- 5 months ago
The history of the US government's defense and intelligence alliances with Israel from the 1950s to the present.
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00:00Funding for Frontline is provided by this station and other public television stations nationwide,
00:07and by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
00:11During the Iran-Contra hearings, one of the most sensitive issues raised was Israel's role in the covert arms network.
00:18Well, Israel was already involved.
00:20Wherever you look today in Central America, you find Israeli weapons, or weapons that were sold by Israel.
00:27You can also find Israeli military advisors.
00:32There are no official Israeli military advisors in Central America at all.
00:38Frontline investigates the history of our strategic alliance.
00:42Tonight, Israel, the covert connection.
00:52From the network of public television stations,
00:55A presentation of KCTS Seattle,
00:58WNET New York,
01:00WPBT Miami,
01:02WTVS Detroit,
01:04and WGBH Boston.
01:06This is Frontline,
01:08with Judy Woodruff.
01:13Good evening.
01:15The trial of Oliver North revealed, once again,
01:18the tangled, sensitive, and often secret relationship
01:21between the United States and Israel.
01:24In the trial,
01:25U.S. government documents revealed Israel's secretly provided weapons to the Contras,
01:31at the request of CIA Director Casey.
01:35Tonight, on Frontline,
01:36we go to Israel to examine the long history of the U.S.-Israeli covert alliance.
01:43It's a history which is told by Israelis,
01:46who speak frankly about the secret role their country has played
01:50in Central America,
01:51in Central America, Africa, and the Middle East.
01:54Our report is called Israel,
01:56The Covert Connection.
01:58Produced by Leslie and Andrew Coburn,
02:01and reported by Leslie Coburn.
02:04We had an idea,
02:11and it was called Israel,
02:13Strategic Ally.
02:16It was a simple idea,
02:18and yet a big one.
02:19We believe that Israel was not just the object of our sympathy and our goodwill,
02:25but a full-fledged partner with the United States,
02:30a partner fully capable of contributing to our security.
02:39Israel's reaction to the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories
02:43is eroding popular support for Israel in the United States.
02:55According to recent national polls,
02:58half of all Americans now consider Israel to be, quote,
03:01an unreliable ally.
03:03That is not the view from the White House.
03:06Some people still have trouble saying the words,
03:09Israel, strategic ally.
03:11I don't.
03:13Israel, strategic ally.
03:16And it's got a...
03:17It's got a nice ring to it.
03:25The ring of hard, enduring reality.
03:28You will demonstrate how you load a shell.
03:3620 miles from the Palestinian uprising,
03:39the Israeli army treats American defense contractors
03:42to a display of military hardware.
03:45And so you'll be able to drink water.
03:49All he has to do is take that out,
03:53pick it up,
03:55and he can drink water.
03:57The U.S. puts over $2 billion a year into Israeli defense,
04:01out of $3.5 billion in total aid.
04:04But the Israelis maintain they contribute a great deal
04:07in return for that money.
04:09What can Israel do for the U.S.
04:12that the U.S. can't do on its own?
04:14The United States is interested
04:17in the stability and peace in the Middle East.
04:22And Israel could be very helpful
04:25in achieving this goal
04:27if we will work together.
04:30And we are working together.
04:32It was one of the reasons
04:34for wanting to have Israel involved
04:37so that we could say it was Israel that was selling
04:40and Israel, everyone knows, sells arms.
04:44Well, Israel was already involved
04:46and we were going to continue to pursue it
04:49in such a way as part of the plausible deniability.
04:52That's correct.
04:52And part of the plausible deniability...
04:54Israel's role was one of the most sensitive issues
04:57raised in the Iran-Contra hearings,
05:00a point well understood by Oliver North.
05:03He and his superiors wanted to sell arms to Iran
05:06but did not dare do it openly.
05:08In order to keep the operation secret,
05:11they turned to Israel as a cutout.
05:13They used weapons borrowed from Israeli stocks
05:16and delivered them to Iran on Israeli aircraft.
05:19Money from the sales was passed
05:21through the hands of Israeli arms dealers.
05:23Next question, Mr. Lyman.
05:26Senior officials of the Israeli government
05:28were involved throughout.
05:30When the arms deals were first exposed,
05:32the White House suggested
05:34that it had been a purely Israeli operation.
05:37Was the point of view expressed to you
05:40that we have to keep Israel involved in this
05:44so that it can be blamed on them
05:47if it's exposed?
05:51I don't want to use the word blame.
05:54I don't think I ever used it,
05:55but very clearly,
05:57because this was a covert operation.
06:00We did not want the U.S. government's hand
06:03or role in this activity exposed.
06:08When the administration needs help,
06:10needs something done discreetly,
06:11it can turn to Israel.
06:14See, we have some rules
06:18in all these issues
06:20and we regard ourselves
06:22as allies and friends of the United States.
06:27If indeed the United States
06:29have won something from Israel,
06:34we are very willing to help the United States.
06:39Israel has been playing a very vital role.
06:42So Israel isn't just a client,
06:44it's a partner all over the world.
06:46Israeli professor Benjamin Beit Halami
06:49has spent years researching
06:50the U.S.-Israeli Covert Alliance.
06:53He is a critic who has found much ammunition
06:55for his case in the Iran-Contra affair.
06:58We can take as an example
06:59the Contra connection.
07:01We know that Israel has helped the Contras.
07:03We can take other situations in Central America
07:06where Israel has been instrumental
07:07in supporting regimes,
07:09especially military regimes,
07:10that the U.S. was very concerned about.
07:14The alliance is based on Israel
07:18having proven itself
07:20to be a very useful ally
07:22in a variety of overt and covert operations
07:25around the world.
07:26It's not a matter of sentimentality.
07:28We decided to evaluate and discuss
07:31and analyze political events
07:33happening in different parts of the world,
07:35whether it be in Africa,
07:36whether it be in Latin America,
07:38Middle East,
07:39or Asia.
07:41And it was this sort of dialogue
07:43that we had together.
07:44From 1980 to 1986,
07:47former Mossad official David Kempke
07:49served as director general
07:50of Israel's foreign ministry.
07:52He is now Israel's official ambassador at large.
07:55He was the key link
07:56to the Reagan White House.
07:58From every point of view,
08:00the United States saw in Israel a partner,
08:03a partner to share its opinions,
08:05its views,
08:06and to even,
08:08well, this may sound presumptuous,
08:09but even to get help
08:10in one or two things.
08:12What would you say that Israel
08:13is doing for the United States
08:15in the third world
08:16or around the world
08:17in terms of military assistance?
08:21I think almost everything.
08:24Supply arms,
08:25supply military expertise,
08:30training,
08:33organizing
08:35and operating
08:36intelligence services.
08:39General Mati Pallad
08:40has been one of the few members
08:42of Israel's parliament
08:43to question his country's contribution
08:45to the alliance.
08:47Doesn't that cast Israel
08:48in the role of a proxy or surrogate?
08:51It does,
08:52and I think that
08:53Israeli governments
08:54are very happy
08:55to fulfill that role.
08:57We see cooperation,
08:58not only very strong cooperation
08:59here in the Middle East,
09:01but cooperation in Africa,
09:02cooperation in Central America.
09:04Yes, for instance,
09:05yes,
09:05in Africa
09:06or in Central America
09:08or Latin America,
09:10the cooperation
09:10is directed
09:13towards the assistance
09:15given
09:15to underdeveloped countries.
09:18Israel is a long experience
09:20in this field,
09:22and if they have a certain assistance
09:24of the United States
09:25or a cooperation,
09:27we can do it together
09:29in a very efficient way.
09:32We have a good technical cooperation
09:36with certain countries
09:37in agricultural things,
09:38mainly in agricultural things.
09:40and this has been
09:41very much encouraged
09:42by the United States,
09:43you know,
09:43things like
09:44how to grow crops
09:47more efficiently
09:47and in a better way,
09:49and our experts
09:50sometimes are quite happy
09:51to go in
09:51completely out-of-the-way places
09:53where you don't find
09:54many other
09:55non-Latin American people,
09:59and they do
09:59a very good work,
10:00if I may say so.
10:01Now,
10:01that has happened
10:02in countries like Salvador,
10:04and that's been
10:05our only presence
10:05in Salvador,
10:06contrary to
10:08what some people
10:09have said
10:09about all sorts
10:10of military advisors.
10:11Yes,
10:11there haven't been any,
10:12but we have had
10:13some agricultural advisors,
10:14that's true.
10:15I would say
10:16that's our main help
10:17in Central America.
10:21Wherever you look today
10:22in Central America,
10:24you find Israeli weapons
10:25or weapons
10:26that were sold
10:27by Israel.
10:29You find the Galil rifle,
10:31you find
10:32the Aravah transport plane.
10:34you can also find
10:35Israeli military advisors.
10:40We know
10:40that several
10:42leading officers
10:43in the Salvadoran army
10:45got their training
10:46in Israel,
10:47and they're quite
10:48proud of that.
10:51Over the course
10:52of the civil war
10:53in El Salvador,
10:54Israel has been
10:55the second most important
10:56source of military supplies
10:58for the government side,
10:59after the U.S.
11:01When human rights violations
11:02cost El Salvador
11:03its American military aid
11:05for a period
11:06after 1977,
11:08the Israelis
11:08were on hand
11:09to fill the breach,
11:11selling everything
11:11from Uzi machine guns
11:13to napalm.
11:15All over Latin America,
11:18the military class
11:20admires Israel
11:21and sees Israel
11:22as its best model.
11:24They see the Israelis
11:30as more like themselves
11:33than the Americans,
11:34and they see the Israelis
11:36as more ruthless
11:38and more efficient
11:39in whatever they do
11:41compared to the Americans.
11:42But Israeli officials
11:47insist they set standards
11:49for customers
11:49of Israeli arms.
11:51We do have limitations,
11:53and there are
11:54definitely
11:55conditions
11:57and cases
11:59where we have not sold.
12:02Give me an example.
12:03I'll give you an example.
12:04If we are asked,
12:06for example,
12:08for arms
12:08used for internal,
12:11in order to
12:12use it internally
12:14against
12:15a population
12:20that does not
12:24lack its own regime,
12:26for example,
12:27whether it be
12:27anti-riot
12:28or tear gas
12:29or whatever,
12:30we haven't sold it.
12:31But in Guatemala,
12:34across the border
12:34from El Salvador,
12:36Israel has been
12:37heavily involved
12:37in the business
12:38of internal security.
12:40Over the past decade,
12:41while U.S.-Guatemalan
12:43relations have been
12:44strained by flagrant
12:45human rights abuses,
12:47Israel has remained
12:48a steady friend,
12:49without protest
12:50from the U.S.
12:52What Israel has supplied
12:54the Guatemalan military
12:56has been a computerized
12:58system of
13:00tracking people.
13:02In other words,
13:03you can have
13:03a computer system
13:04which has in it
13:06every man,
13:08woman and child
13:09in Guatemala
13:09and you can issue
13:12identity cards
13:13and then you can
13:13follow people around,
13:14you can find out
13:15where they are,
13:15who they are
13:16and whenever they're
13:18stopped at the roadblock,
13:19you can track them
13:20immediately
13:21and then you can
13:22arrest them,
13:23they may disappear,
13:24they may never be
13:26seen alive again
13:27thanks to this
13:27computerized system.
13:28we have a list
13:37if they're on the list
13:40they die.
13:44Since 1977,
13:46Israel has provided
13:47not only the computer
13:48network,
13:49but has been the
13:50main supplier of
13:51weapons and trainers
13:52for the Guatemalan
13:53security forces.
13:54according to human
13:55rights groups,
13:56the Guatemalan
13:57counterinsurgency
13:58campaign has left
13:59at least 50,000
14:00people dead.
14:04One Guatemalan
14:05politician said,
14:06quote,
14:06the Israelis do not
14:08let this human rights
14:09thing get in the
14:09way of business.
14:10You pay,
14:11they deliver,
14:12no questions asked.
14:15Let's take a country
14:16which is known for
14:19its human rights,
14:21a country like
14:21Sweden, say.
14:22Sweden sells arms
14:24to countries that
14:25need arms.
14:26Now, you have
14:29the wonderfully
14:30beautifully
14:31so-called
14:32progressive
14:33countries
14:33don't usually
14:34buy arms
14:35to the extent
14:36that the
14:37others do.
14:39And therefore,
14:40one sometimes
14:40sells arms
14:41to countries
14:42whose regimes
14:43one doesn't
14:43necessarily
14:44like very much.
14:45I can assure you
14:47Israel would
14:48prefer selling
14:49tomatoes to
14:50hand grenades
14:51if we could.
14:52In order to have
14:53an arms industry,
14:54you have to sell
14:55arms and that's it.
14:56You yourself
14:57have raised
14:58questions about
14:59cooperation with
15:00certain regimes
15:00in Central America
15:01or dictators in
15:03Africa in the
15:04Knesset.
15:04Right.
15:05What reaction
15:06did you get?
15:08The reaction
15:08was usually
15:09that the government
15:10maintained its
15:11position that these
15:12matters would not
15:12be discussed in
15:13public.
15:14And that's it.
15:15When the
15:19contra-business
15:20first got started
15:21by the CIA
15:22in 1980,
15:241981,
15:25the United States
15:25turned to Israel
15:26because Israel
15:28could offer
15:29expertise
15:29and weapons
15:30and do it
15:32without any
15:33hesitations
15:34and without
15:34any political
15:36problems.
15:37When the
15:37administration
15:38is blocked
15:39from offering
15:39direct aid
15:40by political
15:41pressure
15:41or by an
15:42act of Congress,
15:43Israel can step
15:44in very easily.
15:45did you have
15:47any discussion
15:49about the
15:50possibility
15:51of, in effect,
15:53farming out
15:54the whole
15:55contra-support
15:56operation to
15:57another country,
15:58which would not
15:58only provide the
15:59funding but give
16:00it some direction?
16:03There was some
16:04consideration of
16:05that.
16:06And whose idea
16:07was that?
16:09Well, I believe
16:12it was probably
16:13mine.
16:14And can we call
16:15that country
16:16country one?
16:18Yes, that's
16:19correct.
16:20Country one
16:21was Israel.
16:22Former National
16:23Security Advisor
16:24Robert McFarlane
16:25told Congress
16:26that Israel
16:26had declined
16:27to take over
16:28the entire
16:28contra-operation.
16:29But early
16:31on in the
16:31contra-war,
16:32say White
16:32House documents,
16:34McFarlane had
16:34arranged with
16:35his Israeli
16:36counterpart,
16:36David Kempke,
16:37for the
16:38Contras to
16:39receive arms
16:39and training
16:40from Israel.
16:41Oliver North
16:42acknowledged
16:43this assistance
16:44in a memo
16:44to his
16:45superior,
16:45Admiral
16:46Poindexter,
16:47in September
16:471986.
16:49Quote,
16:49Israeli arms.
16:51On Friday
16:52night,
16:52Defense Minister
16:53Rabin offered
16:54a significant
16:54quantity of
16:55captured Soviet
16:56bloc arms for
16:57use by the
16:58Nicaraguan
16:59Democratic
16:59Resistance.
17:00These arms
17:01will be picked
17:02up by a
17:02foreign flag
17:03vessel this
17:04week and
17:04delivered to
17:05the Nicaraguan
17:06Resistance.
17:07If Perez
17:07raises the
17:08issue, it
17:09would be
17:09helpful if
17:10the president
17:10thanked him.
17:12End quote.
17:13The Contra's
17:14military commander,
17:15Enrique Bermudez,
17:16made no secret
17:17of the help he
17:18had received
17:18from Israel.
17:20He received
17:21some weapons
17:22from the
17:25weapons from
17:26the Israeli
17:27government
17:28took from
17:29the PLO
17:30in Lebanon.
17:32I can assure
17:33you that
17:34we have not
17:36had an
17:36ongoing supply
17:38of weapons
17:38and we have
17:39not had
17:40military trainers
17:41in those
17:42Central American
17:43countries that
17:44you're talking
17:45about.
17:46I know that
17:47this has been
17:48said repeatedly
17:49that we've
17:50had them
17:50in the
17:52Nicaraguan
17:52business and
17:53in Salvador.
17:54This just
17:55happens to be
17:56not true.
17:56Are you
17:57saying that
17:57there are
17:57no Israeli
17:58military
17:59advisors in
18:00Central America
18:00at all?
18:01I'm saying
18:02that there
18:03are no
18:03official
18:04Israeli
18:05military
18:05advisors in
18:06Central America
18:07at all.
18:08Yes.
18:10How about
18:11unofficial?
18:12Absolutely not.
18:13this is one
18:21of Israel's
18:22top military
18:23advisors.
18:24At a firing
18:25range north
18:25of Tel Aviv,
18:26Lieutenant Colonel
18:27Amatsi
18:27Eshowale
18:28talked to us
18:29about what
18:29he does
18:30and where
18:30he does
18:31it.
18:32What's
18:32this?
18:33I'm just
18:33checking the
18:34pistol.
18:34He has
18:35done several
18:35tours training
18:36security forces
18:37in Central
18:38America.
18:39This is a
18:40Barreta
18:4022.
18:46And this
18:47is a
18:47submachine gun.
18:49He chose
18:49his words
18:50carefully.
18:51What about
18:52in a place
18:53like Central
18:53America?
18:54What do you
18:54find about
18:55their abilities
18:56when you
18:57try and
18:58train these
18:58people?
18:58in the
19:01first
19:02what I
19:03found
19:03it's a
19:04very good
19:05motivation
19:06and a
19:08willingness
19:08to learn.
19:10They are
19:10very open.
19:12And if
19:13people got
19:13motivation
19:14you can
19:14give them
19:15you can
19:15give them
19:15everything.
19:17Take the
19:18magazine.
19:19Okay.
19:20Now
19:21charge.
19:23Quick.
19:23Quick.
19:24Very good.
19:25Very good.
19:25Now
19:26aim
19:26to the
19:27target.
19:28Very
19:28very
19:29easy.
19:30Squeeze.
19:35Very good.
19:36You hit.
19:36Is it
19:36difficult for
19:37someone like
19:37you to
19:38adapt from
19:39I mean
19:40the Israeli
19:40environment
19:41is very
19:41different from
19:42the jungles
19:42in Central
19:43America?
19:44No.
19:44If you
19:45have a
19:45flexibility
19:45the
19:45system
19:46the
19:46principle
19:47of
19:47war
19:48it's
19:48never
19:48changed.
19:49You have
19:50to be
19:50flexible.
19:51Yes.
19:51You have
19:51to be
19:52able to
19:52move
19:52from
19:52here
19:53to
19:54a
19:54very
19:54different
19:55environment.
19:55But do
19:57you find
19:58that when
19:58you go
19:58and see
19:59people
19:59for example
20:00in the
20:00Guatemala
20:00when you
20:02go see
20:02people
20:02in the
20:02Guatemalan
20:03army
20:03do they
20:04do they
20:05look up
20:05to the
20:06Israelis
20:06as
20:07being very
20:08experienced
20:08people
20:09in these
20:09kinds of
20:10things?
20:10Yes.
20:11Pull
20:11pull
20:12pull
20:12pull
20:12The
20:13reason
20:13is
20:13they
20:13take
20:13the
20:14Israelis
20:14the
20:14Israelis
20:14have
20:15more
20:15experience.
20:17Now.
20:23Fantastic.
20:24In a situation
20:25like Guatemala
20:26did they
20:26invite you
20:27to come
20:27or did
20:28you go
20:28there
20:28and say
20:29I'm
20:29here
20:29I want
20:29to
20:29train
20:30you?
20:31No.
20:31I'm
20:31I know
20:34I'm
20:34known
20:35in
20:35Israel
20:36and the
20:38people
20:38that are
20:39in their
20:40connection
20:40in
20:41Guatemala
20:41or in
20:42Israel
20:43if they
20:44are looking
20:44for someone
20:45in a job
20:45like this
20:46they come
20:48to me.
20:49There are
20:49some people
20:49who serve
20:50an important
20:51role as
20:52go-betweens
20:52they develop
20:54close relations
20:54with some
20:55military people
20:56they bribe
20:57people
20:57and they
20:58are able
20:59to get
21:01things done
21:01on the
21:02ground.
21:03So these
21:03people
21:03as a result
21:05make money
21:06on commissions
21:07and there are
21:08several Israelis
21:09that have done
21:09that in
21:09Central America
21:10the best
21:11known is
21:12Pesach
21:12Ben-Or.
21:13From 1977
21:14on
21:15Pesach
21:16Ben-Or
21:16was the
21:17arms dealer
21:17of choice
21:18for the
21:18Guatemalan
21:18military.
21:20After 1983
21:21he reportedly
21:22became a
21:23key operative
21:23in the
21:24Israeli
21:24arms pipeline
21:25to the
21:25Contras.
21:27Have you
21:27ever run
21:27into someone
21:28called
21:28Pesach
21:29Ben-Or?
21:29Yes.
21:31Because I
21:31know that
21:31he works
21:32in that
21:32region.
21:33I was
21:33in Guatemala
21:34working for
21:35Pesach
21:35Ben-Or.
21:35So he
21:37knew about
21:38you,
21:38your reputation?
21:39He
21:40knew about
21:40me,
21:40yes.
21:41And he
21:41said,
21:42this is
21:42the man
21:43we need
21:43for the
21:43Guatemalan.
21:44Yes.
21:45Look,
21:46we are
21:46a free
21:47country.
21:48We're a
21:48democratic
21:48country.
21:49If somebody
21:50leaves the
21:50army and
21:51becomes a
21:51private
21:52citizen
21:52and what
21:53he knows
21:54is military
21:56stuff and
21:57he is
21:57contacted or
21:58he contacts
21:59some guy
21:59outside and
22:00goes and
22:02works for
22:02that guy
22:03providing
22:04he's not
22:04selling
22:04military
22:05secrets,
22:06Israeli
22:06military
22:06secrets,
22:07we've got
22:07no possibility
22:08whatsoever to
22:09prevent him.
22:10We don't like
22:11it and we've
22:11tried to
22:12prevent it but
22:13we have no
22:13legal way to
22:15prevent a
22:16Mr. X from
22:17going to say
22:18Guatemala for
22:19example and
22:20saying I will
22:21work as the
22:22bodyguard of
22:24senior so and
22:25so or
22:26whatever.
22:27There's no way
22:27of stopping it.
22:29So when
22:30someone is there
22:31working for
22:31Pesa Benor for
22:33example in
22:34Guatemala, it
22:35has no official
22:36connection with
22:37the Israeli
22:37government.
22:38Absolutely not.
22:39So why was
22:40Pesa Benor in a
22:41position to ask
22:43you to come to
22:44train?
22:45Had the
22:45Guatemalans asked
22:46him for people?
22:46They said we
22:47need people to
22:47show us?
22:48No.
22:49Pesa Benor,
22:50it's a...
22:51He's agent of
22:58the Israeli
22:58army, of
23:00TASS, which is
23:02an Israeli
23:02industry.
23:05And if you
23:07want a good
23:08connection in the
23:09government, in
23:10the army, sometimes
23:12they pay for my
23:13training, sometimes
23:14you give them the
23:16gift.
23:17It's mean to give
23:18the minister of the
23:19defense.
23:20That's a walk.
23:20It's walking all the
23:22world.
23:22The Japanese doing
23:22it, the Americans
23:23doing it.
23:24It's mean to give
23:24it a gift in
23:25South America, that
23:27if you want to go
23:28on, you have to
23:29give a gift, all
23:30the way.
23:30I see.
23:30It's throwing a gift
23:31like this, if you
23:32want to go.
23:33If you don't give a
23:34gift, you stop.
23:36So you are a
23:37gift?
23:37I'm a gift.
23:39While still on
23:40active duty with
23:41Israel's elite
23:42border guards,
23:43Lieutenant Colonel
23:43Shawali says he
23:44trained nearly all of
23:46the officers above
23:47the rank of
23:47captain in the
23:48Guatemalan army.
23:49All of our
23:50instructors have this
23:51operational experience.
23:53Shawali works with
23:55Dror Ayal and
23:56Yer Klein, marketing
23:58and managing
23:58directors of the
23:59Spearhead Corporation,
24:01licensed by Israel's
24:02Ministry of Defense.
24:04We always prefer to
24:06work for governments
24:10or for official
24:12organizations.
24:14In some cases, we
24:17would work for
24:19private or semi-private,
24:21semi-governmental
24:22organizations.
24:24But in that case, of
24:26course, it will be
24:27under the complete
24:28approval and
24:29authorization of our
24:30Ministry of Defense.
24:32Spearhead is
24:33advertised by the
24:34Israeli Ministry of
24:35Defense as
24:36specialists in
24:37anti-terror and
24:38military know-how.
24:39They offered to give
24:40us a demonstration of
24:41their professional
24:42skills.
24:43The Americans have the
24:51problem of public
24:52opinion, international
24:53image.
24:55We don't have this
24:56problem.
24:56Our political views are
25:06very much parallel to the
25:08American political
25:10views.
25:16Fighting terrorism,
25:18especially in that part of
25:19the world.
25:20We'll be glad if the
25:22American authorities will
25:23turn to us and ask us to
25:25do the job.
25:26Yeah, you mentioned the
25:29contrast.
25:30I think here it's the same
25:31thing.
25:32The Americans won't interfere
25:33directly.
25:34We are willing to do it.
25:35Do you just assume that the
25:37American government will
25:38approve of what you're
25:39doing or do you have to
25:40ask permission?
25:42We are positive that what
25:44we're doing is within the
25:45interests of the Americans
25:47and so far it was always
25:50like that.
25:51You'd have heard about it if
25:52it wasn't.
25:53Of course.
25:56How's business?
25:58It's a good thing.
26:00Do we look okay?
26:05Along with the supply of
26:07seasoned advisors and a
26:08reliable source of arms,
26:10Israel can offer another
26:11important service.
26:12When regimes in Latin
26:14America or Africa find it
26:16difficult to persuade
26:17Congress to approve U.S.
26:18aid, Israel can lobby for
26:20their cause.
26:22There are a number of
26:23third world leaders who
26:24believe that Israel is
26:26terribly influential in the
26:27U.S. and feel that if
26:30they can work with Israel,
26:31they'll get a better deal.
26:33Yes.
26:34That myth exists.
26:36We have done nothing to
26:38encourage it.
26:41But I do agree with you
26:42that there is such a myth
26:44and that it does exist and
26:45people come to us sometimes
26:46and say, look, please, we
26:48want to improve our
26:49relations with the United
26:50States.
26:50Please help us.
26:52It's a major selling point
26:54for Israel in the third
26:55world.
26:56And we can use an example,
26:57General Mobutu of Zaire,
26:59who suffers from a
27:01considerable public relations
27:02problem in the U.S.
27:04or an image problem.
27:09Basically, when you mention
27:11Mr. Mobutu, what people
27:12think about is a bloody
27:14dictator who has five
27:17billion dollars in Swiss
27:18bank accounts while his
27:19people are starving.
27:21So this doesn't make him
27:22look very good in the U.S.
27:23Congress or the U.S.
27:24media.
27:25And in this particular case,
27:27Israel comes to the rescue.
27:32Mobutu certainly wanted our
27:34help.
27:35And I think Mobutu was very
27:37unjustly.
27:40I think the criticism of
27:42Mobutu was very, very
27:43strong.
27:44Let's put it that way.
27:45And he certainly wanted our
27:46help to try and try and
27:48soften it a bit.
27:50Yes.
27:52When Mobutu is denied foreign
27:55aid by the U.S.
27:57Congress, and we are talking
27:58about something like 80
27:59million dollars, the Israeli
28:01lobby starts acting.
28:04And within a few short months,
28:06Congress reverses itself and
28:08gives Mobutu the money.
28:11Mobutu wasn't the only world
28:13leader with faith in Israel's
28:14influence.
28:16Did the Shah react the same
28:17way?
28:18Oh, yes.
28:19The Shah, if there'd be any
28:21anti-Iranian article in any
28:24newspaper in the United
28:26States or even in Europe, he
28:27would call us and say, why did
28:29you allow this to happen?
28:30And we would, you know, in
28:33vain plead innocence, saying
28:34that we don't control the whole
28:36of world press, as some people
28:38think we do.
28:39We don't control the
28:39international media.
28:41We don't control the banks.
28:42These myths aren't exactly the
28:46truth.
28:47We had one of the Lebanese
28:49leaders, Pierre Jemayel, he
28:51once said to me, he said,
28:53some people think that Israel
28:54is a colony of the United
28:55States.
28:56It's ridiculous.
28:57How can they say that?
28:58The United States is a colony
28:59of Israel.
29:00Why don't they know that?
29:03The two countries weren't
29:04always so close.
29:06Early on, the state of Israel
29:07received no arms and little
29:09aid from the U.S.
29:10But Israel's founders had hopes
29:12of a much closer relationship
29:14with the United States.
29:16Strangely enough, the special,
29:19unique relations began in the
29:21early 50s, and they were
29:22clandestine, completely secret.
29:25At that time, it started with a
29:27secret cooperation, and an
29:29agreement was signed between the
29:30CIA and the Mossad.
29:33Israeli historian and journalist
29:35Yossi Melman has studied the
29:37origins of the covert relationship.
29:40Actually, in 1951, David Ben-Gurion
29:42went to the United States and
29:44surprised the chiefs of the CIA
29:47when he suggested that the two
29:49security intelligence agencies
29:51should cooperate.
29:53The Americans were a bit
29:55reluctant about it.
29:56They suspected Israel as a
29:58socialist country.
29:59Eventually, the Israelis persuaded
30:01them that the Americans would
30:02benefit from the strategic
30:04intelligence cooperation between the
30:06two countries, and by having Israel
30:09on their side, the Americans could
30:11benefit from good information about
30:15the Soviet Union.
30:16We found ourselves in a position
30:18that we were able just to penetrate
30:21or to solve riddles that others couldn't.
30:28Issa Haral was the most powerful
30:30intelligence chief in Israel's history.
30:33His access to Jewish communities
30:35behind the Iron Curtain yielded
30:37intelligence that the CIA considered
30:39vital.
30:40You were able to get information from
30:43inside the Soviet bloc that the CIA
30:46couldn't get for itself.
30:48Yes.
30:49In the early 50s, there were huge,
30:52massive immigration waves from the
30:55Soviet bloc, from Poland, Romania,
30:57Hungary, and later on from the
30:59Soviet Union itself.
31:00Many Jews served in high positions in
31:04the government, in the communist
31:05parties, and they became a source of
31:07information about what was going on
31:10there.
31:10And for the Americas, it was very
31:12important to know what's going on in
31:14the Soviet bloc.
31:15Now, this cooperation, this agreement
31:17between yourself, your organization,
31:21and the CIA, was this generally known
31:23in America?
31:25Not at all.
31:27But even in this country, we kept it
31:28as a great secret.
31:30If the secret, if it had leaked out
31:32at the time, would this have had a
31:34bad effect for Jewish people in Russia?
31:37Of course.
31:37No question about it.
31:38And I think in a certain time, we
31:42believe that the Russians, in fact,
31:43the Russians rather condemned us for
31:48it.
31:50The turning point was April 56.
31:53The Americans were very anxious to get
31:56hold of a speech which was made by
31:58Nikita Khrushchev, which he denounced
32:00Stalin and paved the way for a new image
32:03of the Soviet Union.
32:05The CIA couldn't get the speech.
32:07And the Israeli Mossad, the Israeli
32:09intelligence, was able to put its hands
32:13on that speech through its agents in the
32:16Soviet bloc.
32:17And the head of the Israeli Mossad, Mr. Israel
32:21himself personally, flew to Washington and gave
32:26this speech as a gift of the state of Israel
32:30to the United States.
32:32Who in America, in the American government,
32:34knew about this cooperation agreement?
32:39The president, the secretary of state,
32:43the top people in the Pentagon,
32:45another very small group of important people
32:49who have some connection with the strategy
32:53and the defense of the United States.
32:55My name is James Angleton.
32:58I'm appearing before the committee today
33:00freely and without subpoena.
33:03One of the pivots, the main supporters
33:06of the joint cooperation was James Angleton.
33:09At that time, he was the head of the
33:10counter-espionage department of the CIA.
33:14I have served in the intelligence community
33:16to the United States for 31 years,
33:19beginning with the OSS during World War II.
33:22Angleton protected the interests of Israel
33:25and later on paved the way for a greater
33:28cooperation between the two intelligence
33:30communities and between the two countries.
33:34He was a great American patriot
33:35and he was also a friend of Israel
33:38as a result of our contribution
33:41and our efforts on behalf of the Americans.
33:43In 1956, Angleton's friendship
33:47was put to the test.
33:49Israel, along with France and Britain,
33:52launched a surprise attack against Egypt.
33:54The Eisenhower administration
33:55had not been told
33:57because at that time,
33:58America was officially neutral
34:00in the Middle East
34:01and refused to arm Israel.
34:03When the American military attache
34:05in Tel Aviv warned Washington
34:06that he believed Israel was going to war,
34:09James Angleton convinced the White House
34:11not to listen.
34:12That military attache tipped the CIA
34:16and the other branches of the administration.
34:19But Angleton, probably knowing that it's true,
34:23tried to distract the mind of the U.S. administration
34:26and said that it couldn't be,
34:28that it's not true,
34:29that the Israelis are planning a major attack
34:32against the Egyptians.
34:36Angleton kept control of liaison
34:38between the CIA and Israeli intelligence
34:40for over 20 years.
34:42After his death in 1987,
34:45the Israelis planted a memorial forest
34:47outside Jerusalem
34:48in honor of their longtime friend at the CIA.
34:51With Angleton's blessing,
34:56Israel also served the CIA's interests in Africa.
35:01The CIA was financing most Israeli operations
35:04in black Africa in the 1960s.
35:08These operations were quite extensive
35:10because at the time,
35:11Israel had relations with about 30 black African countries
35:15and was involved in a lot of things.
35:17And as it turned out,
35:18this was all financed by the U.S. government.
35:22Frontline has learned that under a top-secret program
35:25codenamed KK Mountain,
35:27the CIA funded Israeli covert activities in Africa
35:30with a budget of up to $20 million a year.
35:33One product of this relationship
35:35was the man who would become the dictator of Uganda,
35:38Idi Amin.
35:39He received military training in Israel.
35:46But in spite of the close intelligence cooperation
35:49in Africa and elsewhere,
35:51Israel had secrets to keep from the United States.
35:55In 1957, Israel enlisted France
35:57to help build a nuclear weapons plant at Domona.
36:00According to sources both in the CIA
36:03and the French nuclear program,
36:05the Israelis in turn agreed to supply France
36:08with vital nuclear test data
36:10obtained by Israeli agents in the United States.
36:14When the nuclear reactor was discovered
36:18mainly by a reconnaissance flight of the U.S. Air Force,
36:22Israel said that this nuclear reactor
36:24is for peaceful purposes.
36:26In 1961, President Kennedy met with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
36:31in New York.
36:33It was a crucial meeting.
36:35Kennedy agreed that the U.S. would sell arms to Israel
36:38for the first time.
36:39According to intelligence sources,
36:41his decision was due in part
36:43to White House fears of an Israeli nuclear arsenal.
36:46It was a deal.
36:49Once the Americans discovered
36:52that Israel had a nuclear capability,
36:55President Kennedy and later on President Johnson
37:00persuaded the Israelis
37:02that if they seized the nuclear development
37:06and would allow American inspectors
37:10to inspect the nuclear facilities,
37:12they would get more conventional arms
37:16from the United States
37:17and the United States started supplying Israel
37:20with anti-aircraft missiles,
37:23Skyhawks, Phantom fighters,
37:26and with tanks.
37:29Although Israel's nuclear weapons program
37:31briefly slowed down,
37:32it never stopped.
37:34American inspectors were not given full access.
37:37Nevertheless, the flow of arms
37:39from the United States steadily increased.
37:41Once the political barrier was lowered
37:47through the Hock missiles,
37:50then things became easier
37:52because it's irrelevant.
37:55Once you are selling arms anyhow,
37:57the U.S. government decided
37:58to sell arms to Israel,
37:59then it is easier to widen it
38:02to airplanes and to tanks
38:04and to whatever.
38:06Gradually, they became the main source of suppliers.
38:09So for the armed forces of Israel.
38:12In June 1967,
38:17Israel went to war
38:18with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria,
38:20capturing all of Jerusalem
38:21and what are now the occupied territories
38:24of the West Bank and Gaza.
38:26Officially, the U.S. was neutral.
38:28Secretly, it gave Israel
38:30full diplomatic support.
38:32The final decision to go to war
38:34was not taken, say the Israelis,
38:36until their intelligence chief,
38:38Mayor Amit,
38:39had met secretly
38:40with CIA director Richard Helms.
38:43The first ones to fire
38:46were the Israelis
38:47and the Americans were persuaded
38:49by the head of the Israeli secret service,
38:53the Mossad,
38:54who met with the head of the CIA
38:56and through the secret channel
38:59got the green light
39:00of the administration
39:02to start the war.
39:06In 1973,
39:08it was Israel's turn
39:09to be attacked.
39:11The U.S. poured in
39:12over 2.5 billion dollars worth
39:14of emergency military aid
39:16during and after the war.
39:18U.S. military spending
39:19for Israel soared
39:20at the same time
39:22as Arab nations
39:23began spending billions
39:24for American hardware.
39:29The war was a turning point
39:31because Israel now came
39:33to expect major gifts
39:35of American arms and money
39:36as routine.
39:38In the next 15 years,
39:39Israel would receive
39:40over 27 billion dollars
39:42in U.S. military aid.
39:47Today, that aid guarantees Israel
39:50an important ally in Washington,
39:52the defense lobby.
39:53When American contractors
39:55and lobbyists
39:55turned up in Tel Aviv last fall,
39:57the defense ministry
39:58was anxious to show them
40:00what Israel has to offer.
40:03Weapons are now
40:03Israel's biggest export
40:05and one out of every four Israelis
40:07makes a living
40:08from the industry.
40:09But to survive,
40:10the Israeli defense business
40:12has to have American support,
40:14not only cash aid,
40:15but also technology
40:17handed over by the U.S.
40:18The influence here
40:20by 960 then,
40:21the bridge enables
40:23crossing features
40:24of other world obstacles.
40:25Thanks to the strategic relationship,
40:27Israel gets much
40:28of the American know-how
40:29it needs to develop products
40:31for sale abroad.
40:33The question of what technology
40:34should be released to Israel
40:36is one of the most sensitive issues
40:37in the Pentagon.
40:39The tent is crossing the bridge
40:41and ready for the next mission.
40:43Not all the technology
40:45is open to us.
40:46The U.S. technology
40:47is open to us.
40:48When technology
40:49is open to us,
40:50when we are reaching
40:51the standards
40:52of our own technology,
40:55and when the U.S. government
40:56sees that we are already,
40:58and anyhow,
40:59we mastered that technology,
41:01then they are releasing it.
41:03So, in a sense,
41:06they are forcing us
41:07to do R&D
41:08in certain areas
41:09which are not open to us
41:12in order to get to them.
41:14But if Israel desperately
41:15needed some technology
41:17and was being denied
41:18by the U.S. government,
41:20what do you do?
41:21We develop our own.
41:22Everything you have just seen
41:32has been made
41:33under one roof
41:34in a small country
41:35with big defense problems.
41:40If it is given
41:42or both from the United States,
41:43there is no need
41:44to get it by other means.
41:47But there are certain technologies
41:48when it comes
41:49to the nuclear technology,
41:51when it comes
41:52to some other
41:53very, very sophisticated
41:54advanced technologies
41:56regarding avionics
41:57of the Air Force.
41:59Then it's difficult
42:00even for a good ally
42:02of the United States
42:03such as Israel
42:04to get it
42:05from the United States.
42:06And then,
42:07in that case,
42:08Israel is trying
42:09to get it
42:10either from other sources
42:11or even to steal it
42:13if you wish.
42:15Stolen technology
42:17from U.S. companies
42:18has turned up
42:19in Israel
42:19more than once.
42:20U.S. Customs
42:22tracked one case
42:22of theft
42:23to an American company
42:24called NAPCO.
42:26Sir, I have here
42:27with me a U.S.
42:27a federal search warrant.
42:29We will search
42:30all the buildings.
42:30This is what
42:31we're looking for.
42:32NAPCO had obtained
42:33a top-secret process
42:34for chrome-plating
42:35tank barrels
42:36from the U.S. Army.
42:38The plans
42:38turned up in Israel.
42:40In 1987,
42:41NAPCO pleaded guilty
42:42to illegal export.
42:44Not only did Israel
42:45steal the Army's edge
42:47on improving U.S. tanks,
42:48but they built
42:49a top-secret plant
42:50in Israel
42:51to duplicate
42:52the process.
42:53Israeli military
42:54industries,
42:55also known as TAS,
42:56financed the plant
42:57with $1.9 million
42:59of U.S. aid money.
43:04Questions about theft
43:06have been raised
43:06about technology
43:07ranging from cluster bombs
43:09to nuclear triggering devices.
43:11But the most shocking
43:12of all
43:12was the case
43:13of Jonathan Pollard,
43:15the U.S. intelligence
43:16analyst recruited
43:17to spy for Israel.
43:18He delivered
43:19more than 800,000
43:21highly classified documents
43:22from U.S. naval intelligence
43:24to his Israeli controller.
43:26Many of the documents
43:27he was asked to steal
43:28detailed ultra-sensitive technology
43:30that the U.S.
43:32had no intention
43:32of sharing.
43:34If the United States
43:36government
43:37and people
43:38were offended
43:39that we had
43:40to resort
43:41to spying
43:42on the United States,
43:45that was
43:47bad.
43:51I mean,
43:51we didn't like it.
43:53Zvi Rafia
43:54is a key lobbyist
43:55for Israeli defense interests
43:56in Washington.
43:58It's not just
43:58being caught.
44:00It's the fact
44:01that among
44:02very good friends,
44:03close allies,
44:04et cetera,
44:05one had to resort
44:06to such a means
44:07to get something.
44:09Although,
44:09on the other hand,
44:10one can say,
44:11and I don't mean
44:12to justify
44:13what took place,
44:15but I can only say
44:16that if one
44:18had to resort
44:18to such a case,
44:21maybe one
44:21didn't get
44:22what he thought
44:24he should get
44:25from an ally
44:26and a friend.
44:27The Americans
44:28felt almost like
44:29you invite a guest
44:31to your house
44:31and then he's
44:32putting his hands
44:33on the family jewelry.
44:34Well,
44:35how was that
44:35allowed to happen?
44:36First of all,
44:37it wasn't done
44:37by the Mossad,
44:38which has
44:39a secret
44:40cooperation agreement
44:42with the CIA.
44:43And they felt
44:45that they either
44:46were against it,
44:48against spying
44:49on a major ally
44:50of Israel,
44:51or perhaps
44:52they felt
44:54that they couldn't
44:54do it.
44:55And therefore,
44:55the job was given
44:56to another branch
44:57of the Israeli intelligence,
44:59a secret branch
44:59which wasn't known
45:01even to the United States
45:02until that time.
45:03That was the
45:04Scientific Liaison Bureau.
45:05The Scientific Liaison Bureau
45:08or LACAM
45:09was not named
45:10in this classified
45:111979 CIA report
45:13on Israeli intelligence
45:14captured at the U.S.
45:16Embassy in Tehran.
45:18But the CIA did know
45:19that Israel's top priorities
45:21included,
45:22collection of information
45:24on secret U.S. policy
45:26or decision,
45:27if any,
45:27concerning Israel,
45:29collection of scientific
45:30intelligence
45:31in the U.S.,
45:32end quote.
45:33This mission,
45:34it seems,
45:35was the responsibility
45:36of the secret intelligence branch.
45:38It was an agency
45:39on top of many
45:41other agencies
45:41which had
45:43a greater liberty
45:44of operation
45:45and could probably
45:47operate
45:49with less restrictions
45:51than others,
45:52although the others
45:53are not terribly restricted,
45:55but this agency
45:56was probably
45:56even less restricted
45:57than others,
45:59and therefore
45:59they could go
46:00all the way
46:00to try
46:01and spy
46:03on the American Navy.
46:04They were there
46:06in that business
46:08to get technology
46:09for Israel
46:09for almost any cost,
46:13and they were ready
46:13to pay almost any price
46:15for getting
46:17the technology
46:18they wanted,
46:19which they perceived
46:20as vital
46:21for the security
46:23of Israel.
46:24Whether the United States
46:25government wanted them
46:26to have it or not.
46:27Yes.
46:28Yes,
46:28by all means.
46:31Despite cases
46:33of theft
46:33and espionage,
46:35Israelis hope
46:35that such incidents
46:36will not upset
46:37the relationship
46:38they depend on.
46:40Nothing can be
46:41more frightening
46:41to the Israeli public
46:43than the threat
46:44that the United States
46:45might not support
46:47Israel on a certain issue
46:48or a certain problem
46:49or might cut
46:52the financial defense.
46:53I mean,
46:53these matters
46:54really frighten,
46:55frighten the Israelis
46:56very much.
46:57But having said that,
46:58of course,
46:59apart from that,
47:00the United States
47:00is such a huge country
47:02with so many
47:04opportunities
47:06for little Israel
47:07to benefit from.
47:10So if Israel
47:10breaks the rule
47:11from time to time
47:12on small matters,
47:15it's not considered
47:15really an unforgivable crime.
47:20Israel shares
47:21much of its defense technology
47:23with a country
47:24officially embargoed
47:25by the U.S.,
47:26South Africa.
47:28Refueling tankers
47:29like this one
47:29sold by Israel
47:30allows South Africa
47:32to pursue its enemies
47:33far beyond its borders.
47:35Since 1977,
47:37when the U.N.
47:38embargoed arms sales
47:39to South Africa,
47:40Israel has sold
47:41everything from missiles
47:42and jet fighters
47:43to howitzers and guns.
47:45They have shipped
47:46communications equipment,
47:47radar systems,
47:48and intelligence technology.
47:50There is a very high level
47:53of collaboration
47:54in terms of
47:55military training,
47:57weapons production,
47:58weapon development.
48:00The United States,
48:02I think,
48:04isn't even aware
48:05of everything
48:05that is going on
48:06between Israel
48:06and South Africa.
48:07Total destruction
48:09of the target
48:09is assured
48:10by a specially
48:11developed warhead.
48:13Israel's
48:14Barak naval missile
48:15is reportedly
48:16one current
48:17co-production
48:17with South Africa.
48:21The issue
48:22of whether Israel
48:23has transferred
48:24U.S. technology
48:25as well as its own
48:26was raised
48:27in a 1987
48:28State Department report
48:29on South Africa.
48:31It advised
48:32the President
48:32to, quote,
48:33adopt measures
48:34to prevent
48:35countries such as Israel
48:36that import
48:37U.S. arms
48:38and defense material
48:39from transshipping
48:40such goods
48:41to South Africa.
48:42End quote.
48:44Nevertheless,
48:45Israel has announced
48:45that it will fulfill
48:46all existing contracts.
48:48The length
48:49of these contracts
48:50is classified secret.
48:52The policy
48:53of the State of Israel
48:54for the past few years
48:56has been
48:57to go along
48:59with other
49:00democratic countries
49:01regarding the policy
49:02towards South Africa.
49:04We have acted,
49:07I would say,
49:07accordingly
49:08as far as,
49:09in accordance
49:10with what the other
49:11democratic countries
49:13have been doing
49:14regarding South Africa.
49:15which leads me
49:17to ask a question
49:18about the United States
49:19and its relationship
49:20with South Africa.
49:23That I can't answer you.
49:24I mean,
49:24you're saying
49:25that countries
49:25like the United States
49:26or Britain
49:27or France
49:27at this point
49:30are happy
49:30with a close relationship
49:31with South Africa.
49:32I didn't say that.
49:34I didn't say that at all.
49:36I said that
49:36at one time or other
49:37they were setting arms.
49:39At one time or other.
49:40I'm not saying
49:40they're doing it today.
49:42I'm not saying
49:42that we're doing it today.
49:43I'm saying
49:44that at one time
49:45or another
49:46that had been
49:46a situation.
49:48And then
49:49it was cut out.
49:53Though there's still
49:54arms shipments
49:54now going on.
49:57Where from?
49:58From Israel.
49:59I don't know.
50:02Israeli defense officials
50:03insist
50:04that all arms sales
50:05involving U.S. technology
50:06are coordinated
50:08with the U.S.
50:09General Modi Had.
50:10If you want to sell
50:12to Chile,
50:13if you want to sell
50:14to South Africa.
50:16Because it is not,
50:19because it is
50:19a no alternative situation,
50:22we know that
50:22we have to coordinate
50:23it with the U.S.
50:24authorities.
50:25And we know
50:26that if we want
50:27to continue
50:28to enjoy
50:28the $1.8 billion
50:30a year
50:31military aid,
50:34and the outcome
50:35of it is
50:36military products,
50:37and we want
50:37to sell them
50:38outside of Israel,
50:42we have to coordinate
50:43it with the U.S. government.
50:46So you asked...
50:47It's not a question
50:48of liking
50:49or not liking.
50:50It's...
50:51Those are facts.
50:55Are there any limits
50:56on terms of customers
50:57that Israel will
50:58or will not sell arms to?
51:00I don't think so.
51:01It is well known
51:02that Israel sold
51:04weapons
51:05or spare parts
51:06for weapons
51:07to Khomeini.
51:09Khomeini was
51:10a very welcome customer
51:11when he needed
51:11some spare parts
51:12for his Phantom fighters.
51:15No, I don't think
51:16there is any limit
51:17or any restriction
51:18on who the customer
51:20might be.
51:22When war broke out
51:23between Iran
51:24and Iraq
51:25in 1980,
51:26Iran turned
51:27to Israel
51:28for arms,
51:28especially
51:29American-made
51:30spare parts.
51:31Intelligence sources
51:32say the war
51:33was useful
51:34on two fronts.
51:35It divided
51:36the Arab world
51:36while Israel
51:37earned huge profits.
51:39Israel,
51:40in terms of
51:41its own strategic
51:42thinking,
51:43sees Iran
51:44as an ally.
51:46Now,
51:46the U.S.
51:47does not always
51:47agree with this
51:48thinking completely
51:49and Israel
51:50has had to
51:51persuade the U.S.
51:52to do all sorts
51:53of things.
51:54But Israel
51:55has been supplying
51:56Iran with arms
51:57since 1979.
51:59This has never
52:00stopped.
52:01Then there was
52:01a story of U.S.
52:02involvement
52:02and this is
52:04certainly not
52:04a case where
52:05Israel has dragged
52:06anybody into
52:07anything.
52:08This is something
52:08that has developed
52:09out of internal
52:10and external
52:11pressures on
52:12the U.S.
52:12government.
52:13So when Israel
52:14was selling arms
52:15to Iran
52:16all the way
52:16through the
52:17first regular
52:18administration
52:18from 1981
52:20to 1984,
52:22was this
52:22with American
52:23permission,
52:24with assent?
52:24Certainly.
52:25And we have
52:26at least two
52:27Israeli defense
52:27ministers,
52:28Mr. Arends
52:29and Mr. Sharon
52:31on the record
52:32telling the press,
52:35telling the media
52:35that this is done
52:37with the consent
52:38of the U.S.
52:39government
52:39and this cannot
52:40be doubted.
52:42In 1982,
52:43Moshe Arends
52:44said Israel
52:45shipped arms
52:46to Iran
52:46quote,
52:47in coordination
52:48with the U.S.
52:49at almost the
52:50highest of levels
52:51end quote.
52:52That is three
52:53years before
52:53the shipments
52:54admitted by
52:55the Reagan
52:55administration.
52:56We know
52:58from in the
52:59early 80s,
53:00starting in
53:001981,
53:0282,
53:03Israel was
53:03already
53:04shipping arms
53:05to Iran.
53:05At the time,
53:06Moshe Arends
53:07and Arik Sharon
53:08came out
53:09and stated,
53:10yes,
53:10we're doing it
53:11with the
53:11cooperation
53:11of almost
53:12the highest
53:13levels
53:13of the U.S.
53:14government.
53:14The U.S.
53:15government
53:15later said,
53:17no, no,
53:17all that
53:17started much
53:18later.
53:19I mean,
53:19there was a
53:19denial
53:20of the
53:21cooperation.
53:22Would Israel
53:23have shipped
53:24arms to Iran
53:25without the
53:26U.S.
53:27saying,
53:27okay?
53:28I think that
53:29Israel,
53:30as a matter
53:30of policy,
53:31wouldn't do
53:31anything that
53:32will be
53:33against the
53:35laws or the
53:36rules of the
53:37United States.
53:38If we are
53:38partners,
53:39if we are
53:39friends and
53:40allies,
53:40we have to
53:41coordinate and
53:41work together.
53:42And I think
53:43it's in Israel's
53:44interest not to
53:45do anything to
53:45jeopardize the
53:46United States'
53:47interest.
53:48So as a matter
53:49of policy,
53:50I think Israel
53:51wouldn't do
53:52that.
53:53Israel, on
53:54the record,
53:55had been
53:55selling arms
53:56to Iran all
53:57through the
53:58early Reagan
53:58administration.
54:00No comment.
54:01I don't want
54:01to talk about
54:02this subject.
54:03Sorry.
54:06Sales by
54:07Israel to
54:08Iran were
54:09far greater
54:09than those
54:10revealed by
54:10the Iran
54:11Contra
54:11investigation.
54:13Official
54:13records of
54:14these sales
54:14remain classified.
54:16As with
54:16the Contras
54:17and other
54:18operations,
54:19Israel's
54:19covert role
54:20was not
54:21fully explored.
54:23Does Israel
54:23have an
54:24alternative to
54:25this kind
54:25of arrangement
54:26of acting
54:26as an
54:27American
54:27surrogate
54:28around the
54:29world?
54:30Well, at
54:30this point,
54:31the high
54:33level of
54:33American
54:34support for
54:34Israel,
54:35which means
54:36that the
54:37U.S.
54:38essentially
54:38sustains the
54:39Israeli economy
54:40and the
54:40Israeli
54:41defense
54:43establishment,
54:45with this
54:46level of
54:46support,
54:47of course,
54:47Israel cannot
54:48afford to
54:49stop being
54:50a major
54:51U.S.
54:52ally.
54:52So it's
54:53really out
54:53of the
54:53question.
54:57Is this
54:58good for
54:58Israel?
54:59It's good
55:00for Israelis.
55:01I would
55:01say most
55:01Israelis like
55:02things as
55:03they are.
55:03This is my
55:06pledge.
55:07The
55:08American
55:08Israeli
55:09strategic
55:10partnership
55:11is going
55:12to be
55:12even
55:13stronger
55:13tomorrow.
55:14We need
55:17that
55:18partnership.
55:19It is
55:19in our
55:20self-interest
55:21as
55:21Americans.
55:22No
55:23threat,
55:24no stone
55:25thrown
55:26is strong
55:27enough to
55:27divide us.
55:28No wedge
55:29will be
55:30driven
55:31between us.
55:34When in
55:351982,
55:37Israeli
55:37defense
55:37minister
55:38Ahrens
55:39said that
55:39Israeli
55:40shipments
55:40to Iran
55:41were approved
55:42by the
55:43U.S.,
55:43the State
55:44Department
55:44responded,
55:45quote,
55:46any Israeli
55:47decision to
55:48supply was
55:49purely an
55:50Israeli
55:50decision,
55:51end quote.
55:52As for
55:53Central
55:53America,
55:54the State
55:54Department
55:55told Frontline
55:56that it
55:56has no
55:57legal authority
55:58over sales
55:59of Israeli-made
56:00goods without
56:02U.S.
56:02components,
56:03and when
56:04arms sales are
56:05part of covert
56:05activity,
56:06it is their
56:07policy not to
56:08comment.
56:09Finally,
56:10with regard
56:11to South
56:11Africa,
56:12the State
56:12Department
56:13says it
56:13has no
56:14evidence of
56:15Israel transferring
56:16U.S.
56:17defense technology.
56:19Congress passed
56:19a new law in
56:201987 prohibiting
56:22such transfers.
56:24However,
56:24the law allows
56:26existing contracts
56:27to be fulfilled.
56:29I'm Judy
56:30Woodruff.
56:31Good night.
56:34In 1968,
56:36in a Vietnamese
56:36village called
56:37My Lai,
56:38American soldiers
56:39massacred
56:40hundreds of
56:40unarmed
56:41civilians.
56:42I just
56:42started killing
56:43any kind
56:44of way I
56:44could kill.
56:45The legacy
56:45of that day
56:46still haunts
56:47the soldiers
56:47and the people
56:48of My Lai.
56:55I can't
56:55forgive myself.
56:57I live with it
56:57every day.
56:58Remember My Lai,
57:00next time on
57:00Frontline.
57:01Frontline is
57:21produced for the
57:22documentary consortium
57:23by WGBH Boston,
57:26which is solely
57:26responsible for its
57:27content.
57:28funding for Frontline
57:31is provided by
57:32this station
57:33and other
57:33public television
57:34stations nationwide
57:35and by the
57:37Corporation for
57:38Public Broadcasting.
57:42For videocassette
57:43information about
57:44this program,
57:45please write to
57:46this address.
57:46next time.
57:51Bye-bye.
58:12Bye-bye.
58:14Bye-bye.
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