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00:00En Berlín, en el 2 de octubre de 1942, Rommel fue presentado con el marzo de batón de Hitler.
00:09Rommel appeared a ser un seguidor de la religión, pero su apariencia era deceptiva.
00:14No sabía que la victoria no era posible en el norte de África.
00:17Soon, se preguntaba Hitler himself.
00:30In the early hours of 21st June 1942,
00:54the British forces in the fortress of Tobruk in Libya surrendered.
01:0033,000 British soldiers were taken prisoner.
01:04Rommel had been leading German and Italian troops in North Africa for more than 16 months.
01:10Tobruk was the pinnacle of Rommel's military career.
01:14As a result, Hitler made him a field marshal.
01:17The victors were exultant, the British in despair.
01:21We were lined up by our officers in the usual threes,
01:32and there we were standing, having blown up our equipment.
01:38I think it was a terrible feeling of shame.
01:40And particularly, we felt that, as the Australians had held it,
01:47we have tucked it away.
01:50And we were not happy about that.
01:53At the same time, in Washington, Churchill was visiting Roosevelt.
02:06During their talks, Churchill heard that Tobruk had fallen.
02:09His chief of staff later wrote in his memoirs,
02:12For the first time in my life, I saw the Prime Minister wince.
02:17But what I remember so clearly was,
02:20Mr. Churchill was in Washington,
02:23visiting President Roosevelt,
02:25when that happened.
02:28And I think he must have felt
02:29a sense of shame,
02:32because so many soldiers
02:34had surrendered.
02:36And Mr. Roosevelt
02:40immediately said,
02:43What can we do to help you?
02:46And he offered him
02:47a lot of Sherman tanks,
02:51which were going to be sent
02:53to the American forces
02:54who were in North Africa,
02:56but they were now to be given to the British.
02:59And Mr. Churchill never forgot
03:00that generous gesture.
03:06A little later,
03:07the USA decided to participate
03:09in the conflict in North Africa.
03:16The first supply convoys
03:18left the USA
03:19just 10 days after the fall of Tobruk.
03:22This sealed the fate of the German forces.
03:28The question of reinforcements
03:30was actually the key to success or failure.
03:33We knew from reports
03:34approximately what reinforcements
03:35the British had at their disposal,
03:38and we already had experience
03:39of what reinforcements
03:41actually arrived for us.
03:43So it was to be expected
03:45with the kind of superiority
03:46the British had then
03:47that our side
03:49would not be able
03:50to hold its position.
03:53After the fall of Tobruk,
03:55the British Eighth Army withdrew.
04:00Rommel had no choice
04:02but to exploit the advantage
04:03he now had.
04:04If he wanted to beat the British,
04:06he had to pursue them.
04:09He gave orders for an advance into Egypt,
04:12where the majority of the British forces
04:13were stationed.
04:17I think it was a kind of instinct for pursuit
04:20that made him say,
04:21don't leave the enemy in peace,
04:23he's been routed.
04:26Keep after him,
04:27whatever the circumstances.
04:28and I think that he sometimes went too far.
04:31He demanded too much of the troops.
04:33He didn't wait for the reinforcements.
04:35There was boundless optimism,
04:58not just from Rommel,
05:00but from the whole staff.
05:01We saw ourselves in Cairo already.
05:05We were already wondering
05:06which hotel we would go to,
05:09where we would live,
05:10and in which hotel we should have our HQ.
05:13The mood was completely euphoric.
05:17And I know that the idea discussed
05:20was more or less
05:21to meet up in Palestine
05:23with groups that arrived from the Caucasus.
05:27That was the plan.
05:30We would come over the Suez Canal from the south,
05:33and the troops from the Caucasus
05:35from the north,
05:36and we would join up.
05:38That was a very clear plan.
05:43The British retreated
05:44along the coast road towards Egypt.
05:46On the 29th of June,
05:53Massa Matru fell.
05:55It was now only 150 kilometres to Alexandria,
05:59where the Royal Navy
06:00was already evacuating the port.
06:03In Cairo,
06:05staff in British headquarters
06:06were burning their files.
06:10On the 29th of June,
06:12Mussolini landed in Libya.
06:13He didn't intend to miss
06:18the German-Italian victory parade
06:20in Alexandria.
06:32We all thought Rommel would win.
06:36He only had to get to Cairo.
06:39Furthermore,
06:40according to Egyptian politicians,
06:42whom I got to know after the war,
06:45they were ready to form a government
06:47that was favourably disposed
06:49to the Axis.
06:51And the British in Cairo
06:53had already begun to retreat
06:54after they lost the battle
06:55of Massa Matru.
07:02This place marked the turning point
07:04in the North African war
07:05and in Rommel's career.
07:07The British war correspondent,
07:11Dennis Johnston,
07:13described it.
07:14A small railway station
07:15set in the midst of some hundreds
07:17of miles of absolutely nothing.
07:19That is El Alamein.
07:20And I looked on the map
07:27and saw this little mark
07:28on the map on the coast,
07:30El Alamein.
07:30I didn't realise then
07:31how famous it would become.
07:33And eventually,
07:35it took us about two days
07:37and we got back to this place
07:40and I could see
07:42the British infantry
07:44and the artillery digging in
07:47right across the desert.
07:48A hundred kilometres
07:51from the gates of Alexandria,
07:53General Auchinleck,
07:54commander-in-chief
07:55of the British army
07:56in the Middle East,
07:57improvised the last line of defence.
08:07It was the narrowest point
08:09between the coast
08:10and the impassable Katara depression
08:12and the tank units
08:13had to pass through it.
08:18When we arrived in El Alamein,
08:23I saw the laughably few tanks
08:25which were available for us
08:26in the tank unit
08:27and the other vehicles.
08:31And I realised
08:31how exhausted
08:32the soldiers were.
08:34Our fighting strength
08:35was only a fraction
08:36of what it should have been.
08:39Then I realised
08:41that it could not go on.
08:43Not like that.
08:44Not like that.
08:44Not like that.
08:45At the same time,
08:54British airmen achieved superiority
08:56in the air
08:56for the first time
08:57in North Africa.
09:03Their airfields were nearby.
09:05Their reinforcement system
09:06was working well.
09:07We were dive-bombed
09:10in Stukert once
09:12at El Alamein
09:14and out high up
09:16came the Allied fighters down
09:19and they virtually wiped out the Stukert.
09:22They didn't stand a chance.
09:24And that was the turning point
09:27where we realised
09:28the Allies were now
09:31superior in the Air Force.
09:33and that was the turning point
09:37that encouraged us.
09:41The tide had turned
09:42in the war on the ground as well.
09:46Heavy fighting at El Alamein
09:48put a stop to Rommel's advance
09:50at the beginning of July 1944.
09:52I can still picture Rommel now.
10:00He was in such a rage.
10:03He just stood there
10:04and couldn't grasp
10:05what had happened
10:06over three or four kilometres.
10:09It was quite clear to me then
10:11that we had reached the point
10:13where we couldn't possibly go on.
10:15It was quite clear to me then
10:19that we had reached the point
10:21of the war.
10:24Rommel's position at El Alamein
10:26became more critical by the day.
10:33Dearest Lou,
10:35it can't go on like this
10:37or the front will collapse.
10:39These are the hardest days
10:41of my military life.
10:43You know that I'm
10:44an incorrigible optimist
10:46but there are places
10:48where it's completely dark.
10:51You're Erwin.
10:54Now Rommel only showed confidence
10:56for the cameras.
10:57I joined up
11:19because I just had to go
11:21and do my bit.
11:24I had to help.
11:25But when I saw
11:27the first dead bodies,
11:29that's when I first
11:30shot a tank.
11:32I went over
11:33and we opened the hatch
11:35and there sat the driver
11:38and the commander
11:40dead.
11:42Just skeletons.
11:43You could see the tank
11:45had been completely burned out.
11:50It gave me such a shock
11:52and that turned us
11:54into deadly serious
11:55grown-up people.
11:57On the 8th of August 1942,
12:03Churchill visited
12:04the British troops
12:05in North Africa.
12:09He was accompanied
12:11by Rommel's new opponent,
12:13Lieutenant General
12:13Bernard Law Montgomery.
12:20He had a reputation
12:21for being obstinate.
12:23I had just taken over
12:26Chief of Staff
12:28of the 7th Arbor Division
12:29and this
12:30rather small man
12:34arrived
12:35with a rather large
12:37pair of shorts
12:38and very white,
12:40knobbly knees
12:41and you thought,
12:44who is this curious man
12:45who's appeared
12:48to command the army?
12:49And having sand
12:53encrusted in my shoes,
12:55I mean,
12:56having been in the desert
12:57from the very beginning,
12:59we were very suspicious
13:00of people
13:01who came out from England
13:02and hadn't been
13:03in the desert before.
13:05He wore the black beret
13:07of an ordinary tank driver.
13:09It was supposed
13:09to make him popular
13:10with his men.
13:12His grim determination
13:13also marked him out.
13:15There will be
13:16no further withdrawal.
13:17I have ordered
13:18that all plans
13:19and instructions
13:20dealing with further withdrawal
13:22are to be burned.
13:23Our mandate
13:24from the Prime Minister
13:25is to destroy
13:26the Axis forces
13:27in North Africa.
13:29It can be done
13:30and it will be done.
13:31I was cleaning out
13:33my firing position
13:34where I had
13:35my brand gun
13:36and I just had
13:39a pair of shorts on,
13:41no shirt,
13:42and he stood
13:43at the top
13:44of the communication trench
13:46and he said to me,
13:48how long have you been
13:49in the desert, soldier?
13:51I said,
13:52about 15 months, sir.
13:54He said,
13:54well, don't worry,
13:55he said,
13:55you won't be here
13:55very much longer.
14:00At Bletchley Park,
14:01the British Secret Service
14:02had been trying
14:03to break the German
14:04Enigma Code
14:05for years,
14:06Operation Ultra.
14:07We didn't read
14:11any army
14:12Enigma
14:13until
14:15the second half
14:16of 1942
14:17and we didn't,
14:19we never read it
14:21consistently
14:22or promptly.
14:24Though at one point,
14:25we did read it
14:26so that it was
14:27operationally valuable.
14:29That was to say,
14:29we read it,
14:31we read one day
14:32what they were going
14:33to do the next
14:33instead of reading
14:35one day
14:35what they had done
14:36two weeks earlier
14:37and that was really
14:39the most important
14:39thing about Ultra.
14:43Germany still thought
14:44their code
14:45was absolutely safe
14:46but now the British
14:47Secret Service
14:48was listening in.
14:53Montgomery was one
14:54of the first
14:55to profit
14:55from the new weapon.
14:57He was now informed
14:58of all Rommel's
14:59intentions.
15:06Montgomery hung Rommel's
15:11picture in his quarters
15:12as though it helped
15:14him read his mind.
15:18This again was
15:19another myth.
15:20What
15:21Monty was really
15:23profiting from
15:24was not
15:25reading Rommel's mind
15:28from his photograph
15:28of getting Ultra.
15:31That's what mattered.
15:33No, that was a myth.
15:34It was all part of his...
15:35I mean, he was very
15:37clever with his
15:38public relations.
15:39I mean, he took care
15:42to see that he had
15:43good public relations
15:44and it's a very good
15:45thing for a general
15:47to have good
15:47public relations.
15:50As every day went by,
15:51the British gained
15:53more strength.
15:58Rommel knew,
16:07and I got wind of it
16:08too, that the
16:09British army was
16:10incredibly well
16:11provided with
16:12reinforcements.
16:14Rommel said
16:15again and again,
16:16if we achieve
16:17anything, then it
16:19must be as quickly
16:19as possible,
16:21before the British
16:22start their
16:23offensive.
16:27Rommel's
16:27reinforcement
16:28situation did not
16:29improve.
16:30He needed
16:31everything, spare
16:32parts, ammunition,
16:34petrol.
16:39Mussolini and
16:40Hitler urged
16:41Rommel to attack,
16:42but he hesitated.
16:43He was beginning
16:44to feel unwell.
16:48At that time,
16:49Rommel was in
16:50rather poor shape.
16:52He had been
16:52very overstretched.
16:55I had already
16:56noticed it because
16:57one of my jobs
16:58when we were on
16:58the road was to
16:59see to his food.
17:01There were many
17:01things where he
17:02just said,
17:03no, I'm sorry,
17:04I don't want any
17:05of that.
17:06I can't eat that.
17:08And that his
17:11physical condition
17:12was decisive in
17:13determining his
17:14whole psychological
17:15and bodily
17:16state.
17:18I think that's
17:18just obvious.
17:19I was sure that was
17:20I was sure that
17:21was it.
17:24You often notice
17:25that he just
17:26didn't have the
17:27verve anymore
17:27or the energy
17:29that he used to.
17:32In Marsa Matruh,
17:34on the 24th of
17:35August 1942,
17:37Rommel was examined
17:37in the army hospital.
17:40He'd already asked
17:41Hitler for his
17:42replacement.
17:44His doctor wrote,
17:45his present condition
17:47is a result of
17:48extreme physical
17:49and psychological
17:49exertion.
17:53A nurse did
17:54some lab tests.
17:58And then he was
18:00suddenly supposed
18:01to have diphtheria.
18:04But diphtheria,
18:06a children's illness,
18:07really wasn't credible
18:08in these circumstances.
18:15But I had to
18:17carry out the tests.
18:20There was not
18:20a trace of it.
18:23And I gave in
18:24a completely
18:25negative report.
18:27I'm sorry,
18:28I can't say
18:29it's diphtheria.
18:31And I wouldn't,
18:32just because Rommel
18:33wanted to be sent
18:34home from Marsa Matruh
18:36because of ill health.
18:37That is the truth.
18:44Rommel had no choice.
18:47He was not well,
18:48but had to get on
18:49with the last
18:49big offensive.
18:51The morning before
18:52the attack,
18:52he spoke to his doctor.
18:54Professor,
18:55the decision to attack
18:56today is the hardest
18:57of my life.
18:59Either we will succeed
19:00in taking Grozny
19:01in Russia
19:02and reaching
19:03the Suez Canal
19:03here in Africa,
19:05or...
19:08He said to us,
19:12you know that
19:12the British have
19:13infinite superiority
19:14over us,
19:15don't you?
19:16He always spoke to us
19:17in a mixture
19:18of personal
19:19and formal.
19:21And we said,
19:22of course, sir.
19:23We know that,
19:24but we will
19:24sort it out.
19:28On the 30th of August,
19:301942,
19:32Rommel's troops
19:32took up their positions.
19:36His opponent,
19:38Montgomery,
19:38knew every detail
19:39of the plan
19:40because of the
19:41ultra-code-breaking
19:42system.
19:48We expect him
19:49in there.
19:50We had everything
19:51ready.
19:52Everything went
19:52entirely according
19:53to plan.
19:55In fact,
19:55it went even better
19:56in a way
19:56because we delayed
19:58new minefields
20:01there north
20:02of Hermione
20:02and we managed
20:04to delay
20:05much longer
20:06than we expected.
20:09Rommel's last
20:10offensive started
20:11in the evening.
20:13His troops
20:13marched
20:14to their destruction.
20:15And the word
20:26came that the
20:26Germans were
20:27going to break
20:27through.
20:29And we were
20:30told,
20:30don't fire at
20:31them.
20:32Just let them
20:33go by.
20:35And he said,
20:36then when the
20:36infantry
20:37and the
20:38supply wagons
20:39come through,
20:40take them on
20:42and knock them
20:43out.
20:43Well, the
20:44Germans,
20:45about 50
20:45tanks,
20:46went through
20:46and, as I say,
20:48the infantry
20:49where we
20:49knocked them
20:50out.
20:53After three
20:54days,
20:55Rommel had
20:55to stop.
20:56It was all
20:57over.
21:13The mood
21:17at Rommel's
21:18HQ was
21:19dismal.
21:23If we
21:24don't win
21:25El Alamein,
21:26Africa is
21:27lost.
21:29I said,
21:31sir,
21:31the war
21:33is lost.
21:35He took
21:36my arm
21:37and we
21:38walked 300
21:39meters into
21:40the desert.
21:42Then he
21:42said,
21:43who else
21:44have you
21:44said that
21:45to?
21:45And I
21:46said,
21:46nobody else.
21:48You must
21:49not say
21:49things like
21:50that.
21:50I wouldn't
21:51be able
21:51to protect
21:52you.
21:52You can
21:53say anything
21:53to me
21:54in private,
21:55but nowhere
21:55else.
21:56I think
21:57we understand
21:57each other.
21:58Rommel
22:02left Africa
22:02on the
22:0323rd of
22:03September.
22:04He was
22:05supposed to
22:05take a
22:05health
22:06cure.
22:07After his
22:07recovery,
22:08Hitler wanted
22:08to send
22:09him to
22:09the east.
22:10But when
22:10he left,
22:11Rommel
22:11made a
22:11promise.
22:12If
22:13fighting
22:13breaks
22:13out,
22:14I will
22:15break off
22:15my cure
22:16and come
22:16straight
22:16back to
22:17Africa.
22:20That was
22:21the only
22:21thing that
22:22really
22:22demoralized
22:23us,
22:24that Rommel
22:24had left.
22:26We kept
22:27asking,
22:27will
22:28he or
22:29won't
22:29he come
22:29back.
22:31It
22:31made us
22:32suspicious.
22:35We
22:35felt
22:35protected
22:36by the
22:37ability
22:37and
22:37stature
22:38of
22:38the
22:38man.
22:40I'm
22:40sorry
22:40to
22:40have
22:41to
22:41say
22:41it,
22:42but
22:42Rommel
22:43was
22:43more
22:43important
22:44for
22:44us
22:44than
22:45our
22:45own
22:45officers.
22:50Six
22:51days
22:51later,
22:51Rommel
22:52came
22:52to
22:52Berlin.
22:53Hitler
22:53wanted
22:54to
22:54hand
22:54him
22:54his
22:55field
22:55marshal's
22:55baton
22:56personally.
22:57He
22:58was
22:58greeted
22:59by
22:59the
22:59Goebbels
22:59family.
23:00The
23:01propaganda
23:01minister
23:01had
23:02offered
23:02him
23:02a
23:02room
23:02for
23:03the
23:03night.
23:10In
23:10Berlin,
23:11the
23:11regime's
23:12crimes
23:12against
23:12the
23:13Jews
23:13could
23:13no
23:13longer
23:14be
23:14overlooked,
23:15even
23:15by
23:15Rommel,
23:16when
23:16his
23:16former
23:17staff
23:17officer
23:17was
23:18getting
23:18married.
23:18were
23:19married.
23:20He
23:21asked me
23:22where
23:22we
23:22wanted
23:22to
23:22live.
23:24I
23:24said
23:24probably
23:25in
23:25Berlin.
23:27I
23:27will
23:27give
23:27you
23:27a
23:27letter
23:27of
23:28recommendation
23:28to
23:29my
23:29friend
23:29Minister
23:29Speer.
23:31Thank
23:31you,
23:32I
23:32said.
23:35The
23:35staff
23:35officer
23:36didn't
23:36know
23:36that
23:37Speer
23:37was
23:37distributing
23:38flats
23:38belonging
23:39to
23:39deported
23:40Jews.
23:40My
23:43wife
23:44and
23:44I
23:44drove
23:44to
23:44the
23:45flat.
23:46It
23:46wasn't
23:47empty.
23:48There
23:48was a
23:49woman
23:49wearing
23:49a
23:49star
23:50of
23:50David
23:50and
23:50had
23:51two
23:51children.
23:52I
23:53was
23:53shocked.
23:53Said
23:54I'm
23:54so
23:54sorry,
23:55I
23:55rang
23:55the
23:55wrong
23:55bell.
23:57I
23:57went
23:57back
23:58to
23:58the
23:58ministry,
23:59to
23:59councillor
23:59summer.
24:00You
24:00don't
24:01forget
24:01some
24:01of
24:01the
24:01arsehole's
24:02names.
24:03I
24:03said
24:03you
24:03put
24:03me
24:03into
24:04a
24:04terrible
24:04situation.
24:05How's
24:06that?
24:06I
24:07said
24:07the
24:07flat
24:10haven't
24:11they
24:11been
24:11picked
24:12up
24:12yet?
24:12Well,
24:13did
24:13you
24:13like
24:14the
24:14flat?
24:14I
24:15will
24:15make
24:15sure
24:15that
24:15they
24:15are
24:16picked
24:16up
24:16in
24:16the
24:16morning.
24:17Then
24:17the
24:17flat
24:18only
24:18has
24:18to
24:18be
24:18disinfected
24:19and
24:20you
24:20can
24:20move
24:20in.
24:24The
24:24staff
24:24officer
24:25refused
24:25the
24:26offer.
24:28And
24:29when I
24:29told
24:29Rommel
24:30everything,
24:31that it
24:31was
24:31probably
24:32all
24:32flats
24:32belonging
24:33to
24:33Jews
24:33that
24:33Speer
24:34was
24:34distributing,
24:35he
24:35said
24:35I
24:36don't
24:37believe
24:37that
24:37Speer
24:37knows
24:38that.
24:39I
24:39think
24:39he
24:39was
24:39convinced
24:40of
24:40that.
24:41Excuse
24:42me
24:42for
24:42being
24:42a
24:42bit
24:42naive,
24:43but
24:43it
24:43is
24:43my
24:44firm
24:44conviction
24:45that
24:45he
24:45was
24:45not
24:45having
24:46me
24:46on
24:46when
24:46he
24:46said
24:47I
24:47don't
24:48believe
24:48that
24:49Minister
24:49Speer
24:49knows
24:50that.
24:51That
24:51was
24:52his
24:52reaction.
24:55Kerbels
24:56continued to
24:56use
24:57Rommel's
24:57presence
24:57for
24:58propaganda
24:58purposes.
25:01On
25:02the 30th
25:02of September
25:031942,
25:04the Winter
25:04Charity
25:05campaign
25:05opened
25:06in
25:06Berlin.
25:06Rommel
25:08owed
25:08Hitler
25:08a
25:09great
25:09deal
25:09and
25:10as
25:10a
25:10result
25:10was
25:10loyal
25:11to
25:11him.
25:12Hitler
25:12said
25:12of
25:12him,
25:14He
25:14is
25:14a
25:14safe
25:14pair
25:14of
25:15hands.
25:15He
25:16is
25:16not
25:16just
25:16close
25:16to
25:16us
25:17national
25:17socialists.
25:18He
25:18is
25:18a
25:19national
25:19socialist.
25:21My
25:21father
25:21was a
25:23career
25:24soldier
25:24and
25:25tried
25:25hard
25:26to
25:26stay
25:26out
25:26of
25:26politics.
25:29I
25:30think
25:30he
25:30hardly
25:30thought
25:30about
25:31political
25:31issues
25:32because
25:34he
25:34had
25:34taken
25:34to
25:34heart
25:35the
25:35idea
25:35that
25:35soldiers
25:36should
25:36have
25:36nothing
25:37to
25:37do
25:37with
25:37politics.
25:41The next
25:42day there
25:43was an
25:43improvised
25:43press
25:44conference.
25:45Although the
25:46situation in
25:46North Africa
25:47looked almost
25:48hopeless,
25:49Rommel
25:49seemed
25:49optimistic.
25:51Today we are
25:51100 kilometers
25:52from Alexandria
25:53and Cairo
25:54and have the
25:55gate of
25:55Egypt in
25:56our sights
25:56and we
25:57intend to
25:58be
25:58successful.
25:59But Rommel
26:00no longer
26:01believed his
26:01own rhetoric.
26:03Meanwhile
26:03at
26:03El Alamein
26:04Montgomery
26:05was preparing
26:05for the
26:06decisive
26:06battle.
26:08You can't
26:09describe it.
26:10You're
26:10undercover
26:10and still
26:11you think
26:11they'll hit
26:12me,
26:12they'll hit
26:13me,
26:13they'll hit
26:13me.
26:14It was a
26:15miracle that
26:15they didn't
26:15get every
26:16single person.
26:17The artillery
26:18was practically
26:18picking off
26:19individuals.
26:20Not a foot
26:21of sand
26:21was left
26:21untouched.
26:23Montgomery
26:24had filled
26:24his soldiers
26:25with hate.
26:27Everyone,
26:27everyone must
26:28be imbued
26:29with the
26:29burning desire
26:30to kill
26:30Germans.
26:34If you speak
26:34today about
26:35feelings towards
26:36the enemy,
26:36they didn't
26:37exist in
26:37battle.
26:39They only
26:40existed
26:40afterwards or
26:41when they
26:41were wounded
26:42or prisoners.
26:44During the
26:45fighting,
26:45there weren't
26:46any feelings.
26:49That is
26:50stuff and
26:50nonsense.
26:51It was war.
26:54Not a
26:54kid's game.
26:58Despite
26:58heavy losses,
26:59the Germans
27:00and Italians
27:01were able
27:01to hold
27:02off the
27:02first
27:02onslaught.
27:06Rommel's
27:06successor
27:06in Africa,
27:08General
27:08Stummer,
27:09wanted to
27:09go to the
27:09front to
27:10get an
27:10idea of
27:11the
27:11situation.
27:17General
27:18Stummer
27:18said to
27:19Colonel
27:19Westphal,
27:20I'd like to
27:21see the
27:21front for
27:21myself.
27:22I'll
27:22drive up
27:22there
27:23myself.
27:24Westphal
27:24said,
27:25Sir,
27:25you can't
27:26do that.
27:26you don't
27:26know the
27:27terrain.
27:28Yes,
27:28I do,
27:28I've got
27:29my maps.
27:30Well,
27:30the maps
27:30were practically
27:31blank because
27:32there were no
27:32features anywhere.
27:34And so
27:34General Stummer
27:35drove up there
27:36with Colonel
27:37Buchting,
27:37the head of
27:38intelligence.
27:41After a few
27:42kilometers,
27:43Stummer was hit
27:44by enemy
27:45fire.
27:47He had a
27:47fatal heart
27:48attack and
27:49his body was
27:50left in the
27:50desert.
27:51Anyway,
27:55the driver
27:56came back to
27:56headquarters without
27:57his commander,
27:58the general.
27:59It was,
27:59of course,
28:00a catastrophe.
28:01The British
28:01would attack and
28:02no more
28:03commander-in-chief.
28:06On the
28:0724th of
28:07October 1942,
28:09Rommel was in
28:10Wiener Neustadt.
28:12He still
28:13didn't know
28:13Stummer was
28:14dead.
28:17His daughter
28:18Gertrude was
28:18visiting him.
28:21My mother
28:23said,
28:26Führer
28:26headquarters has
28:27called.
28:30And then
28:30the Führer
28:31was on the
28:31phone,
28:32wanting
28:33Field Marshal
28:34Rommel.
28:38Hitler
28:39personally
28:40told him
28:40to go to
28:41Vienna,
28:43catch a
28:43plane to
28:44Naples
28:44and then
28:45to Africa
28:46because the
28:48British
28:48had attacked
28:49at El
28:50Alamein.
28:5124 hours
28:56later,
28:57Rommel
28:57was back
28:58in Africa.
28:59British
28:59troops were
29:00attacking his
29:00defenses
29:01relentlessly.
29:02It was now
29:13only a matter
29:13of time
29:14till they
29:14broke
29:15through.
29:16After
29:17seven days,
29:18Rommel
29:18could only
29:19retreat.
29:23I can
29:24well remember
29:24Colonel
29:25Westphal,
29:26he was our
29:26first staff
29:27officer,
29:28rang Rommel
29:28and said,
29:29the British
29:29have broken
29:30through
29:30Grenadier
29:31Regiment
29:31125
29:32again.
29:33What shall
29:34we do?
29:35I think it
29:36was the
29:36fourth day
29:37of the attack.
29:38Rommel said,
29:39get the army
29:39ready to leave.
29:41Tomorrow I
29:41want to lead
29:42them according
29:42to the mission
29:43tactics.
29:45Westphal asked,
29:46when should the
29:47army be ready
29:48to leave?
29:48Tomorrow morning
29:49at six?
29:49No, said
29:50Rommel,
29:51tonight at
29:5211.
29:53And it
29:53was, as far
29:54as I
29:54remember,
29:54already 9.15
29:56p.m.
30:01The news
30:01of Rommel's
30:02retreat reached
30:03Hitler's HQ in
30:04Rustenburg,
30:05East Prussia,
30:06in the early
30:06hours of the
30:073rd of November
30:081942.
30:10Major Wilhelm
30:10Borne was
30:11on duty.
30:12On that
30:17night, my
30:18father received
30:19a telex from
30:20Rommel, saying
30:22that he had
30:22started the
30:23retreat,
30:26although this
30:28did not come
30:28as news to
30:29my father.
30:34And he
30:34forwarded
30:35Rommel's
30:36message,
30:38together with
30:38his own
30:39Pracy,
30:42for the
30:43Progress
30:43meeting,
30:44which was
30:45to take
30:46place on
30:47the following
30:47morning.
30:52When
30:52Hitler learned
30:53about the
30:53retreat the
30:54next morning,
30:55he thundered
30:55treason.
30:57If he'd been
30:57informed immediately,
30:59he could have
30:59stopped Rommel's
31:00plan, he
31:00thought.
31:01Major Borne
31:02was summoned.
31:08The first
31:08thing my
31:09father knew
31:10about it
31:10was that
31:11Hitler came
31:12up to him
31:12seething with
31:14rage, and
31:15in the first
31:16sentence hurled
31:17at him,
31:19in less than
31:2060 minutes,
31:22you will be
31:22shot as a
31:24saboteur.
31:28Borne was
31:29not killed.
31:30Instead, he was
31:31demoted to the
31:31rank of gunner and
31:33sent to the
31:33Atlantic Wall, on
31:34probation.
31:36At 2pm on the
31:374th of November,
31:38Rommel got a
31:39wireless message
31:39from Fuhrer HQ.
31:41Hitler ordered
31:42him to halt the
31:43retreat and hold
31:44out.
31:45You cannot lead
31:46your men anywhere
31:47but to victory
31:48or death.
31:50Adolf Hitler.
31:51When the order came
31:56through from
31:56Hitler's HQ that
31:58Rommel must hold
31:58his position at
31:59El Alamein until
32:00the last man, he
32:02was standing, as
32:03far as I can
32:03remember, next to
32:04me in the car.
32:07And when
32:07Westphal gave it
32:08to him, I
32:09don't know now
32:10whether he read it
32:11himself quickly or
32:12whether Westphal told
32:13him, he said,
32:14I wouldn't dream
32:16of it.
32:17I wouldn't dream
32:18of it, sacrificing
32:20the Africa Corps
32:21here in El Alamein.
32:26However, Rommel
32:27followed the order
32:27and stopped the
32:28retreat.
32:29Later, he wrote,
32:30We all felt as
32:31though we had been
32:32hit in the face.
32:33And for the first
32:34time during the
32:35African campaign, I
32:36didn't know what
32:37to do.
32:38Rommel, the
32:39soldier, was in a
32:40state of inner
32:40conflict.
32:41Should he obey
32:42or not?
32:44And soon it
32:46was being said
32:47that Hitler was
32:47mad.
32:48He must be
32:49mad.
32:51A force of more
32:52than 200,000 men
32:54who can no longer
32:55defend themselves,
32:56who haven't enough
32:58ammunition and
32:59petrol, who will
33:01very shortly be
33:02completely unable
33:03to fight, to just
33:06let them be wiped
33:07out completely, it
33:08can't be true, we
33:10said.
33:10We didn't yet
33:14know what had
33:15happened at
33:15Stalingrad.
33:20Rommel hesitated
33:21for 24 hours, then
33:23ordered the retreat
33:24against Hitler's
33:25express orders.
33:27He wrote a letter
33:28of farewell to his
33:29wife.
33:30Dearest Lou, what
33:32will become of us
33:33is for God to
33:34decide.
33:34May you and our
33:36boy be well.
33:37I kiss you both.
33:40You are Ervin.
33:46At the same time
33:47in Russia, German
33:49forces under
33:49General Paulus were
33:51reaching the suburbs
33:51of Stalingrad.
34:07On the 19th of
34:08November 1942, they
34:10were surrounded by
34:11the Red Army.
34:12They had only a few
34:13days to break out,
34:15yet Paulus
34:15hesitated.
34:16You can draw
34:21comparisons between
34:22El Alamein and
34:24Stalingrad, and
34:26personalities like
34:27Paulus and
34:28Rommel.
34:30Both knew they
34:31were decisive
34:31battles at a
34:32turning point in
34:33the war.
34:35Both were
34:35ordered not to
34:36give up one
34:37metre of ground
34:38and not to
34:39retreat one
34:40metre.
34:43One followed
34:45the order, and
34:46one did not.
34:48Nothing happened
34:49to Rommel.
34:51Historians
34:52sometimes say,
34:53if Paulus had
34:54dared to break
34:55out, he would
34:56have been
34:56sentenced to
34:57death.
34:58Do you know
34:59how I replied
35:00to that?
35:01So what?
35:02A field
35:03marshal has to
35:04take risks to
35:05save 100,000
35:06lives.
35:11In
35:11Stalingrad on
35:12the 31st of
35:13January 1943,
35:1450,000 soldiers
35:16had been killed.
35:19200,000 became
35:21Soviet prisoners.
35:23Only a few
35:25thousand would
35:25return home
35:26many years
35:27later.
35:32Paulus put
35:33obedience above
35:34the lives of his
35:35men.
35:35Rommel did
35:37not.
35:46Of course,
35:48there was a
35:48difference.
35:50Putting it
35:50crudely, if you
35:52are a darling of
35:53the regime, you
35:55can afford more
35:56than if you are a
35:57number among many
35:58army commanders.
35:59That sounds
36:02hard, but I
36:03would like to put
36:04on record the
36:05fact that there
36:06were differences.
36:08That does not
36:09diminish what
36:10Rommel did, but
36:12it was easier
36:13for him.
36:15It was easier.
36:23More than 30,000
36:24German and Italian
36:25soldiers remained
36:26in El Alamein
36:27and were taken
36:28prisoner.
36:34Among them was a
36:36German general,
36:37Wilhelm Ritter von
36:38Thoma.
36:42Montgomery invited
36:43him to dinner.
36:56Don Thoma was a
36:57very decent fellow
36:59and he was
37:02shocked, but
37:04obviously quite
37:05enjoying sitting
37:06next to Monty.
37:08And Monty said
37:10to him, well,
37:12I've beaten
37:12Rommel once in
37:14the first battle
37:14of El Alamein
37:15and I'm going to
37:16beat him again.
37:18And Martin Thoma
37:19said, ah, so.
37:21And then, a
37:22dramatic moment,
37:24orderly came into
37:25the room with a
37:26message.
37:27Monty read it.
37:29And the message
37:29said that we've
37:30captured Fouca,
37:31which was quite a
37:32long way up the
37:33coast.
37:33We'd broken out
37:34and captured Fouca.
37:35So Monty said to
37:36Vontoma, I have
37:38and I was very
37:41surprised and
37:43couldn't believe it.
37:48Montgomery had won
37:49the decisive victory.
37:51Rommel's army was
37:52on the retreat.
38:00A soldier came in,
38:03one of our privates,
38:06in complete disarray.
38:07covered in sand and
38:11dirt.
38:14He came into the
38:16headquarters and
38:17said, it's all
38:19over, it's all
38:21over.
38:22I looked at the
38:23man and then a few
38:25officers said, he's
38:27got sunstroke.
38:29Take him to
38:29hospital quickly.
38:30And when I went to
38:35the man, a lot
38:37more started coming
38:38in, a lot
38:39more.
38:41It was the
38:42beginning of the
38:43end.
38:45There was relief
38:47in London.
38:50Rommel's army has
38:51been defeated.
38:53It has been
38:54routed.
38:55It has been very
38:57largely destroyed as a
38:59fighting force.
39:03Ah, this is not the
39:05end.
39:06It is not even the
39:07beginning of the end.
39:10But it is perhaps the
39:12end of the beginning.
39:13Well, Alamein, as you
39:20know, was a decisive
39:22British victory.
39:24And in Hap 3, we had
39:28hour after hour, day
39:30after day, these bitter
39:33reports from Rommel
39:35people, saying,
39:36Panzerarmist is
39:37exhausted, Panzerarmist
39:40are schuft.
39:42We have 24 tanks
39:44left, we have 17
39:45tanks left, and I
39:46remember one day we
39:47have 11 tanks, 11
39:49tanks only left.
39:51And, I mean, you
39:52could have parked
39:52those 11 tanks on the
39:54lawns around this
39:54house, you know, it's
39:55so few.
39:57And we could not
39:58understand why
39:59Montgomery was not
40:03able to exploit the
40:04victory.
40:0670,000 German and
40:0830,000 Italian
40:09soldiers were fleeing
40:10with Rommel.
40:12He said,
40:14After all these
40:14experiences, I can
40:16only admit to one
40:17mistake, and that
40:19is that I did not
40:19ignore the order
40:20victory or death
40:2224 hours earlier.
40:25Hitler reluctantly
40:26accepted Rommel's
40:27disobedience.
40:29Rommel was
40:29shattered.
40:31I realised that
40:32Hitler didn't want
40:33to see the true
40:34situation.
40:35He was protecting
40:36himself emotionally
40:37from what his
40:38intellect told him.
40:42From that point on,
40:45Rommel was no longer
40:47the same.
40:48It was a real change.
40:51He was different.
40:53I was with him every
40:54evening in our little
40:55group.
40:57He hardly spoke.
40:58Everyone was thinking,
41:00what can we say to the
41:02supreme commander, as we
41:04could only call it,
41:05moving backwards
41:06fighting, rather than
41:08retreat.
41:12In Alexandria, on the 8th
41:14of November, 1942,
41:16German and Italian
41:17prisoners were driven
41:18through the town.
41:19On the same day, Americans
41:22landed in Algeria and
41:24Morocco.
41:25Rommel's war in North
41:27Africa was finally lost.
41:29The End of
41:59Gracias.
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