Full version Regulating Judicial Elections: Rules and Norms of Judicial Ethics in State Supreme
- 3 years ago
https://msc.realfiedbook.com/?book=1138653837
State judicial elections are governed by a unique set of rules that enforce longstanding norms of judicial independence by limiting how judicial candidates campaign. These rules have been a key part of recent debates over judicial elections and have been the subject of several U.S. Supreme Court cases. Regulating Judicial Elections provides the first full accounting of the efficacy and consequences of such rules. C. Scott Peters re-frames debates over judicial elections by shifting away from all-or-nothing claims about threats to judicial independence and focusing instead on the trade-offs inherent in our checks and balances system. In doing so, he is able to examine the costs and benefits of state ethical restrictions. Peters findings conclude that while some parts of state codes of conduct achieve their desired goals, others backfire, emboldening interest groups to get involved in elections in ways that increase the politicization of judicial elections. Moreover, modest gains in the protection of independence come at the expense of the effectiveness of elections. These empirical findings will inform ongoing normative debates about judicial elections.
State judicial elections are governed by a unique set of rules that enforce longstanding norms of judicial independence by limiting how judicial candidates campaign. These rules have been a key part of recent debates over judicial elections and have been the subject of several U.S. Supreme Court cases. Regulating Judicial Elections provides the first full accounting of the efficacy and consequences of such rules. C. Scott Peters re-frames debates over judicial elections by shifting away from all-or-nothing claims about threats to judicial independence and focusing instead on the trade-offs inherent in our checks and balances system. In doing so, he is able to examine the costs and benefits of state ethical restrictions. Peters findings conclude that while some parts of state codes of conduct achieve their desired goals, others backfire, emboldening interest groups to get involved in elections in ways that increase the politicization of judicial elections. Moreover, modest gains in the protection of independence come at the expense of the effectiveness of elections. These empirical findings will inform ongoing normative debates about judicial elections.