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00:05Tonight on NOVA, the race to build an atomic bomb didn't end with Hiroshima.
00:12In a desperate effort to catch up with the United States, Russia kidnapped German scientists, ordering them to help build
00:18a Soviet bomb.
00:21We felt that the American process, of course, was much better than our process.
00:27These scientists helped move the Soviet Union into the nuclear aid, Nazis and the Russian bomb.
00:47Funding for NOVA is provided by Lockheed, America's aerospace company, supporting math, science and engineering education for national technology leadership.
00:59And Johnson and Johnson, the signature recognized around the world for commitment to quality health care products for the entire
01:08family.
01:09Major funding for NOVA is provided by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and by the financial support of viewers like
01:16you.
02:10When October came, my sister came to visit me and it was that very day that the Russians came and
02:16picked me up.
02:17It was early, around 5 a.m.
02:20I can remember the time exactly.
02:22There were cars driving through the streets near us.
02:25We were a little out of the way.
02:32Yes, when the Russians came, rifle bots against the door, my brother opened up.
02:37They had an interpreter and she said, everybody to Russia.
02:41And then my brother said, but not my mother and sister, they're just visiting here.
02:46And then the interpreter said, everybody.
02:49And within two hours, we were all packed up for Russia.
02:59Not long after the close of World War Two, the Soviet Union rounded up an elite core of German scientists
03:07whose orders were to bring Russia into the atomic age.
03:10Many of these scientists careers had already been shaped by the rise of Adolf Hitler.
03:29Germany, 1933.
03:31Under Hitler, the country was becoming the dominant power in Central Europe.
03:35The Nazi rearmament brought industrial growth and an emphasis on engineering skills.
03:42Many Germans hoped for an end to unemployment and the future to look forward to.
04:16the Nazi icy
04:17RAWS
04:17The Nazi
04:21Germany was also a center of research into the new science of atomic physics.
04:26Professor Nikolaus Riehl was a student at the time.
04:35Then I went to the university in Berlin.
04:38I took my doctorate with Lisa Meitner and Otto Hahn.
04:42That was how I became involved in radioactivity.
04:46Professor Manfred von Ardenne also carried out his research into electromagnetic radiation in Berlin.
04:53Before the Second World War, I had my institute in Lichterfelder in Berlin, now West Berlin.
05:04And very near was Dahlem, the institute of Otto Hahn.
05:12Otto Hahn was a Nobel Prize winner, who, with Lisa Meitner, studied the behavior of radioactive elements.
05:20In 1938, Meitner had to flee Germany as Hitler occupied Austria, and on Kristallnacht, the night of broken glass, declared
05:29all-out war on the Jews.
05:34I remember the famous Kristallnacht.
05:40A first-floor window fell right in front of me on my way to school.
05:43So I turned to these people and said to the brown shirts who were standing there,
05:47You can't do this.
05:49A civilian grabbed me and said, Keep your mouth shut, shrimp.
05:52I got to school and half the class was missing.
05:55I can't claim today that I saw nothing and knew nothing.
05:59The Kristallnacht took place all over Germany.
06:01You must admit it now.
06:06As war in Europe became almost certain, so too did the results of Hahn's work on the atom.
06:12In the last months of 1938 in Berlin, he announced the discovery of the splitting of the uranium atom.
06:19Few at the time understood how much the world would be changed by these events.
06:33After Hahn's discovery of the splitting of uranium, it was natural for me to enter this field.
06:39One's thoughts were about the so-called uranium machine, which would create a huge amount of energy and so on.
06:46That fascinated me.
06:56Not long after Germany invaded Poland in 1939, the German War Office set up a nuclear physics research center in
07:04Berlin
07:05with Professor Werner Heisenberg and Otto Hahn leading it.
07:12Dr. Riel and Dr. Gunther Wirz were given a government contract to produce uranium.
07:19You know that just before the war, everybody realized in the scientific world that an atomic bomb should be possible,
07:27theoretically.
07:29And there was some estimate in Germany from the side of German scientists, us from the government,
07:34that they believed that it could take a time of 20 years to achieve this,
07:39that one has to develop a brand new technology which was not available at that time.
07:45The future development of the German atomic bomb was decided in the Harnack House in 1942.
07:52At a secret meeting held between Hahn and Heisenberg, Field Marshal Erhard Milch,
07:57and Armaments Minister Albert Speer, Heisenberg raised the possibility of a nuclear bomb.
08:02How big would such a bomb be, asked the Field Marshal.
08:05About the size of a pineapple, said Heisenberg.
08:08But he quickly added that it would take several years to develop such a weapon.
08:13Marshall Milch left the meeting very unimpressed.
08:16And shortly afterwards, authorized production of the V-1 and V-2 rockets.
08:22Speer, however, did decide to spend some money on building a nuclear reactor.
08:29Well, but to start to do something on the second order, which was not a priority, of course,
08:37was to make pure uranium metal for so-called critical assembly.
08:44In the buildings of the Max Planck Institute, the German scientists proceeded with their work.
08:49In a custom-built cellar protected by walls 10 feet thick,
08:53they attempted to assemble a nuclear reactor using uranium blocks produced by Professor Reel.
08:58We have known that there should be this critical assembly,
09:03and that was the one, the uranium as a metal,
09:07and then you need a moderator,
09:09and the Germans had failed to find out that graphite is a useful,
09:15pure graphite is a useful moderator,
09:17and so they had to use heavy water.
09:21So the first critical assembly was on the base of heavy water and this metal.
09:27And the results were, as far as I know, were not very interesting.
09:33It was all went with low priority.
09:36And last not least,
09:46Hitler and his advisors' interest in the whole of nuclear technology and uranium reactors
09:52and also in the uranium bomb wasn't especially great.
09:58That was too abstract.
10:00For them, it was Jewish physics.
10:06The low priority, you see,
10:08one has to concentrate in wartime,
10:10one has to concentrate on the things which you can use very soon.
10:13So the V1, the V2,
10:16there were the German concentrates.
10:18Then we had developed, as you know,
10:20the jet-driven planes.
10:23So there were the centers of German efforts during the war.
10:27But not this year.
10:29It was just enough to protect us from serving in the army.
10:38As Berlin was hit by more and more air raids,
10:41the German atomic research program became non-existent.
10:44Professor Riel and Dr. Wirtz abandoned their work
10:48and fled to the outskirts of the city.
10:51In May 1945,
10:53the Soviet army launched its final attack on Berlin.
10:57German fortunes had been totally reversed,
11:00and the capital of Hitler's Third Reich
11:02became a slaughterhouse.
11:14Peter,
11:15A.
11:18A.
11:21A.
11:24A.
11:25A.
11:27A.
11:29A.
11:36A.
11:37A.
11:46THE END
12:20During the last days of the war, the whole war was terrible.
12:25The last days were even more so.
12:27We all felt in a kind of end-of-the-world mood.
12:31I lost the continuity of my scientific work.
12:35And I lost my flat.
12:36In fact, I'd lost my home, Berlin.
12:40It had been a fascinating city once.
12:43But under Hitler, it got worse and worse.
12:46It used to be a center of science and technology and of culture.
12:51A highly interesting city.
12:53But all this was lost.
13:03The armies of the Soviet Union invaded all of Berlin and the surrounding countryside.
13:09The Soviet Union dominated Central Europe, and Germany as a state had almost ceased to exist.
13:15By May 9th, Germany surrendered.
13:18And within days, a team of Soviet scientists were sent to locate the whereabouts of the German atomic experts.
13:25They found Professor von Ardena and his undamaged institute.
13:28When the Soviet scientists in May 1945 saw these working equipments,
13:43they saw there were elements also for important, for the resolution of important nuclear problems.
13:55Professor Riel and Dr. Wirtz were in a village outside Berlin, but the Soviets found them too.
14:09Then the Russians came.
14:11They found me right away.
14:13It wasn't difficult for them to find me.
14:16Two colonels of the NKVD, the secret police, came round and picked me up.
14:22It wasn't an arrest.
14:23It was called detaining someone for questioning.
14:27From that moment on, I was never again without a guard.
14:32I was never independent again.
14:35I was separated from my family.
14:46And then on June 9th, we were taken to the Soviet Union by plane.
14:51We were driven to NKVD headquarters and requested to go and see Beria, the head of the secret police, in
15:00his office.
15:02That's when I met Hertz again and von Ardena.
15:08I met Beria and the big table and before me was Zimovic and Kodratov and the other leading nuclear scientists
15:21of the Soviet Union.
15:26Soviet circles were primarily interested in the atom bomb, or atomic energy.
15:33And they apparently already knew more in this field than we knew in Germany.
15:40Professor Riel's impressions were correct.
15:42The Soviet scientists that he met with Lavrenty Beria in Moscow had already started a bomb project.
15:50The Soviet Union had an active atomic research community in the 1930s based in Leningrad.
15:57Headed by Abram Yafi, a highly regarded physicist, the institute had built a cyclotron for the study of atomic particles
16:05in 1937.
16:06Leningrad attracted many young scientists, of whom Igor Kurchatov was the most outstanding.
16:13By 1940, Kurchatov and his associates were already investigating the implications of Otto Hahn's discovery in Germany.
16:20And at a seminar that year, physicist Yorgi Fiorov presented a paper on the possibility of achieving a nuclear explosion
16:29from uranium fission.
16:34At the time, before the war, we were basically thinking of nuclear power stations.
16:38But we nevertheless felt that beside providing electric power, this phenomenon could at some time provide unique explosive force.
16:54The Soviet Union is a very important thing.
17:24The German invasion in 1941 brought an end to any atomic research.
17:29The announcement of war by Molotov signaled the start of the mass evacuation of Leningrad
17:35and Moscow.
17:36Scientists were drafted to work on rebuilding the Soviet forces and Kurchatov began work
17:41on tank armor.
17:56Yet Fiorov continued to lobby Stalin.
18:07About this time we captured a German pilot, a fascist flyer, who said, so what, you shot
18:14me down, but you will die just the same.
18:16We'll destroy you.
18:18We hold something in reserve, something horrible, which you know nothing about.
18:26I realized that if they had really succeeded in making a bomb, they would not hesitate a
18:32moment before using it.
18:34So I wrote to Stalin about it.
18:36I wrote a letter explaining what needed to be done, outlining as if in a fantasy the design
18:43of a possible atomic bomb.
18:51Soviet spies in Germany and Britain confirmed Fiorov's fears and in 1942 the State Defense
18:57Committee, headed by Stalin, set up a team to investigate building an atomic bomb.
19:02Kurchatov was appointed as its head.
19:05Kurchatov was a very present man.
19:08I think he was the leading nuclear scientist in the Soviet Union in that time.
19:15He was the first man also in the technical Soviets who organized the development of the atomic bomb.
19:33The Russians were, the Russian physicists are, of course, first class.
19:37No question about that.
19:39All the things they knew, but Kurchatov also had a very, very good impression.
19:48He was really a good, a great man, an important man.
19:52By the time Stalin met Truman and Churchill at Potsdam in July 1945, Kurchatov's team had
19:58been working on a bomb project for over two years.
20:01Stalin knew from his spies that his allies, the US and Britain, had been secretly developing
20:06an atomic bomb since 1940.
20:09But it wasn't until Potsdam that Truman hinted to Stalin that the United States now had a bomb,
20:14calling it a new weapon of unusual destructive force.
20:37After the United States dropped the atomic bomb, Wirtz was summoned to Moscow from Siberia, where
20:43he had been scouting a site for a uranium plant.
20:47The dropping of the bomb had changed the situation, of course, basically.
20:52So we came back and at that time they had already decided to reinstall the small plant nearer
20:59to Moscow in a small town called Elektrostal.
21:05It was really a shock for all the Germans, because we felt that now that was not a thing
21:12just to begin with, because it was clear that at that time for everybody it was clear that
21:17already the superpowers were more or less in competition, and that the Americans with the
21:23bomb had, of course, a very strong weapon in their hands, and that the Russians need,
21:29because it was priority number one for the Russians now to have the bomb.
21:35The decision to pursue the bomb was made at great cost to the Soviet people.
21:41The German invasion and the subsequent defeat of Nazi Germany left the Soviet Union with millions
21:46millions of dead, and massive destruction of their factories and farms.
21:51The United States' effort to build the bomb had involved $2 billion in 1945, and the resources
21:59of over 100,000 people.
22:01To the smashed economy of the Soviet Union, the race to catch up represented an almost inhuman
22:08struggle.
22:09But in the minds of the Soviet rulers, there was no question but to proceed with the development
22:15of the bomb.
22:22To begin with, there was absolutely unavoidable to have this uranium metal that was the number
22:29one on the route to plutonium.
22:38The main task in hand was the production of uranium, in a form that would be suitable for use in
22:45an atomic reactor.
22:46This was one problem that we had already almost solved in Germany.
22:56Kurchatov was the scientific head of the bomb project, but in overall charge was Marshal Beria,
23:02head of the secret police and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
23:06His absolute power was critical in coordinating all the necessary resources.
23:11He and his deputy, Avrami Zavanyagin, were directly responsible for the execution of the bomb project.
23:18You know that all the secret policy was under Beria, all that what is called from Solzhenitsyn
23:25the Gulag was under him, and all people were afraid of this organization.
23:33Zavanyagin was a very clever and a very likable man, but he was also lieutenant general of
23:39the NKVD.
23:40He was a very energetic man, he had to be.
23:43Those around him were scared of him, but even Zavanyagin was afraid of Beria.
23:48He came once to our plant, and that was prepared, since weeks was prepared, and that was an
23:59impression unbelievable, we said Beria, because that, that assistant minister, Zavanyagin,
24:08that was something what we in Germany called, this is a Herr, this is a gentleman.
24:12He came up, he was a man, very capable man, but when Beria was present, he had only spoken
24:19with him like this.
24:20It was for us Germans, it was just unbelievable how they were afraid of Beria, which was a
24:27very unpleasant man, but let's shake hands with Beria.
24:34Beria put great pressure on the scientists to build the Soviets a bomb, feeding them information
24:39his spies stole from the U.S. program.
24:43I should explain this, that I told you that our technology was very unsatisfactory.
24:50And that changed rather soon, because the Russians could get the report from the Manhattan Project,
24:59which was either secret or confidential, I don't know it.
25:03At least, I got also this report from the Manhattan Project, in which the Americans surely
25:10had described their processes, how they made the nuclear pure uranium.
25:15And that was quite different from ours, and we felt that the American process, of course,
25:21was much better than our process.
25:24And so, there was a decision to go ahead along the American line.
25:29So, we went along this line, we installed a new purification plant, and later on, the
25:36method making the metal was also modified.
25:39So that after some time, we got really pure, good metal, with the help of the Americans.
25:48Some of the help the Soviets received came from inside the Manhattan Project itself, from
25:54the physicist Klaus Fuchs, who gave them top secret information.
26:05Fourteen months after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, the Soviet Union made a critical
26:10advance, which the scientific and engineering skills of Nazi Germany had failed to achieve.
26:16Using the uranium, Professor Reel and Dr. Wirtz helped to produce.
26:20The first reactor in Europe became active in December 1946.
26:25But for the Soviet bomb project, there was still a long way to go.
26:47After the Soviets' occupation of Germany in 1945, they paid some of the rocket engineers, who
26:54hadn't fled to the US, to continue their work on the V2 rocket at a plant which they had
26:59taken over in Germany.
27:00One of these scientists was Dr. Kurt Magnus.
27:05In Bleicherode, we had several people who were from a group of rocket experts, Panamunda.
27:13This group worked on the outline and specifications of the A4 rocket.
27:18This was the former V2 rocket.
27:24In October 1946, shortly before the first atomic reactor in the Soviet Union started working,
27:31a Soviet delegation came to see the rocket plant in Germany.
27:34The delegation, led by General Gaidukov, had plans for the German rocket experts.
27:44General Gaidukov was present and listened to all the proceedings.
27:51Then he said with a large gesture,
27:54Well, you've been very industrious.
27:56And because you've been so industrious, I'd like to invite you to a dinner tonight.
28:03A huge table had been set up in a big hall there.
28:06The whole thing was lit in a festive manner.
28:09And we were offered a meal the likes of which we, at the time, remember it was autumn 1946,
28:16and there was nothing to eat in Germany.
28:19It was a meal the likes of which we'd never seen before.
28:26Fruit in absolute abundance, which was unheard of at the time.
28:30And of course, vodka, vodka, vodka.
28:34Nothing else.
28:36Only when the party was over, shortly before midnight,
28:40were we, each of us, individually taken home in a car by Soviet officers.
28:46And three hours later, they got us out of our beds.
28:54Mrs. Grotrup's husband, one-time deputy to Werner von Braun, was the engineer in charge.
29:04My husband went to celebrate with a big group, and with the Russians.
29:09Celebrations were always a big thing.
29:11I went to sleep, and around 3 a.m. I was wakened by the telephone.
29:15Someone, I can't remember who, said,
29:17The Russians are at the front door. We're going to be taken away.
29:22And I thought it was a joke.
29:23Chris, has kept into that front door.
29:31I was a pretending to an
29:53We had some real adventures during the course of that journey, some wild stories.
29:59It seemed like, well, a bit like going west, only we were going east.
30:05We went off in a terrible rush that night.
30:08It all seemed chaotic to us, but the train left with all of us aboard.
30:19If I remember rightly, there were on that train about a hundred people, including families and children.
30:41We got on the train that we weren't expected and weren't on any list, but my mother and I were
30:46immediately looked after.
30:48That's how organized it was.
30:50So organized was this.
31:40The point was to get us all to Russia as fast as possible.
31:44They stuck to that idea, but for us, it was terrible.
31:48They had to get us there.
31:50They couldn't care how.
31:53That was it.
31:54End of story.
31:59Three days into the journey, we were told we were going to Moscow.
32:04Then we drove into Moscow, and I found it incredibly shocking.
32:09I had never seen so much poverty in my life.
32:12I'd come from a destroyed Germany, and for the first time I could comprehend what this war had done.
32:18The houses hadn't been destroyed, but they were small and no longer properly habitable.
32:24And the people, it was shocking.
32:27The houses hadn't been destroyed.
32:28It was terrifying.
32:32It was terrifying.
32:33It was terrifying.
32:58They had so many of their own problems, what with their famine, that they didn't talk about the war at
33:04all.
33:04Here and there we heard, the Americans have the atom bomb and we have nothing.
33:08So, Grotrup, at least build us some rockets. We have nothing. They can destroy us.
33:13That was the main thing.
33:17The German rocket engineers were probably the most experienced in the world at that time.
33:22The leading Soviet rocket expert was Sergei Korolyov, who had actively pioneered the science in the 1930s and had carried
33:31out many experiments with small rockets.
33:33But in 1937, Korolyov was jailed by the KGB for espionage, and by the time of his rehabilitation, Soviet rocketry
33:42was primitive compared to the V-2.
33:45Korolyov was placed in joint charge of the rocket program with Dr. Grotrup.
33:53Korolyov and my husband were originally colleagues of the same rank.
33:59Both were chief construction engineers, so they could cooperate in running the German and Russian teams.
34:06Just a short time ago, the German scientists had been working for Nazi Germany.
34:12Now, in the Soviet Union, they had little freedom.
34:15But compared to the Soviet people, they were treated very well.
34:27After all, we were in good shape.
34:30We were all well taken care of.
34:33We were given much better food than the others, than the Russian population.
34:39Sometimes it was quite uncomfortable.
34:40All around us, people had to live very modestly, especially after the war.
34:47And we had everything.
34:49Sometimes that was rather embarrassing.
34:59I received about 800 rubles a month.
35:02Russian female colleagues in the same position earned 400 rubles.
35:06So, as you can imagine, living alone, I could manage quite well on that.
35:11And my fiancée sent me flour and pudding from Brunswick.
35:15So, we'd have pudding, and we'd do some baking.
35:20There were things they weren't familiar with.
35:22And I must admit, it was quite pleasant.
35:34Two people would have one room and a living room.
35:38To the Russians, those were fantastic living conditions.
35:41There were eight or nine to a room.
35:43I realized that later, through a friend who showed me around Moscow.
35:48He didn't just take me to the cushy side.
35:51He also showed me the Arbat, the back streets.
35:54I really found that more fascinating than the things I usually saw,
35:59like Gorky Street in the Bolshoi Theater.
36:07Yet, however privileged the German scientists were,
36:11there was a price to pay.
36:13The Soviet Union had no atomic weapon
36:16and no effective way of delivering one.
36:19The Germans were there to help remedy this.
36:22And they were expected to deliver the goods.
36:33Our first task in the Soviet Union we worked on in the rocket field
36:37was the reconstruction of the A-4 rocket.
36:42That was a job which didn't really entail anything more
36:45than putting together all the contemporary knowledge and findings
36:49about the construction as well as the experiments
36:52concerning the A-4 rocket.
36:56The Russians had found several fairly complete rockets
36:59at the Middle Works factory.
37:01They brought them to the Soviet Union
37:03and had got them ready to launch.
37:08We had to do some preparatory work for that.
37:10And we had to do some work for that.
37:36And we had to do some work for that.
37:39We were very worried that they'd been abducted again.
37:43But it soon transpired that they'd been taken to this rocket testing site.
37:52In an area of bare desert,
37:54the Soviet Union had set up a rocket-firing range
37:56at Kapustinyar, near Kazakhstan.
38:00Kazakh steppe, clay huts, camels, people in their huts.
38:09It was in such contrast to the most modern facility imaginable in the world.
38:14Even the Americans didn't have it.
38:15That contrast was almost impossible to live with.
38:21Koroliov had arrived at the site
38:22and the first launch of an A-4 was prepared.
38:25The date was set for September 29th, 1947.
38:34One leg shifted a few millimeters,
38:36but they wanted to go ahead with the launch.
38:39They had a deadline from Moscow.
38:41You will launch it on such a date.
38:43They had to, no matter what,
38:44or else it was sabotage.
38:48And so they used train sleepers
38:50and a winch to raise the whole thing up.
39:00For the first time in my life I saw a rocket self-ignite.
39:04Not just that.
39:05I was partly responsible for the third rocket being tested.
39:09I had to make sure it worked
39:11because the first two rockets hadn't reached their destinations.
39:15It was an interesting experience
39:17because I also got to know
39:19the chief Soviet rocket designer Koroliov.
39:27I got to know him pretty well.
39:29He was sometimes called the Wernher von Braun of the Russians.
39:33We worked very closely with him during that time.
39:36He was responsible for that rocket launch on the Kazakh steppe.
39:40It was vital that nothing should go wrong.
39:44So he looked after us most diligently.
39:57The series of rocket tests was successful.
40:05After that launch, they were so happy and enthusiastic.
40:08They jumped up and down like little children.
40:11High-ranking ministers or not,
40:13they were just like little children.
40:15Then they grabbed their vodka bottles and got drunk.
40:20But far from Kazakhstan,
40:21the atomic bomb program was still causing
40:24the Soviets considerable anxiety.
40:26It was about 1947
40:29that the assistant minister came up to our plant.
40:32He took me aside and said,
40:35well, we have now got a piece of American uranium metal
40:40and we have analyzed it.
40:42What do you think, he asked me?
40:44What metal is pure?
40:46American or ours.
40:47I said, without hesitating,
40:49yours is pure.
40:51He said, yes, it's true.
40:52And we are very proud of it.
40:54And they said, it's no use to be proud of it
40:57because the Americans make it just as pure as necessary
41:01and you do by far more.
41:04And that makes it very expensive.
41:06And he said, you damn germs.
41:10The problem for Kuchatov and his team
41:13was to make the vital leap from the lab bench
41:16to industrial production.
41:18I think that the conditions were very difficult, of course.
41:23But the power of the government was strong enough
41:26to start very quick the conditions for bringing up
41:33big industrial buildings and so on
41:38for doing the development of the industrial isotope separation.
41:44They had very good co-workers and so, and good conditions
41:52according to the technical Soviet methods.
41:57And so, the work was, could be done very quick.
42:03Tempo was the most important question in that field in that time.
42:10Soviet resolved to catch up with the United States
42:13now on a Cold War footing
42:15deepened when they realized that U.S. scientists
42:17were continuing to build bombs.
42:26Never has such high-pressure work been done at such speed.
42:30This is because we knew they were making bombs,
42:33and each month brought more and more bombs.
42:35They were accumulating.
42:37We knew from air analysis how many bombs there were.
42:44As it was wartime, people were fighting,
42:46but they enabled us to work here behind the lines.
42:50We worked hard, we were hungry,
42:53but we weren't fighting.
42:56But after the war,
42:57we realized that the construction of our giant reactors,
43:01institutes and testing sites
43:03had deprived a great many people of food and housing,
43:06and that we owed them our utmost effort.
43:12It required more than knowledge to build a bomb.
43:16A complex industry had to be created
43:18to handle all the stages
43:20in the production of the material for an atomic bomb.
43:24In the autumn of 1947,
43:26factories to produce enriched uranium
43:28were set up in Siberia.
43:30And in March 1948,
43:32work started on a series of industrial reactors
43:35that would produce plutonium on a large scale.
43:38The first one was operating five months later.
43:45Let's just say that at the beginning,
43:47our reactors were not powerful.
43:49100,000 kilowatts, and there was only one.
43:51We were afraid to go larger.
43:53This one could produce about 100 grams of plutonium
43:56in 24 hours,
43:57that is, one bomb in several months.
43:59But then further reactors appeared.
44:03Starting from a very low level of industrial organization,
44:06the Soviet Union had created
44:08one of the most advanced industrial processes in the world.
44:12They had reactors like you call the whole reactors in Great Britain.
44:16And that means that you have a moderator like graphite.
44:20And in this reactor,
44:22from the uranium is built up
44:24a small quantity of plutonium.
44:28And after some time,
44:30you take it out.
44:31You have highly reactive product now,
44:34and you have to separate
44:35the radioactive elements
44:38from uranium and from plutonium.
44:41And so you get plutonium.
44:43And you need the two pieces,
44:44if you shoot them together,
44:45then the bomb explodes.
44:47What we learned now.
44:59On August 29th, 1949,
45:02a second atomic power joined the world.
45:05Despite enormous problems,
45:08Kurchatov and his scientists
45:09had succeeded.
45:19I was there.
45:21I set up my detector
45:22and watched it for signs
45:23of anything that might go wrong.
45:27So I was the last to descend the tower,
45:30having done all my test work.
45:31And then I joined Kurchatov in the bunker.
45:36When the explosions occurred,
45:39Kurchatov looked as if a weight
45:40had been lifted off his shoulders
45:42because there was a 10% chance of failure.
45:47He jumped out of the bunker
45:49and shouted,
45:50it worked, it worked.
45:54Such strong words.
45:56However, a cloud of dust
45:58was approaching the bunker,
45:59and I, also in a state of excitement,
46:02about 0.7 of the level of Kurchatov's,
46:05I put my arm around him
46:07and let him back into the bunker.
46:10That's how it was,
46:11how I remember it.
46:13When it's a question of prestige,
46:20either for political reasons
46:21or military reasons,
46:23then everyone's work
46:25is concentrated on this one problem
46:27and it's solved.
46:33Then somebody told us,
46:35now that it's a great success
46:36and you will get awards
46:38and so for your work here
46:40and we got later on.
46:43Well, that was in the plant
46:44or in Moscow,
46:45I don't remember.
46:46But very soon we learned
46:48that it had worked.
46:58I didn't want to receive
46:59any medals or anything.
47:02But after the success,
47:04after the Soviet atom bomb
47:06had been completed,
47:07medals were just handed out.
47:10I was even made a hero
47:12of socialist work as well.
47:14That's a very high distinction.
47:19It's also rather grotesque.
47:23I'm a great friend of Russia.
47:26I'm also against fighting
47:27the Soviet system.
47:33But I was never a socialist.
47:40I'm a friend of private enterprise,
47:43of the capitalist approach.
47:44And yet, it was I
47:46who got the hero
47:47of socialist work medal,
47:49the golden star.
47:51Perhaps one more question
47:53that you really need to ask is,
47:55what would have happened?
47:57How far would the Soviet Union
47:59have gone
48:00if they'd had no help
48:02from the Germans?
48:03And if they'd had no espionage?
48:05The certain answer is
48:07that the Russians
48:08would have finished a year,
48:10maybe two years later.
48:12But no more than that.
48:20Back in Kazakhstan,
48:22it didn't take long
48:23for the Germans to realize
48:24they were building rockets
48:25for the purpose of delivering
48:27atomic bombs
48:28beyond the Soviet borders.
48:36I once asked my husband,
48:40don't you realize
48:41what you're doing?
48:42Because one day,
48:43his brief was,
48:44Grotrup,
48:44you'll fire 3,000 kilometers.
48:46And I said,
48:47now, take a compass
48:48and consider this.
48:49You can hit the whole of Europe.
48:53He was dumbfounded,
48:55but he didn't react.
48:56He was just fascinated
48:58by solving this or that problem,
49:00a problem of steering,
49:01whatever it was.
49:02They didn't think
49:03about the consequences
49:04and didn't want to.
49:07At least not at that time.
49:20We, of course,
49:21were never told
49:22what tasks the rockets
49:23would perform.
49:24But you could work out
49:25for yourself
49:26what it would be.
49:27The A4 rocket
49:29was capable
49:29of carrying a payload,
49:31say a 300 kilogram warhead,
49:33about 300 kilometers.
49:34It could carry
49:36a 3,000 kilogram warhead,
49:38about 300 kilometers.
49:41Using that
49:41to transport
49:42an atomic warhead
49:43would have made no sense.
49:48The R-14 project
49:50was a rocket
49:51which was supposed
49:51to have a 3,000 kilometer range
49:54with about
49:55a 3,000 kilogram payload.
49:58Of course,
49:58these would have been suitable
49:59to carry an atomic bomb.
50:01Some of us began to grumble,
50:03and we said
50:04we preferred
50:05not to work
50:06on this rocket
50:07because our homes
50:08lay 2,000 kilometers
50:09from Moscow
50:10and we didn't want
50:11to build rockets here
50:12which could be fired
50:14on our country.
50:17By 1950,
50:19the German rocket scientists
50:20were moved yet again,
50:21this time to an island
50:22on Lake Seliger.
50:24Their growing reluctance
50:25in the Soviets'
50:26increasing knowledge
50:27made the team expendable.
50:34At the time,
50:36my husband was still
50:37chief construction engineer.
50:38Then he was relieved
50:40of his post.
50:41Then we realized
50:42what was going on
50:43in the Gorodomya project.
50:45We were only there
50:46to supply Korolev
50:47with what he didn't know.
50:49That is,
50:49he still used to come
50:50with specific questions
50:51frequently at the beginning,
50:53but then at increasingly
50:54long intervals
50:55finally stopping
50:56altogether.
50:57We weren't asked anymore
50:59about the R-14
51:00and with that,
51:01our work was finished.
51:16They remained on the island
51:18for three more years,
51:19fearful about
51:21what would happen to them,
51:22not knowing
51:23if they would ever
51:24be allowed
51:25to return to Germany.
51:27Then with the death
51:28of Stalin,
51:29the situation
51:30changed dramatically.
51:36We heard of Stalin's death
51:38on the BBC.
51:39We suddenly heard
51:40Stalin is tot,
51:41that is,
51:42Stalin is dead.
51:42We were excited
51:44at what might happen.
51:45Next morning,
51:46the Russian people
51:46came completely happy
51:48and said,
51:49Stalin kaput.
51:50that was the first
51:51we heard.
51:52That was the first
51:53we heard.
51:58With the passing
51:59of the worst
52:00of repression,
52:02Mrs. Grotrup
52:02and the other Germans
52:03on the island
52:04were moved once again.
52:06But this time,
52:07they were going home.
52:16I was shattered.
52:21There's a Heine poem
52:22and I drive over
52:23the border
52:24with tears.
52:26That came to mind
52:27a lot at the time
52:28because we'd learned
52:29a lot in Russia
52:29and I left many friends there.
52:31I came back
52:32quite different
52:33from when I'd gone.
52:34The war had changed me.
52:43I can't say
52:44we returned
52:44with our former vigor.
52:46It had influenced
52:47me profoundly.
52:49It was a difficult time.
52:51The uncertainty
52:52bothered us most.
52:53At least it did me.
52:54Will I ever get home?
52:55Will I ever see
52:56my parents again?
52:57But now that we were back,
52:59now that it was all over,
53:01I could only feel
53:02that it had been
53:02an enriching time.
53:04I wouldn't have missed it.
53:06I wouldn't have missed it.
53:08I would have missed it.
53:31I wouldn't have missed it.
53:36the Soviet Union,
53:37but they chose
53:37to return home
53:38in the mid-1950s.
53:40They came back
53:41to a Germany
53:42that would be split
53:43into East and West
53:44for the next
53:44three and a half decades,
53:46divided between
53:47two superpowers,
53:49one of which
53:50they had helped to arm.
53:52I'm sitting here now.
53:54I'm in good health,
53:56and I have this small,
53:58nice house
53:58in the countryside.
54:00What was the wrong side?
54:02I have never been a soldier,
54:03which during Hitler time
54:05was a great luck.
54:06I came back
54:07as a healthy man
54:08from the Soviet Union,
54:09and when I returned,
54:11so they had in Germany
54:12a need for a man
54:13who knew how to make
54:14nuclear uranium metal,
54:15and I was the only one
54:17who knew it at that time.
54:19So they gave me a job,
54:21and I developed this job,
54:23and I've wonderfully
54:25cooperated with the British,
54:26with the UK
54:27Atomic Energy Authority,
54:29with the Commissariat
54:30of the Atomic Energy
54:31in France,
54:32with the Americans.
54:33It was a wonderful life.
54:57atomic Energy Agency.
54:58We're on the North-class
54:58We're still in charge.
55:00We're now looking for
55:02of theications
55:03We're here.
55:08We're here.
55:08We're here.
55:09We're here.
55:09We're here.
55:11We're here.
55:14We're here.
55:37Funding for Nova is provided by Lockheed, America's aerospace company.
55:43Supporting math, science and engineering education for national technology leadership.
55:49And Johnson & Johnson, the signature recognized around the world for commitment to quality health care products for the entire
55:57family.
55:59Major funding for Nova is provided by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and by the financial support of viewers like
56:06you.
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