The war in Ukraine is now fought across two fronts: a grinding battlefield stalemate and an escalating air campaign reshaping the conflict’s future. Ukrainian long-range strikes are targeting Russia’s military industry, logistics, and energy revenues, aiming to weaken the war machine without territorial breakthroughs. But Russia’s retaliatory bombardment is inflicting devastating costs on Ukraine’s infrastructure and civilians. Who is winning the war in the air — and how long can either side endure this phase?
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00:00The war in Ukraine has two distinct theatres.
00:03The first is the brutal war of attrition being waged on the battlefield, where hundreds of
00:08thousands of troops face off against each other across an extended 1,000-mile front
00:13line.
00:14The second is in the air, where both sides bombard each other nightly with long-range
00:18missiles and drone swarms.
00:20The near-constant bombardment is designed to inflict so much damage to the other side
00:25that continuing the war becomes unfeasible, regardless of progress on the ground.
00:30And with that goal in mind, in 2025, Ukraine has begun zeroing in on the heart of the Russian
00:37war machine.
00:38So let's look what's on their radar and why it's made a significant difference.
00:43In many ways, air superiority has become one of the more critical aspects of the war.
00:49On the ground, neither side appears to have the numbers or resources for more than a slow,
00:54bloody grind forward.
00:55At best.
00:56At the current rate of advances, it would take years, if not decades, for either side
01:01to secure a decisive victory territorially.
01:04But in the air, Ukraine has made monumental strides.
01:08They've been striking targets both in the occupied territories in the Donbas, Crimea, Kurson,
01:14and Zaporizhia Oblast, and ever deeper inside Russia since 2022.
01:19But they seriously picked up the pace in the early summer of 2025, with primary targets
01:25in three categories.
01:27First, it targeted military facilities or sites within the military-industrial complex,
01:33such as factories that produce military equipment or components.
01:36According to a recent report compiled by Ukrainian website United24Media, a total of 132 military
01:44facilities were hit during 2025, including 91 strikes on military-industrial complex facilities,
01:5225 strikes on overt military facilities, and 16 strikes on airfields.
01:57That's one successful strike on a major military target every three days.
02:02The most famous, and likely consequential of these, was the operation dubbed Operation Spiderweb, carried out on June 1st.
02:11Ukrainian intelligence services smuggled dozens of drones into Russia, and assembled them into
02:16specially designed launcher trucks.
02:18The trucks were then driven close to critical Russian air bases, where the Russian fleet
02:23of strategic nuclear bombers was housed, and the drones were then launched at them.
02:27The attack caught the Russians completely by surprise.
02:31The bombers were standing out in the open, unprotected, in line with the recently expired
02:36New START's nuclear arms control treaty, which compelled both the US and Russia to park their
02:41bombers in places where they can be seen by satellite surveillance.
02:45By the time the dust had settled, at least seven 295 and 222 M3 bombers had been destroyed
02:52or damaged, along with a couple of transport and early warning aircraft.
02:57Four air bases in total were successfully hit.
03:00Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast, Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast, the Agilevo Air Base
03:07in Ryazan Oblast, and Ivanovo Air Base in the Oblast that shares the same name.
03:13Another critical air base struck by Ukraine was the Khanskaya Air Base in the Republic of
03:18Adigeia. This key Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, rear logistics hub, was attacked overnight
03:26on December 28.
03:28But it wasn't just air bases that Ukraine struck.
03:31It also targeted facilities that produced Russia's military equipment throughout the year as well,
03:36and to great effect.
03:38On May 28, for example, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and Intelligence Services, or SBU, hit
03:46the Kronstadt plant in Dubna in Moscow Oblast. As the producer of Orion in Obdets, Grom and
03:52Helios drones, among others, the troubled plant, which is undergoing all sorts of financial woes
03:58at the moment, is a critical node in Russia's UAV production chain.
04:03On the same night, in the same city, SBU units also struck the Raduga plant, manufacturer of
04:09cruise missiles like Kh-101-555, Kh-69, and Kh-59-MK missiles with which Russia regularly strikes
04:19Ukraine. On what was a particularly fiery night for the Russian military industrial complex,
04:24particularly in the Moscow region, the UAV forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine also struck the
04:30Angstrom plant, which develops and produces micro-electronic components widely used by
04:36the Russian military. Later, on July 26, Ukrainian drones reportedly hit and damaged two buildings
04:43at the Signal plant in the city of Stavropol. The plant is one of Russia's leading producers
04:48of electronic warfare equipment, including radar, radio navigation, and remote-controlled radio
04:54equipment. The second main category of targets, hit by Ukrainian long-range strikes, was logistical
05:00targets. These included 30 strikes on electrical substations, 28 strikes on logistics infrastructure,
05:07and 15 strikes on Russian ports. The city of Belgorod, the closest large Russian
05:13city to the Ukrainian border, has borne the brunt of the worst of the strikes on electrical
05:17infrastructure. The Luch substation was struck on October 5, causing widespread blackouts, while
05:24another attack on September 28 targeted the Belgorov thermal power plant and associated
05:30substations, cutting power to over 500,000 people. The city has also been plunged into
05:36darkness at least twice during early 2026, with hot water and centralized heating systems
05:42reportedly unavailable until April or May. Additionally, the Novo-Briant substation in the
05:48Bryansk region, an Oriol combined heat and power plant in Oriol, were reportedly hit by Neptune
05:54missiles on October 31, disrupting electricity to the area. Further strikes on substations and other
06:02electrical facilities were also recorded in Vladimir, Smolensk, Voronezh, and Tambov.
06:08In terms of strikes on logistics, Ukrainian forces focused primarily on rail infrastructure. Repeated
06:15strikes on railway lines in Rostov Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, the occupied Zaporizhia region, and the cities of
06:22Oriol, Voronezh, and Bryansk derailed military and fuelled trains, disrupting troop and equipment
06:28movements. A major sabotage operation on the Trans-Siberian railway on November 13 temporarily
06:34blocked a key logistics artery. Russian trains carrying fuel and military supplies were also targeted.
06:42In May, the GUR Special Forces struck a moving Russian fuel train in Zaporizhia, with OWA UAV drones.
06:49Then, in July, a train carrying fuel, lubricants, and military equipment was destroyed in Rostov Oblast.
06:57And in August, Ukrainian strikes derailed fuel trains near Tokmak and Zankhoi, cutting supply into
07:03Crimea. Russian railway stations and junctions were also not spared. Between July and August alone,
07:10for example, the South Station in Rostov Oblast, Surovikino Station in Volgograd region,
07:16and Jankhoi Station in Crimea were all hit, damaging power lines, halting traffic,
07:21suspending military cargo flows, and disrupting supply routes in the process. And traction substations
07:27and relay cabinets in Rostov, Volgograd, Voronezh, and Krasnodar were also hit, causing automatic shutdowns
07:35and widespread rail disruptions. As for the strikes on Russian ports, these primarily targeted fuel
07:42storage and oil export facilities, focusing on Black Sea and Sea of Azov ports that are critical
07:48to Russia's energy industry, naval, and land operations. The most striking of those came arguably
07:54right at the end of the year, when Ukrainian drones struck oil product tanks at the Temryuk
07:58port on the Azov Sea on Christmas Day. Two large fuel reservoirs caught fire at the southern port of
08:05Temryuk, scorching an area of around 2,000 square feet. Six weeks earlier, a Ukrainian drone attack
08:11damaged an oil depot and a civilian vessel in the port of Novorossiysk near Krasnodar Krai,
08:17temporarily halting oil exports from Russia's largest Black Sea oil terminal.
08:22Indeed, strikes on Russian energy infrastructure are the third category of Ukrainian long-range
08:28strike targets. And in many senses, it's these strikes that have been the highest priority
08:33and had the greatest consequences. According to the United24 report, in 2025, Ukraine hit Russian
08:40oil refineries 88 times, oil storage facilities 28 times, and gas infrastructure 6 times.
08:48For example, the Mahachkala oil refinery in Dagestan was struck on the night of October 21,
08:55damaging a processing unit that supplies fuel to Russia's Caspian flotilla.
08:59Then, on December 14, at least three refineries were hit in diverse locations.
09:04The Afivsky refinery in Krasnodar Krai, a major refinery with 6.25 million tons per year capacity,
09:11the Uruyupinsk oil depot in Volgograd oblast, and the Slavnev Janos refinery in Yaroslavl oblast.
09:19For good measure, alongside the Temiryuk fuel reservoir strike, Ukraine also hit the Novosuktinsk
09:25oil refinery in Rostov oblast with storm-shadow missiles on Christmas Day. However, there were
09:32other strikes that pushed the dagger even deeper into Russia's military heart. Perhaps the most daring
09:37strikes and those with the most far-reaching long-term consequences have been Ukraine strikes
09:42on Russian oil tankers at sea. These tankers are part of Russia's so-called Shadow Fleet,
09:48which continues transporting Russian oil despite Western sanctions. During the year,
09:53at least 11 Shadow Fleet tankers have incurred critical damage after being attacked by drones
09:59or suffering unspecified external explosions. The SBU has claimed responsibility for four of these
10:05attacks while pointedly not denying the others, and has made clear that they intend to substantially
10:11damage Russian seaborne crude oil export revenues. The tanker's strikes actually started in late
10:17December 2024, when Ursa Major, cargo ship owned by a company affiliated with the Russian Ministry of
10:24Defense, sank in the Mediterranean following several explosions. They then continued throughout
10:29the winter months of early 2025. The crude oil tanker Sea Charm was damaged in mid-January,
10:35while in the vicinity of Turkey's Seyhan port. The Grace Verum was impacted off Libya in early February.
10:42The sea jewel was hit in Italy's Savona port on February 15, and the tanker Koala suffered damage
10:48from explosions while docked at Russia's Ust Lager port on the Baltic Sea. While details of the cause of
10:54the explosions and all these cases remained somewhat murky, experts believe they were likely the result
11:00of limpet mines, small explosive charges with powerful magnets that stick to the hull of a ship.
11:06But during the course of the war, Ukraine has rapidly upgraded its naval drone capabilities,
11:12and these entered the fray with a vengeance in the second half of the year.
11:15In June, the crude oil tanker Vilamura, under Greek management, suffered an explosion off the coast of
11:22Libya. It was carrying one million barrels of crude oil and had to be towed to southern Greece for repairs.
11:28Two weeks later, on July 6, the Eco Wizard tanker, also under Greek management, was hit by two explosions
11:35just ten minutes apart. Then on November 27, the Mersin, a Panama-flagged oil tanker managed by
11:42Istanbul base Besiktas Shipping, was damaged off the coast of Senegal after being struck by four
11:48external explosions while at anchor near Dakar. The explosion caused seawater to enter the engine room,
11:55leading to a distress signal, emergency response, and successful evacuation of all crew who were
12:00unharmed. While Ukraine hasn't claimed responsibility for the attack, and naval authorities denied that
12:06naval drones were involved given what happened right after, it seems that Ukrainian naval drones,
12:12particularly its new Sea Baby maritime drones, were the likely culprit. In November, Ukraine's SBU
12:18started openly deploying Sea Babies to attack Russian commercial ships, damaging three Shadow
12:24Fleet tankers in the Black Sea, in attacks for which it claimed responsibility on 28 November and
12:30December 10. These attacks were followed by an aerial drone attack on a tanker in the Mediterranean
12:35on December 19, the first overt deliberate strikes on commercial ships seen in the war.
12:41Combined, these strikes bring the number of shadowed tankers either taken out of action entirely,
12:47or significantly damaged by Ukraine in 2025, up to at least 11, including 8 crude oil tankers.
12:54Now, meticulously collated facts, analyzed, and compiled into cutting-edge analysis, that's what we
13:01deliver day after day here on The Military Show. If you haven't done so yet, subscribe to the channel to
13:07keep your finger on the pulse of what's really going on in the world of warfare.
13:11Now, the loss of the tankers themselves represents a pretty hefty financial blow for Russia. While most
13:17of the tankers in Russia's Shadow Fleet are estimated to be pretty long in the tooth at around 15 years
13:22old, replacing one is likely to set them back around $59 million each. At current oil prices,
13:29a tanker sunk while carrying a cargo of 2 million barrels of Russian Ural's crude would cost Russia
13:35over $200 million. According to S&P Global, in September 2025, the Russian Shadow Fleet comprised
13:43978 tankers with over 27,000 deadweight tonnage, representing a combined capacity of 127 million
13:51deadweight tons, or approximately 18.5 percent of the global oil tanker fleet. On the face of it,
13:58Ukraine has a long, long way to go before making a meaningful dent in that. However, not all tankers
14:04are used as prolifically as others. Based on their history, the majority of the tankers hit by Ukraine
14:10appear to be part of a much smaller group of tankers that make multiple Russian port calls a year,
14:16which the Kyiv School of Economics referred to as the core of Russia's Shadow Fleet.
14:20If that assessment is accurate, the tankers damaged or disabled in the last year may represent up to
14:2710 percent of the total fleet, a potentially significant economic result. But the fallout
14:32from these attacks for Russia doesn't stop there. Insurance markets reacted strongly to the strikes,
14:38with rates for ships trading in the Black Sea increasing by as much as 300 percent in early
14:43December and doubling again in January. Russian seaborne crude exports via the Black Sea
14:48country have plunged by 30 percent. And Besiktas Shipping, one of Turkey's largest tanker operators,
14:55including the Mersin and several other vessels sanctioned by Ukraine, announced that it will
14:59no longer transport Russian cargoes after the attack on the Mersin, citing untenable risks.
15:05Bottom line, it's basically become a lot more dangerous and expensive for Russia to export its oil.
15:10And that's the basic idea with all of these strikes, which former SVU chief Vasil Malyuk famously dubbed
15:17kinetic sanctions, to starve Russia's war machine by cutting off access to revenues from its oil and
15:23gas exports. As little as a decade ago, the Russian economy was deeply dependent on revenues from energy
15:30exports, prompting the late U.S. Senator John McCain to state in 2014 that Russia is a gas station
15:36masquerading as a country. Others, like futurist Yuval Noah Harari, U.S. Representative Denny Heck,
15:43and former EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, expanded the notion, contending that Russia is
15:49a gas station with nukes or derivatives of the statement. Up to half of Russian state revenues
15:54were derived from oil and gas exports in the mid-2010s. However, that share has declined steadily
16:01and significantly over the years, as Russia has increasingly diversified its economy. In 2024,
16:08oil and gas revenues reached 11.1 trillion rubles, around $120.3 billion, representing 30% of the
16:16federal budget, a 60% decline over little more than a decade. Officially, Russia's defense budget for
16:232025 was 13.5 trillion rubles, around $177 billion at current exchange rate. However, some estimates
16:33place total military and security spending as high as 16.8 trillion rubles, around $220 billion,
16:41when broader categories like internal security and classified items are included. Under this expanded
16:47definition, military spending increased by almost 70% in 2024. At those levels of spending, Russia's
16:55oil revenues clearly aren't sufficient to cover the cost of its war in Ukraine, with government funding
17:00sources shifting toward domestic taxation and an expanded export base rather than oil and gas revenues.
17:07Still, in 2025, the cost of the Ukrainian strikes on Russia's oil revenues quickly tallied up,
17:14increasing the urgency of diversifying its funding sources. According to Yevgeny Borovikov,
17:20deputy general director of leading Russian insurance broker Mainz, the Russian oil sector incurred more
17:25than $13 billion in direct and indirect losses as a result of Ukrainian drone attacks in 2025. The direct
17:33financial damage to oil and gas facilities from drone and missile strikes exceeded 100 billion rubles,
17:39approximately $1.3 billion, with lost revenue and indirect impacts bringing the total cost
17:45to over a trillion rubles, around $13.1 billion at today's rate. Consulting firm Argus reported a sharp
17:53decline in crude oil deliveries via pipelines to Russian refineries, which dropped to their lowest level
17:59in 15 years. In 2025, Russian refineries received 228.34 million tons of crude oil, 1.6% less than
18:08in 2024.
18:10Total domestic refining output fell by 1.7%, down to 262.3 million tons. Additionally, Russian insurance
18:19companies faced a surge in claims under terrorism and sabotage risk categories. According to a February
18:262026 report, in the Russian financially focused website Kommersant, payouts in these categories
18:32exceeded the total value of premiums collected. Alexei Kotoyansky, head of corporate underwriting
18:39and insurer Saglesyer, corroborated this fact, stating that the loss ratio on relevant insurance
18:45portfolios increased tenfold, with premiums no longer covering the volume of payouts. Insurance broker
18:51Remind reported a significant rise in the frequency of incidents and claimed that average
18:56losses from a single refinery attack often reach 5 to 10 million dollars. Taken together,
19:02it's easy to conclude that the kinetic sanctions are working and Ukraine is winning the war in the
19:07air. It looks like, in conjunction with countless sanctions by Western nations, Ukrainian long-range
19:13strikes are progressively bringing Russia to the point where it can no longer fund its war or justify
19:18its continuation to the Russian public and financial elites. The problem is that there are two sides
19:24participating in this air war, and it requires substantially greater mental gymnastics to come
19:29to the same conclusion when you look at the damage Russia's reciprocal strikes are doing to Ukraine.
19:34In 2025, the size of Russia's nightly bombardments consistently exceeded those of Ukraine's,
19:41typically by several times, and these ramped up considerably in the second half of the year.
19:46That was in response to Ukrainian summertime attacks on Russian oil infrastructure that temporarily
19:51caused petrol shortages, a ban on petroleum exports, and queues at the pump in multiple regions.
19:58According to data compiled by United24, Russia launched around 2,400 missiles and more than 100,000
20:05drones of various types during long-range strikes in 2025. Both sides have regularly claimed interception
20:12rates of over 90%, implying that roughly 10,000 Russian long-range drones and 240 missiles struck targets
20:20during the year. Those are sobering numbers compared to the Ukrainian figures, especially when you
20:25consider how much larger Russia is than Ukraine. Not only is Russia landing many more blows, but the mere
20:31fact that Russia has three times the population and infrastructure spread out across such vast
20:36territory makes it that much more difficult for Ukraine to make a meaningful and long-lasting dent.
20:42Due to strict censorship of Russian strike results in Ukraine, it's very difficult to get an accurate
20:48handle on how much damage was caused by the many hundreds of strikes on Ukrainian military infrastructure,
20:54a military-industrial complex claimed by Russia. But the fact that Ukrainian drone manufacturing,
20:59for example, takes place in top-secret circumstances for fear of Russian strikes, speaks volumes.
21:05By contrast, Russian drone factories like Kronstadt and Allaberga stand out in the open for Ukrainian drone
21:12operators to see. But while military damage remains a subject of speculation for now,
21:18the growing humanitarian catastrophe caused by relentless Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy
21:23infrastructure right in the middle of a winter where temperatures in Ukraine have regularly dropped
21:28below 14 Fahrenheit is plain to see. By January 2026, Ukraine's available generating capacity had dropped
21:36from 33.7 GW to about 14 GW, roughly one-third of pre-invasion levels, including the destruction
21:43of 90% of thermal power generation, 50% of hydropower installations damaged, and 40% destroyed.
21:51Already, the energy sector's long-term reconstruction needs are estimated at 68 billion dollars,
21:57and the nightly strikes continue unabated. As a result, basic things like electricity, heating,
22:03water coming out of the taps, and a working sewage system have become luxuries for the majority of
22:08ordinary Ukrainians. More than 600 residents of Kyiv, roughly one in five, have reportedly heeded
22:15Mayor Vitaly Klitschko's call to flee the city for the winter. Emergency power schedules have been in
22:20operation across the country for weeks with no end in sight, with most regions on most days lucky to see
22:26four hours of power a day. As you can imagine, trying to keep an economy afloat in these circumstances,
22:32let alone live with a modicum of comfort, is challenging to say the least. Millions of city
22:37residents around the country have been left without heat for days on end, with sewage freezing in the
22:42pipes in many buildings as a result. This has forced some residents to resort to emergency measures like
22:48using cat litter when nature calls. As Desnyansky District State Administration Maxim Bukhmatov recently
22:55bluntly spelled out, it's unpleasant, humiliating and un-European, digging holes, installing portable
23:01toilets, using plastic bags and cat litter. But you have to survive, pipes are already bursting in
23:07the golosie vor and s**t is pouring out of the windows. Judging by the increasing number of protests
23:13against electricity outages by Ukrainian citizens and comments on Ukrainian telegram channels, a growing
23:19number of Ukrainians are questioning the sanity of escalating long-range attacks on Russian energy
23:24infrastructure when the consequences are so severe. Russians, with the exception perhaps of Belgorod,
23:31aren't feeling the effects of the air war to anywhere near the same extent as they are.
23:35So, will economic sanctions and kinetic sanctions coupled with military stagnation bring Russia to
23:42its knees in 2026, as we discussed in this recent video? Or will armies of freezing Ukrainians armed with
23:49bags full of used cat litter force the Ukrainian government into an unfavorable conclusion to the
23:54war? Subscribe to this channel to stay informed as the situation develops and not miss out.
24:00It's not true that it's our time.
24:00It's totally fine.
24:00Not over the last one, but why are real?
24:00I guess thanks for watching!
24:02Like, I haven't occurred to you, but haven't happened.
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