- 4 months ago
A look at the U.S. involvement in and struggle for control of the Nicaraguan Revolution.
Category
📺
TVTranscript
00:00The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua turned out to be just an exchange of one set of autocratic
00:16rulers for another. No sooner was victory achieved than a small clique ousted others who had been
00:24part of the revolution from having any voice in the government. Humberto Ortega, the minister
00:29of defense, declared Marxism-Leninism would be their guide. And so it is.
00:39In 1979, there was a revolution in Nicaragua.
00:45A revolution that shocked Central America and challenged the United States, much as Cuba had in 1959.
00:52It was a revolution that the United States first tried to prevent,
01:01then tried to court, and then tried to undermine.
01:06Will interventionism in Central America again be imposed with impunity?
01:15Will the United States promote a wrong-headed policy, a policy which will detonate a regional crisis,
01:22a policy worsening an already difficult international situation?
01:26The Sandinista Revolution erupted in a small country of only two and a half million people
01:33that had been a trusted U.S. ally for half a century.
01:44The crisis had its roots in a dynasty, the Somozas.
01:48Boasting of anti-communism, they skillfully manipulated U.S. policy.
01:55There were three Somozas who took their turns ruling Nicaragua, a father and two sons.
02:02They maintained a democratic facade, but whenever challenged, they called out their National Guard.
02:07The only thing that the opposition wanted in Nicaragua is a real free election.
02:16Right now, they are killing people in the street of Managua.
02:20While the Somoza family is in power in Nicaragua,
02:24I believe we are not going to have peace in Nicaragua.
02:30You say the chief criticism is because I am a Somoza.
02:34Well, I'm very proud to be a Somoza, and I will continue to be proud.
02:37The difference with the Somozas is, I believe, if I'm not mistaken, as follows.
02:47Tacho, the old man, Tacho Somoza Garcia, he was a remarkable, charming fellow.
02:55Nice looking, and he was more liked than disliked.
03:01Luis, he was goody-goody, very moderate,
03:06and everybody liked him.
03:08But Tachito, he was more aggressive.
03:12I knew him since he was a kid.
03:15And later on, he was accused of being even bloodthirsty.
03:20Nobody liked the young Anastasio Somoza de Baile.
03:26Hardly anybody liked him.
03:27He was too arrogant.
03:32Nicaragua in 1927.
03:34Central America saw the smoke of civil war rise in a tropical sky.
03:38The origins of the dynasty date back to the 1920s and 30s.
03:42It was then to end a civil war that the United States created a nonpartisan armed force,
03:48the National Guard,
03:49and chose the first Somoza, U.S.-educated Anastasio Somoza Garcia,
03:55to be its first Nicaraguan commander.
03:59The U.S. Marines had been stationed in Nicaragua for two decades,
04:04and many Nicaraguans had come to resent them.
04:07A rebel general, Augusto Cesar Sandino,
04:10led a six-year guerrilla campaign to drive the Marines out.
04:14In 1933, the Marines willingly left.
04:19Somoza then turned the supposedly neutral guard into a tool of his own ambitions.
04:24In 1934, Somoza had his rival Sandino assassinated,
04:29and in 1936, he took the presidency by force.
04:33Anagua, Nicaragua is a beautiful town.
04:37You buy a hot sea and a for a few places of town.
04:40A popular American song in the 40s depicted Nicaragua as a paradise.
04:45As post-war prices for Nicaraguan exports rose,
04:49the wealthy enjoyed good times.
04:53For rich Nicaraguans like these,
04:55attending the 1950 wedding of young Anastasio Somoza de Barley,
05:00Nicaragua was wonderful.
05:01In 1956, the father of the dynasty was assassinated.
05:21After 20 years, many felt it was time for a change.
05:25But as Somoza's favorite horse, Cashbox, led his funeral procession,
05:30Somoza's oldest son, Luis, stepped into the presidency.
05:35Young Anastasio, a West Point graduate and the new chief of the National Guard,
05:39jailed the family's political opponents.
05:42All the people of this hemisphere are entitled to a decent way of life.
05:47In 1961, President Kennedy, recognizing the need for change in Latin America,
05:55launched an ambitious economic and military assistance program,
05:59the Alliance for Progress.
06:01Fearing more Cubas,
06:03President Kennedy challenged Latin American dictators to reform.
06:07Those who make peaceful revolution impossible
06:09will make violent revolution inevitable.
06:12U.S. funds poured into Nicaragua.
06:19A Central American common market was formed,
06:22and Nicaragua's middle class expanded.
06:25It was a decade of hope.
06:31But when in 1967,
06:33rigged elections brought the third Somoza,
06:36Anastasio Somoza de Barley,
06:37to the presidency,
06:38the hopes for political reform were dashed.
06:42In addition,
06:45the economic boom of the 60s primarily profited the rich.
06:51The decade of the 60s
06:54brought economic progress,
06:58tremendous economic growth,
07:007, 8 percent.
07:02Unfortunately,
07:06we could not accomplish all the social progress
07:10that Nicaragua needed.
07:13The poor people of the third world
07:15have become aware of how poor they are,
07:18how the other side lives,
07:21and they are demanding
07:23more social progress
07:25to be held in a very short time.
07:32In 1972,
07:35a massive earthquake destroyed Nicaragua's capital.
07:4110,000 people died.
07:43300,000 were left homeless.
07:46Somoza exploited the tragedy.
07:48Many of the aid that came
07:51after the earthquake
07:53was personally taken
07:56by Somoza
07:57and by his cronies.
07:59Land development
08:00became quite a business
08:02after the earthquake
08:03on account of Managua
08:04having to move
08:05into the outskirts
08:07of the city.
08:08There,
08:10Somoza
08:10showed his greediness,
08:12and everyone in Nicaragua
08:15became convinced
08:15that it was
08:17a necessity
08:18to get rid
08:19of Somoza,
08:20to get rid of corruption.
08:22By the mid-70s,
08:24Somoza was the richest man
08:25in Central America.
08:27In a nation
08:28of poor farmers,
08:29he owned
08:30one-fifth
08:31of Nicaragua's farmland.
08:33He also owned
08:33Nicaragua's only
08:34two meat processing plants
08:36licensed to export,
08:38three of the country's
08:39six sugar mills,
08:40and numerous
08:41agricultural processing.
08:42With his business partners,
08:45he owned 168 factories,
08:48a quarter of the
08:49industrial economy.
08:50He owned Nicaragua's
08:52only airline,
08:53a radio and TV station,
08:55and the Mercedes-Benz
08:56dealership.
08:58He controlled
08:59many of the
08:59transportation
09:00and marketing companies
09:01that exported
09:02what he produced,
09:04and he used
09:05his own banks
09:05and the National Treasury
09:06to finance
09:07his operations.
09:10A small group
09:12of men and women
09:12was committed
09:13to a violent overthrow
09:14of the Somoza government.
09:16They called themselves
09:18Sandinistas,
09:19after Sandino,
09:20the rebel leader
09:21of the 20s.
09:24They are depicted
09:25in this government
09:26training film
09:27by National Guardsmen.
09:28The actual
09:31Sandinista Front
09:32for National Liberation,
09:33the FSLN,
09:34was created
09:35in 1961.
09:37The only surviving
09:38founder is
09:39Comandante
09:39Thomas Borges.
09:40I joined the struggle
09:48against Somoza
09:49in 1944
09:52when, as a child,
09:55I saw the brutality
09:56of the National Guard.
10:02One time,
10:04Somoza Garcia,
10:05the father of the
10:06Somoza dynasty,
10:08arrived in Matagalpa.
10:09All of the students
10:11in my school
10:12had to stand
10:13in line
10:14to shake hands
10:15with the dictator.
10:17I refused
10:18to shake hands
10:19with him.
10:20That is when
10:20my struggle
10:21against Somoza
10:22began.
10:26In 1974,
10:28the Sandinistas
10:29struck.
10:31Commandos
10:31burst into
10:32a Christmas party
10:33attended by many
10:33of Somoza's
10:34top officials
10:35and took
10:3626 guests hostage.
10:37I was in charge
10:45of training
10:46the commandos.
10:51I had spent
10:52over a year
10:52in Cuba
10:53in a military school
10:55from which
10:56I graduated.
11:00This qualified me
11:01to train
11:02my fellow
11:02Sandinistas.
11:08The Sandinistas
11:09demanded the release
11:10of 14 political
11:12prisoners
11:12and $5 million.
11:14Somoza granted
11:15most of their demands
11:16but then declared
11:18a state of siege.
11:19Over the next
11:20two years,
11:21the Sandinistas
11:22were devastated.
11:22It was a violent
11:29repression.
11:31In the countryside,
11:32in the mountains,
11:33they tried in vain
11:34to eradicate
11:35the control,
11:36the networks
11:36that the Sandinista
11:37front had created.
11:40Without a doubt,
11:41the majority
11:42of the people
11:42who died,
11:43the victims
11:44of this repression,
11:45were not even
11:46militants
11:46or members
11:47of the Sandinista
11:48front.
11:50Sometimes
11:51they were not
11:51even sympathizers.
11:52They were simply
11:54people who had
11:55the misfortune
11:56of being near
11:57an area
11:57where some
11:58incident had occurred.
12:01They encountered
12:02members of the
12:03National Guard
12:04who were arrogant
12:05or hysterical,
12:07who had the
12:08desire to kill.
12:12In his 1977
12:17inaugural address,
12:19President Carter
12:20sent the world's
12:21dictators a message.
12:22U.S. aid
12:26would be
12:26contingent upon
12:27respect for
12:28human rights.
12:29People's more
12:31numerous and
12:31more politically
12:32aware are
12:34craving and
12:36now demanding
12:36their place
12:38in the sun,
12:39not just for
12:41the benefit of
12:42their own
12:42physical condition,
12:44but for basic
12:46human rights.
12:47rights.
12:50Regional reaction
12:51varied.
12:53The military
12:53government of
12:54Guatemala, the
12:55most repressive
12:55in Central
12:56America, rejected
12:57U.S. aid.
12:59No U.S.
12:59president would
13:00tell them how
13:01to run their
13:01country.
13:03In Nicaragua,
13:04however, Somoza
13:04accepted Carter's
13:05conditions.
13:07In September of
13:081977, Somoza
13:10lifted his
13:10state of siege.
13:12Somoza recognized
13:13at the very
13:15beginning of the
13:16administration that
13:17he had what he
13:18would consider a
13:19human rights
13:20problem and that
13:21he would have to
13:22do things
13:23internally that
13:25would permit the
13:25United States to
13:26have a normal
13:27relationship with
13:28him.
13:29At the same time,
13:30his opposition in
13:31the country realized
13:33that they might have
13:34a chance for the
13:35first time to
13:37voice their
13:37concerns, to
13:39try to change the
13:41political system
13:42in Nicaragua.
13:43The leading
13:44Nicaraguan opposition
13:45figure at the
13:46time was Pedro
13:47Joaquin Chamorro,
13:49publisher of the
13:50popular opposition
13:51newspaper La
13:51Prensa.
13:53Chamorro had
13:54struggled all his
13:55life against the
13:56Somoza dynasty.
14:00I remember one
14:02time Pedro Joaquin
14:03came to Venezuela
14:04while I was
14:05president and he
14:06told me,
14:07Carlos Andres,
14:08now you can do
14:09something for my
14:10country, and I
14:11answered, Pedro
14:12Joaquin, you are
14:14the one who has
14:14to do it, and
14:15if you do, I'll
14:16support you, but
14:18such are the
14:19ironies of life.
14:20It was the death
14:21of Pedro Joaquin
14:22Chamorro, the
14:23assassination of
14:24Pedro Joaquin
14:25Chamorro that
14:26ignited the
14:27Nicaraguan
14:27volcano.
14:33Chamorro was
14:34assassinated on
14:35January 10, 1978.
14:38No one ever
14:38determined who
14:39ordered the
14:39murder, but
14:40everyone blamed
14:41Somoza.
14:57It was
14:57tremendous the
14:58way the people
14:59expressed their
15:00feelings about him
15:01at that moment.
15:02There was also a
15:03lot of unrest as
15:05a result of the
15:06assassination.
15:06assassination.
15:07It was very sad
15:09for me, of
15:09course, and it
15:10feels as though it
15:11just happened
15:12today, because
15:14when you love
15:15someone, you
15:16never forget
15:16that.
15:17There was only one
15:36Somoza left, Anastasia.
15:38It was then that the
15:40people united to have
15:41demonstrations, strikes,
15:43uprisings.
15:50After Chamorro's
15:52burial, the National
15:53Guard, provoked by
15:54taunts and rock
15:55throwing, opened fire
15:56fire on the crowd.
15:57Outraged by Chamorro's
16:17murder, business leaders
16:19organized a nationwide
16:20shutdown and asked
16:22Somoza to resign.
16:24Events forged an improbable alliance.
16:27The middle class picked up the revolutionary chant,
16:30a people united will never be defeated.
16:41Rioting broke out in several cities.
16:53People built barricades to keep the National Guard
16:57out of their neighborhoods.
17:16The Carter administration became very concerned
17:19after the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro.
17:22In January 78,
17:25and a general strike in the uprisings after that,
17:29it became clear that the descent to Somoza was strong,
17:35it was deep, and it was wide.
17:37It included the business, community, and everyone.
17:44When the insurrection against the Somoza regime began,
17:47it was perfectly clear that it was not an action
17:50directed exclusively by one guerrilla group
17:52or by one political ideology.
17:55On the contrary,
17:57it was perhaps one of the broadest,
17:58most popular movements in the history of Latin America.
18:02All of the people were fighting against Somoza.
18:05Era todo el pueblo luchando contra Somoza.
18:08Mr. President,
18:09some members of the opposition
18:11have called for you to resign.
18:14Could you tell us
18:15what your response would be to such a request?
18:18Nixon.
18:19Could you be more elaborate?
18:21Yes, I would say no.
18:24The Chamorro incident
18:25has obviously affected the nation.
18:28Absolutely.
18:29He was your political enemy for many years.
18:32Can you tell us
18:32how you personally felt about the assassination?
18:35Personally.
18:37Well,
18:37I felt like I always thought I would feel.
18:41That was the biggest mistake made by anybody to kill him.
18:46Are you saddened by his death?
18:47Sure.
18:47I'm a politician.
18:49I could be killed too, you know.
18:52I'm a human being too.
19:03In August of 1978,
19:05the Sandinistas seized the National Palace.
19:08They held the entire Nicaraguan Congress hostage.
19:12In the attack of the palace,
19:13I was the acting president of the Congress.
19:15And I remember that when I got shot here in my head
19:20and blood started falling,
19:22I fell down
19:23because they told everybody to go to the floor.
19:26And to the secretary,
19:28I was bleeding on his pants
19:29and I saw a military face
19:30that I knew the face.
19:33I couldn't really place who he was.
19:36And I said,
19:37Officer,
19:38is the situation under control?
19:40And then I received the kick,
19:41well, not a very hard kick,
19:42you know,
19:43on my back
19:44and he says,
19:44I am a Den Pastora.
19:46Viva la Revolución.
19:47Viva el Frente Sandinista.
19:48And he took out his red handkerchief.
19:54There was a man on the floor
19:55who tried to get up when he saw me
19:57and asked,
19:58what happened, officer?
20:00And I told him,
20:00you will see what happened,
20:02what is going on.
20:03I slammed the butt of my rifle
20:07against the table
20:08and yelled,
20:09this is the people's army,
20:11the Sandinista Front
20:12for National Liberation.
20:17After two days of negotiations,
20:20Eden Pastora released the hostages.
20:22In return,
20:23the Sandinistas received
20:24half a million dollars,
20:26the publication of a communique,
20:28the release of 59 political prisoners,
20:30and safe passage out of the country.
20:32The trip from the palace
20:42to the airport,
20:43that trip was the reward
20:45the people gave us
20:46for our attitude,
20:49our conduct,
20:50and our struggle.
20:54A multitude spilled onto the road
20:56along those 11 kilometers.
20:59They applauded us.
21:02They cheered us.
21:03Nos echaban vivas.
21:09When we were going to the airport,
21:11I remember that the pastora
21:12told me,
21:14look, Louis Palais,
21:15look how the people
21:16is worrying about me.
21:17You know,
21:18how the people is for us.
21:19And honestly,
21:19I didn't see so many people.
21:21You know,
21:21and I told him,
21:22I told him,
21:22there's not so much people,
21:23there's crowds of 50,
21:24of 100, you know.
21:25And it's true that they were
21:26doing the victory to him
21:27and say,
21:28then, zero.
21:29Because, of course,
21:30to be honest,
21:31I mean,
21:32that was a brave act
21:33of pastora.
21:34I mean,
21:34nobody can deny that
21:35it was a,
21:36I mean,
21:36I don't know how many
21:37hundred years
21:38nobody had ever
21:39taken a Congress.
21:40The success of the palace raid
21:53triggered uprisings
21:54in seven cities.
22:00I am fighting against Somoza
22:02because Somoza
22:04is the biggest killer
22:05in Central America.
22:06The people of Nicaragua
22:07don't want that Somoza
22:08continue to rule the nation.
22:10All right.
22:14For the first time,
22:25the Sandinistas
22:25launched large-scale attacks
22:27against the National Guard.
22:40Somoza struck back,
22:54showing little concern
22:55for the civilian population.
22:56the National Guard.
23:00They were so close to the hotel.
23:03Pato, the balancier!
23:05The balancier!
23:08Pato, the bar!
23:10Pato!
23:11Hey!
23:13Hey, my mother!
23:15Hey, my mother.
23:18I'm going to leave my mother's house and everything we have inside.
23:23No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
23:26Oh, my God.
23:27After two weeks, the guard routed the Sandinistas.
23:49Tens of thousands of refugees fled toward neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica.
23:54The National Guard soldiers are on drugs, they're drunk, they care about nothing, they're
24:05murderers.
24:07I guess what really gave it crisis proportions was the outbreak of violence in September of
24:1778.
24:18That really, really demonstrated that the disintegration had really reached dangerous proportions.
24:26That for Samosa to keep his grip on the country meant he would have to really resort more
24:30and more to naked force.
24:32Furthermore, it was clear, I think, certainly by September of 78, that the real problem was
24:38Samosa's continuance in power.
24:40The only way you were going to affect a political transition, you had to key it to Samosa's
24:47departure.
24:49And that was, I think, very evident by 78.
24:53And that presented a real dilemma and a real problem.
24:55How do you do that?
24:56The Carter administration was opposed to forcing Samosa to resign.
25:04Instead, on September 21st, the U.S. called on the Organization of American States to sponsor
25:09mediation talks between the Samosa government and anti-Samosa moderates and the Sandinistas.
25:15And the opposition groups within Nicaraguan society.
25:19But you really had a dilemma.
25:22Administration officials intellectually recognized that you had to affect the change or it was
25:27going to collapse into radicalization and that to affect the change, Samosa had to go.
25:32On the other hand, they were not prepared, frankly, it seems to me, to use the kind of actions
25:40that they would have had to use, the kind of pressures that they would have had to use because
25:46it tended to violate self-imposed limitations.
25:50We did not intend to overthrow any government, not just in Nicaragua, no government of the
25:56right nor of the left.
25:58President Carter had been elected highly critical of the covert actions against Chile.
26:05We did not intend to repeat actions like that.
26:10We would not only look inconsistent with what Carter had said about non-intervention, but
26:16we would also look incompetent and impotent because in our view, in the view of many
26:23in the administration, Samosa was not prepared to step down at that point.
26:27Look, there are 200,000 property owners in Nicaragua that I am not ready to give it to
26:33the communists unless there is an election and an orderly way that they know with what
26:39they count.
26:40There was an underestimation of how obdurate and stubborn Samosa was.
26:48What happened was when the mediation collapsed, the center got chewed up.
26:53In fact, they threw up their hands and said, well, maybe there is no other way.
26:57It was the collapse of any alternative to violence which legitimized the Sandinistas.
27:03The Sandinistas pulled out of the mediation talks after only three weeks and retreated
27:10to plan their next offensive.
27:16They were not interested in any settlement that would strengthen the moderate center and
27:20anti-Samosa business groups.
27:22The decisive and the only way possible to defeat Samosa was through armed struggle.
27:33And in that sense, Nicaraguan businessmen did not have the experience, the guts or the commitment
27:39that the Sandinista front had.
27:41It was not a question of a businessman's revolution or a Sandinista revolution.
27:47Business groups wanted to keep the rules of the game intact in Nicaragua.
27:51But only superficial changes.
27:54And that was completely different from what the Sandinista front or national liberation wanted.
28:03Throughout 1978, Sandinista military supplies had come from a variety of countries.
28:10But in early 1979, after the Sandinistas formally established a unified nine-man directorate, Cuba
28:16became their chief arms supplier.
28:19The increase in arms flow was dramatic.
28:24General Torrijos of Panama gave firm support to the Sandinista front in the way of arms and
28:32other resources.
28:35The Social Democrats of Venezuela supported us in the same way, perhaps with the idea
28:40that Nicaragua would change along a social democratic path.
28:46Also, the President of Costa Rica at that time lent us valuable help by facilitating the delivery
28:52of some arms which Fidel Castro gave to our revolution.
29:01On May 29th, 1979, the Sandinistas launched another major offensive.
29:06Right now, the FSLN, the vanguard of our people, is launching the final offensive against
29:15the Samosa dictatorship.
29:20As the fighting spread, Samosa reinstituted a state of siege.
29:41Summary executions became commonplace.
29:44Every morning, bodies turned up on the shores of Lake Managua.
29:53Then on June 20th, U.S. newsman Bill Stewart was murdered by a National Guardsman.
29:58The murder was broadcast on American television that evening.
30:14The U.S. newsman Bill Stewart was murdered by a National Guardsman.
30:28On June 21st, an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States was convened
30:33in Washington.
30:34In a stark reversal of policy, the United States proposed sending an inter-American peacekeeping
30:39force to Nicaragua.
30:41The OAS blocked the initiative, calling it interventionist.
30:45Instead, the OAS passed a resolution simply asking Samosa to resign.
30:50The Carter administration, bucking a strong Samosa lobby in the U.S. Congress, dispatched
30:55a new U.S. ambassador to tell Samosa to get out.
30:58Well, I arrived alone and met Samosa, who was accompanied by Congressman Jack Murphy from
31:06Staten Island, which surprised me.
31:09And the foreign minister.
31:16What I told Samosa, and I read to Samosa, was a series of concerns.
31:22And it began with a statement that we didn't see how the conflict could end without Samosa
31:29leaving the scene.
31:30Samosa would leave, and he was agreeable to leaving, but under the condition that the
31:34Guardia be kept intact, and that the Liberal Party, which was the major party in the country,
31:41continue, and that a non-communist government come in.
31:45In Costa Rica, a new Nicaraguan government was formed, a junta controlled by the Sandinistas.
31:53The junta satisfied the concerns of Samosa, Nicaraguan moderates, and the U.S. that a reformed
31:58National Guard would remain after Samosa's resignation as a check against a Sandinista monopoly of power.
32:04On the basis of this agreement, a transition began.
32:10Samosa resigned.
32:13Then Francisco Urcullo, a long-time Samosa associate, was appointed interim president.
32:20In turn, Urcullo was supposed to hand over power to the junta, but he refused.
32:28He said he would never turn over the government to any communist junta.
32:33Now, I was very surprised when, after being sworn into the presidency, I arrived at the
32:40presidential palace at 6 a.m. on July 17th, and Mr. Pizzullo called me to request an audience.
32:47I granted it immediately.
32:50At that meeting, he asked me if I was ready, and I asked him, ready for what?
32:57With the transition plan in trouble and Samosa gone, the guard collapsed.
33:02On the afternoon of July 17th, guardsmen changed into civilian clothes and fled the country.
33:08The next day, U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pizzullo left in protest.
33:12I'm being recalled by Washington because of our unhappiness with the actions being taken
33:19by the Urcullo government, which are a breach with an understanding that we had reached both
33:26with Samosa and with him before the transfer took place.
33:30What was the understanding?
33:31The understanding is that he would be a very short-term president and that he would turn
33:36over power to a government of national reconstruction.
33:39Samosa was on his way to Miami, where the U.S. promised him, his associates, and his family
33:46safe haven.
33:49Believing that Urcullo was not acting alone, the U.S. State Department contacted Samosa
33:54for a solution.
33:56Samosa lands at Homestead Air Force Base, goes to his house in Miami, is called by Warren
34:04Christopher, the Under Secretary of State, and said, now Samosa's out of the country.
34:09He's resigned as president.
34:11Warren Christopher said, you're not welcome here because you haven't lived up to our arrangement.
34:16Samosa said, what's the matter?
34:18He said, Okuyo refuses to leave.
34:19Samosa said, tell him to leave.
34:21See, you told me to leave and I left, tell him to leave.
34:25Stepping up pressure on Urcullo, the Junta flew into the Sandinista-held city of León.
34:32Sandinista Comandante Tomas Borges introduced the Junta as the official government of Nicaragua.
34:40The U.S. transition plan was now in ruins, but the State Department, encouraged by the
34:45presence of two moderates, Violeta Chamorro and businessman Alfonso Robelo decided to back the Junta.
34:52Urcullo resigned after just 43 hours in office.
34:56The Sandinistas rolled into Managua.
35:03The new government, the Junta of National Reconstruction, pledged democratic elections, a mixed economy,
35:24a free press, and a non-aligned foreign policy.
35:30I felt overwhelmed facing the prospect of responding to the expectations of the people.
35:44I remember as we were coming into Managua, crowds lined the road.
35:53Tens of thousands of people were greeting and cheering our advancing columns.
35:59I remember at that moment, being fully aware of the enormous responsibility we were taking on.
36:10Frankly, my head was spinning.
36:16I was crying because I could only think of Pedro, because I was thinking that we were going to find democracy.
36:24I asked God, our Lord, for things to turn out the way Pedro envisioned them.
36:29I asked him, enlighten me, enlighten me so that everything may turn out for the better.
36:35It was a risk.
36:40As a statue of his father was being destroyed in Managua,
36:44Anastasio Somoza left Miami and eventually settled in Paraguay.
36:48In September of 1980, Somoza was assassinated by left-wing Argentine terrorists.
36:58Thirty to fifty thousand Nicaraguans had died during the war.
37:03One hundred and fifty thousand Nicaraguans were left homeless.
37:08The Somoza family had plundered the national banks.
37:11The inexperienced new government faced an enormous task to rebuild the country.
37:18The general mood, however, was optimistic.
37:21The new government confiscated Somoza's vast holdings and transformed them into state farms and cooperatives.
37:29The new government also launched a campaign to teach hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans to read and write.
37:35And the Sandinistas introduced an ambitious public health program.
37:39Western European and Latin American democracies were generous with their aid.
37:44At the same time, the Sandinistas adopted Cuban ideas.
37:48They created neighborhood watch groups modeled after Cuba's Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.
37:54Committees designed in part to monitor revolutionary loyalty.
38:01From Cuba, the Sandinistas also received material aid.
38:04Cuba has gone further than its international duty in its relations with Nicaragua by sending a great number of doctors and teachers,
38:19and by sending 200 military advisors who helped us in the formation of our army.
38:25These relations are kept and will be kept indefinitely.
38:29The Sandinistas also met with and signed agreements with the Soviets.
38:38In their speeches, Sandinista leaders often made vehement attacks against the United States.
38:44The Sandinista anthem contains the verse,
38:46We are struggling against the Yankee, the enemy of mankind.
38:50Following the fall of Somoza and the entry into power of the Sandinista movement,
39:03there were really three options open to the United States in policy terms.
39:07One was to wait and see what happened.
39:11Or you could be, you could take a position of hostility.
39:14Or you could take the last option, which was to accept the fact that this revolution had occurred,
39:21whether we liked it or not, and try it as best we could to be helpful,
39:27and in the process maybe have some effect over the course of events.
39:31With President Carter, we saw the real possibility of establishing good relations with the United States.
39:42He gave us the chance to talk to him directly.
39:47We had the opportunity to talk clearly and frankly.
39:50We gave the revolution a chance.
39:55We swallowed the adolescent incantations about U.S. imperialism for as long as we possibly could,
40:03in the hope that over time, the Sandinistas would learn that in order to govern effectively,
40:10in order to meet the needs of their people, which we felt they'd wanted to do,
40:14they were going to have to reach an accommodation with the United States and with Western governments.
40:21And that the longer we played for time, the longer they experienced government,
40:26the more likely they were going to accept a more moderate course.
40:38The Sandinistas built an army of 20,000,
40:40three times larger than Samosa's army in 1978.
40:4750,000 Nicaraguan civilians were also given arms and military training.
40:52The Cuban experience led the Sandinistas to expect attacks.
40:57Early on, despite our expressions of wanting to help the regime,
41:02they did invite Cuban military advisors from the beginning.
41:06They invited East German security people from the beginning.
41:10They consolidated their hold on both the military and on the security services at the beginning,
41:17before there was a threat.
41:19We viewed this as ominous, but we didn't necessarily think that was the end of it.
41:29There is a tendency, which I would classify as a tendency belonging to a colonial mentality,
41:34and which is understandable, which is common in Europe, and is common in the United States,
41:47where they consider that it is impossible for countries to act by themselves,
41:51to think for themselves, to look for answers for themselves.
42:00And the United States wanted this government to look only towards the United States, in all aspects,
42:07political, economic, etc.
42:09Despite strains, the Carter administration remained cautiously optimistic.
42:19They were encouraged that 60% of the economy was in private hands, and that moderates remained in the government.
42:26These same moderates, however, were increasingly pessimistic.
42:30My struggle against the domination of the FSLN within the Junta was a struggle that started in the very beginning,
42:42when Somoza's newspaper was confiscated and became Barricada, the FSLN official newspaper.
42:50And there you could see exactly what was happening.
42:54Instead of being the revolution that represented the national unity that overthrows Somoza,
42:59instead of being the government that represented that national unity, it was the party, the FSLN,
43:05that because they controlled the weapons, were controlling everything.
43:11Robelo begins to have problems with the Sandinista Front for ideological and political reasons,
43:17and because it must be very difficult for a man who is worth 21 million dollars to be part of a revolution.
43:26He cannot transcend his class values.
43:30The last drop that pulled the glass was the subject of the Council of State.
43:36The Council of State was revolutionary Nicaragua's chief legislative body.
43:40Initially, the majority of seats were to be held by non-Sandinista representatives.
43:45When the FSLN revised the Council plan and established a Sandinista majority,
43:50Robelo resigned from the Junta in protest.
43:54The other moderate on the Junta, Violeta Chamorro, had resigned two days earlier.
43:58I resigned from the Junta, in fact, because my conscience was not at ease,
44:09because the promises that had been made to me were not being met,
44:13and because I could already see that this was not what was needed for Nicaragua.
44:18Immediately following the resignations of Chamorro and Robelo,
44:24a group of prominent businessmen stepped up pressure on Sandinista leaders to hold democratic elections.
44:30We had explained to them that although those elections were not to be held right away,
44:39this was fundamental to create peace and lower the tension,
44:44because people cannot live in an everlasting anxiety.
44:49They have to know where they are going, what's going to happen in the near future.
44:52We were living through anxiety since the death of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro.
44:59All of 1978 has been a year of anxiety. All 79 has been a year of anxiety.
45:04And here we were, close to the middle of 1980, and people still living in anxiety.
45:09People didn't know where the hell they were going.
45:11In response to pressure from business leaders, the FSLN directorate promised to announce a date
45:20for elections at the revolution's first anniversary celebration.
45:25But when the day's speeches were over, there had been no mention of elections.
45:34Former Sandinista allies Costa Rica and Panama were discouraged by the direction of the revolution,
45:40and did not send representatives.
45:42The day's main speaker, Fidel Castro, urged other nations not to abandon Nicaragua,
45:48and specifically challenged the United States to expand its economic assistance.
45:55We even salute the assistance that the United States government says it will provide.
46:10I only regret, truly and sincerely, that it is so little, given the wealth of the United States.
46:25President Carter was sending Nicaragua more than any other donor nation,
46:30but Carter was worried by the celebration show of military force and international revolutionary fervor.
46:36By the end of 1981, we will be able to speak not just a revolutionary fervor.
46:46We will be able to speak not just a revolutionary fervor.
46:50Not just a revolutionary Nicaragua.
46:52No just a revolutionary Nicaragua.
46:54But also a revolutionary in Salvador.
46:57But also a revolutionary in Salvador.
46:59A revolutionary Guatemala.
47:01Finally, it was evidence of armed shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvadoran revolutionaries
47:14that led the Carter administration to suspend aid to Nicaragua in January of 1981.
47:20When Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, he came to the presidency with the conviction that Nicaragua
47:32was a Marxist-Leninist state inviting Soviet imperialism into Central America.
47:38He cut off the aid that Carter had suspended.
47:41Given the government of Nicaragua's involvement in the activities supporting violence in El Salvador,
47:48the president has decided to invoke the provisions.
47:51For reasons that I never thought were good ones, we cut off the aid completely on April 1st, 1981.
48:00And by cutting off the aid, we left no flexibility in our policy response to them.
48:06They unquestionably viewed it as a hostile act.
48:09Within months of the aid cut-off, the Reagan administration began funding Nicaraguans
48:15fighting to bring down the Sandinista government.
48:21U.S.-Nicaraguan relations have deteriorated ever since.
48:26The Sandinista rule is a communist reign of terror.
48:29Many of those who fought alongside the Sandinistas saw their revolution betrayed.
48:34They were denied power in the new government.
48:36Some were imprisoned, others exiled.
48:38Thousands who fought with the Sandinistas have taken up arms against them,
48:42and are now called the Contras.
48:44They are freedom fighters.
48:46What the Sandinistas have done to Nicaragua is a tragedy.
48:52Many Sandinistas are Marxists, but Nicaragua is not like Cuba, a communist state.
48:57The Nicaraguan revolution is still evolving.
49:03Businessmen face an uncertain future, but about half of the nation's economy is still privately owned.
49:10Elections were held in 1984.
49:12Most opposition political parties boycotted the process, but the Sandinistas say it was a step toward democracy.
49:22An opposition press is often censored and sometimes shut down, but it still continues to publish.
49:27The church is often harassed, but Nicaraguan bishops are still able to publicly protest government policies.
49:37When the Pope came to Nicaragua, he criticized the government and scolded Nicaraguan priests who held government posts.
49:43In turn, he was heckled by pro-Sandinista demonstrators.
49:54For nine months I have begged the Sandinistas.
49:57They know very well.
49:58Fidel knows very well.
50:01All the revolutionaries know very well.
50:03I want fraternal treatment, to be treated like a Sandinista.
50:09Some former Sandinista supporters are disenchanted with the revolution.
50:14Eden Pastora, once a Sandinista hero, has taken up arms against the government.
50:20So has former junta member Alfonso Rubello.
50:22Many mosquito Indians of eastern Nicaragua have also joined anti-Sandinista groups in response to government abuses of their human rights.
50:34The Sandinistas claim it is CIA-supported counter-revolution that forces them to tighten control over dissent and to seek Soviet military aid.
50:4415,000 Contras, they point out, have in the past three years attacked Nicaraguan towns,
50:50burned crops, bombed strategic targets, and mined Nicaraguan harbors.
50:57Nicaragua is back at war.
51:00The United States is involved.
51:03President Reagan is betting he can shape events in Nicaragua more successfully than previous U.S. presidents.
51:10The Sandinistas are betting they can hold on.
51:12If peace does not arrive, and war continues, and with it the possibility of a North American military intervention,
51:27the whole world should know that the people of Nicaragua, barefoot, in rags, and hungry, will fight to the end.
51:40Until we achieve peace by defeating the invaders,
51:47or until we immolate ourselves, if imperialist aggression requires us to do so.
51:53keep saying...
51:54.
51:55.
51:55.
51:56.
51:57.
51:58.
52:01.
52:16.
52:19.
52:21.
Be the first to comment