risk?
19:44You know, why would Riyadh maybe turn to Beijing, for example, to lean on Iran to rein in the Houthis
19:52rather than Washington?
19:53Because it seems that the U.S. hasn't been the stable partner, but is it really in the U.S.
19:58interests to not be a stable partner if China's on the other end?
20:03I think that's always been a bit of a boogeyman that, like, Saudi leaders have raised in Washington.
20:09This sense of like, oh, if you don't sell us these weapons, if you criticize our human rights record too
20:14much, we can always turn to China.
20:16Whereas when Saudi elites talk among themselves about foreign policy aims, there's a broad recognition that China has no appetite
20:23or even capacity to get involved militarily in the region.
20:26We do see outreach to China in a handful of areas.
20:30So when the United States won't sell particular technology to Saudi Arabia, like ballistic missiles, then Saudi Arabia will turn
20:37to China.
20:38When it's convenient to bring China into something to signal that they are distant, that Saudi Arabia is disting itself
20:44from the United States, as happened when Saudi Arabia normalized ties with Iran, then that's useful.
20:50Beyond that, it's kind of just, you know, out of desperation to try to turn to China in the hopes
20:55they can intervene somehow.
20:56So we've seen Saudi Arabia reach out to China to try and get Iran to somehow restrain the Houthis in
21:02Yemen.
21:03But China's approach to that is effectively to say, sure, we'll pass along some messages.
21:08We'll let people know this isn't great.
21:09But like, we're not going to, you know, we're not going to put much, you know, coercive leverage behind that.
21:15So I think there's a growing recognition in Saudi Arabia, or maybe there always was recognition that China's not going
21:20to be able to play the geopolitical role they've counted on the United States to play.
21:25Okay. And Kate, what's your opinion on that?
21:27I mean, do you have a counterpoint to that?
21:29Because the counterpoint one could bring up is that China buys the vast majority of Iran's seaborne oil.
21:35So that gives them some leverage there.
21:37It's also Saudi Arabia's biggest customer.
21:40So how much leverage does that give Beijing over Tehran, for example?
21:47I don't, I think they do have some leverage, but they've chosen not to use it.
21:53You know, what China's doing, China's investing a lot.
21:55So they, I think they do a lot of soft power.
21:58They are the biggest investor.
21:59They've overtaken the EU with their investments in the GCC countries in certain sectors.
22:05But I think as, you know, as we heard, they don't really have the military power.
22:11Okay. But Andrew, isn't it in China's interest to be active in the region, to be a counterpoint to the
22:18US, to secure oil supply?
22:23It's really kind of a paradox.
22:24I mean, you can go back like decades and the people in the policy community in the United States keep
22:29kind of making this case to Chinese officials.
22:32Like, it's definitely in your interest based on this chart of how much oil you consume.
22:35Sorry for my hand gestures here.
22:36But they never actually follow through on that.
22:41The view in China is that, so you're telling us that in the United States policy community, the Middle East
22:47is viewed as a strategic quagmire in which the United States has been pulled into conflict after conflict for no
22:52clear economic benefit, while mostly investing in a securitized relationship.
22:56While we, China, are able to enjoy a great economic relationship that's entirely in our interest, and we don't have
23:02to get involved in the security side, I think there's just really little appetite to get involved in the conflicts
23:09of the region.
23:10And it's much easier to just sit back and say, hey, if you all could sort this out, we're happy
23:14to buy any oil that comes out.
23:17That may change if we really hit a crisis situation that is directly impacting China's ability to just meet daily
23:26energy needs.
23:27But unless or until that happens, I don't expect them to get involved in the geopolitics of the region.
23:33Okay, I think that's such a good point from kind of the Chinese perspective of how they see this.
23:38I think that's really interesting.
23:40So, I kind of just want to wrap things up here.
23:43And with Kate, my kind of final question to you is that, I mean, you wrote in July already that
23:48there will be no return to the status quo after the Hormuz crisis.
23:54So, when this war eventually ends, how will the way Gulf oil reaches the world look different?
24:03It depends.
24:04I mean, at the moment, the oil that is getting out, and I mean, we are seeing about 12 million
24:10barrels compared to about 20 million before the conflict.
24:13And that's due to the fact that the US Navy is present and it's escorting and it's aiding those shipments
24:20to come through.
24:20I just wonder how long that presence can last.
24:24I mean, you cannot – it is still the fastest.
24:27Asia is the growth market.
24:29It is still the fastest route.
24:31All these countries, except for Saudi Arabia, which has the option, and the UAE, which has the option to –
24:37it doesn't mean that Fujairah has not been targeted for attack.
24:40It doesn't mean that Oman is not going to be targeted in the future.
24:44So, everybody is going to be looking at alternatives.
24:47I know Saudi Aramco is.
24:49They're looking at another pipeline, maybe going through Oman.
24:53And the UAE is already expanding its pipeline capacity to Fujairah, which will be ready by early 2027.
25:01But, you know, all the other options – Kuwait is stuck.
25:04We've just heard Qatar saying they don't have any pipeline plans because, you know, you can't get LNG into a
25:09pipeline.
25:10So, you know, unless Hormuz opens, you really, really cannot have these alternatives at work.
25:17They take a long time.
25:18So, I think that's why the GCC countries don't really want to escalate with Iran.
25:25They want to see a resolution.
25:26They don't want Iran to be in control.
25:28So, I think it's a bit of a conjury.
25:30But at the end of the day, everybody is going to be looking at a potential Hormuz bypass.
25:36It's going to take time.
25:37And in the meantime, you just have to accept that there is a situation that is – I mean, let's
25:45face it.
25:45Hormuz was open.
25:46There was always a threat.
25:48We always lived with the threat.
25:49I lived in Dubai for sort of 18 years on and off.
25:52We always thought about the possibility that Iran might cause mischief, not shut it down completely, which was a shock.
25:59When the attacks came by the U.S. and Israel, that gave them the reason to go and shut it
26:06down.
26:06So, yeah, I don't think we can go back to normal because Iran now has demands.
26:11So, I think we are going to be in a sort of no peace, no war, occasional attacks on tankers,
26:20shuttle services.
26:21But I don't think it can be something that can be sustained for a long period of time.
26:26Something has to give.
26:27Okay, so no return to normal.
26:30And, Andrew, just picking up on that, it's clear that Saudi Arabia, also the wider GCC countries, they're at this
26:38kind of pivot point of geoeconomics at the moment or crossroads, kind of symbolizing all of the major issues that
26:46are going on at that big macro level.
26:49You know, if you were to advise Mohammed bin Salman as to what to do in this situation and how
26:54to balance all of these extraordinary, difficult combinations and conflicts, what would you say?
27:01What is the way forward for Saudi Arabia?
27:05Oh, man, I would have a very different job in that case.
27:08But, yeah, no, I mean, I think that the advice against trying to find a military solution for this is
27:16sound.
27:16I think you see this circulating in some Saudi commentary that the way forward on the diplomatic front is very
27:22uncertain, very unsteady.
27:24But simply trying to, you know, launch attacks, launch airstrikes, and to hope this is going to change something.
27:31We've seen that again and again since the start of this conflict.
27:34And at no point has it produced the kind of decisive breakthrough that advocates suggested.
27:40So I would generally focus on, yeah, continuing to maintain diplomatic channels, continuing to try to encourage things back towards
27:49some kind of agreement.
27:51But also kind of, A, not assuming that the status quo will hold forever.
27:57I think there was a belief of, well, we've got a ceasefire with the Houthis.
28:01We don't need to either get a peace agreement or invest in the capacity of the government of Yemen.
28:08I think you can do both of those things.
28:10Both try to push for an actual diplomatic solution, but also invest in the unity and capacity of the government
28:18of Yemen as more than just a collection of different factions that are dependent on Riyadh.
28:23Okay, so I think we're agreed that while there is definitely room for things to be done, there could eventually
28:30be peace on the horizon.
28:31But that there is no going back to the way things were before, especially now that these new choke points
28:36have become so clear and so proven to be choke points that they'll become tempting to use in the future.
28:43Fascinating conversation, Kate and Andrew.
28:45Thank you very much for joining me today.
28:48That's it for this week on The Dip.
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